Managed entry agreements for pharmaceuticals: the European experience by Ferrario, Alessandra & Kanavos, Panos
  
Alessandra Ferrario and  Panos Kanavos  
 
Managed entry agreements for 
pharmaceuticals: the European experience 
 




 Original citation: Ferrario, Alessandra and Kanavos, Panos (2013) Managed entry agreements for 
pharmaceuticals: the European experience. EMiNet, Brussels, Belgium.  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50513/ 
 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2013  
 
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support from the EU Commission – DG 
Enterprise for the preparation of this study, under the auspices of the EMINet project. 
 
© 2013 EMiNet 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 











Managed entry agreements for pharmaceuticals:  
The European experience1  
 
 












                                                      
1The present document is without prejudice to any existing or future EU/ national and international legislation   
 2 
Disclaimer 
This document has been prepared in the framework of a service contract with the European 
Commission (Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry). The views expressed therein 
are purely those of the authors and should not be regarded as stating a position of the 
European Commission or its services. The European Commission does not guarantee the 
accuracy of the data included in this document, nor does it accept responsibility for the use 
made thereof. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support from the EU Commission – DG 
Enterprise for the preparation of this study, under the auspices of the EMINet project. We 
are also thankful to Hans Van der Meersch and Ellen Vanhaeren from the National Institute 
for Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI) in Belgium, Antonis Akontemeniotis from the 
Ministry of Health in Cyprus, Helena Katzerová and Jindrich Kotrba from the State Institute 
of Drug Control (SÚKL) in the Czech Republic, Tina Engraff from the Danish Health and 
Medicines Authority, Lauri Pelkonen from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in 
Finland, Pierre Pribile from the Ministry of Health in France, Paolo Siviero, Annalisa 
Sammarco, Giovanni Tafuri and Luca De Nigro from the Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA), 
Anita Viksna from the National Health Service in Latvia, Kristina Garuoliene from the 
National Health Insurance Fund under the Ministry of Health of the Republic in Lithuania, 
Isabelle Zahra-Pulis from the Ministry of Health in Malta, Huibert Kooijman from the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport in the Netherlands, Marit Måge from the Ministry of 
Health and Care services in Norway, Jakub Adamski from the Ministry of Health in Poland, 
Bruno Costa from the National Authority for Medicines and Health Products in Portugal, 
Jana Ivanova from the Ministry of Health in Slovakia, Jamie Espìn from the Andalusian 
School of Public Health in Spain, Karl Arnberg from the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Agency (TLV) in Sweden, Helena Bowden from the UK Department of Health, Edith Frénoy 
and Richard Bergström from EFPIA, and Henk Eleveld from Menzis, for providing data and 
constructive feedback on the report throughout the research process. Further, we would 
like to thank the six patient representatives from Belgium, Italy, Sweden and the UK who 
generously offered their time to take part in interviews. 
Particular thanks are also due to AIFA, who as chair of the working group of managed entry 
agreements provided invaluable feedback and support during the entire process.  
  
 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................... 3 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. 7 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................................. 8 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. 9 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 11 
1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 15 
2 Conceptual framework and objectives ............................................................................ 17 
3 Methods ........................................................................................................................... 20 
3.1 Systematic literature review ..................................................................................... 20 
3.2 The EU survey ............................................................................................................ 21 
3.3 Stakeholder input ...................................................................................................... 21 
3.4 Taxonomy .................................................................................................................. 22 
4 MEAs in context ............................................................................................................... 24 
4.1 EMA: Adaptive licencing ............................................................................................ 24 
4.2 EUnetHTA .................................................................................................................. 25 
4.3 EU initiatives in the field of registries for rare diseases ............................................ 25 
4.3.1 The Joint Action on Patient Registries (PARENT) ............................................... 25 
4.3.2 The European Union Committee of Experts on Rare Diseases.......................... 25 
4.3.3 The International Rare Disease Research Consortium (IRDiRC) ........................ 26 
4.3.4 European Platform for Rare Disease Registries (EPIRARE) ................................ 26 
4.4 Managed entry of new pharmaceuticals .................................................................. 26 
5 Results of the systematic literature review ..................................................................... 28 
6 Results of the EU survey and stakeholder interviews ..................................................... 35 
6.1 The EU Survey ............................................................................................................ 35 
 4 
6.1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................ 35 
6.1.2 Implementation of MEAs in EU Member States ................................................ 41 
6.1.3 Prevalence of MEAs in EU Member States ........................................................ 41 
6.1.4 Common elements of MEAs .............................................................................. 46 
6.1.5 Disease focus...................................................................................................... 47 
6.1.6 Most common drugs part of a MEA ................................................................... 48 
6.1.7 Features of MEAs in EU Member States ............................................................ 52 
6.1.8 Existence of a legal framework and legislation ................................................. 52 
6.1.9 Average duration ............................................................................................... 56 
6.1.10 Instruments used ............................................................................................... 56 
6.1.11 Stakeholder in charge of MEAs functioning and control ................................... 57 
6.1.12 Financial and administrative burden ................................................................. 57 
6.1.13 Administrative requirements ............................................................................. 58 
6.1.14 Regional differences in MEAs implementation ................................................. 59 
6.2 Stakeholder input: Competent authorities ............................................................... 60 
6.2.1 Belgium .............................................................................................................. 60 
6.2.2 Czech Republic ................................................................................................... 63 
6.2.3 Denmark ............................................................................................................. 66 
6.2.4 France ................................................................................................................. 67 
6.2.5 Germany ............................................................................................................. 71 
6.2.6 Italy..................................................................................................................... 74 
6.2.7 Latvia .................................................................................................................. 78 
6.2.8 Lithuania............................................................................................................. 79 
6.2.9 The Netherlands ................................................................................................. 81 
6.2.10 Portugal .............................................................................................................. 85 
6.2.11 Slovakia .............................................................................................................. 86 
 5 
6.2.12 Spain ................................................................................................................... 87 
6.2.13 Sweden ............................................................................................................... 88 
6.2.14 UK - England and Wales ..................................................................................... 91 
6.2.15 Overview of Member States perspective on MEAs contribution ...................... 96 
6.3 Stakeholder input: Manufacturers ............................................................................ 98 
6.4 Stakeholder input: Patient representatives ............................................................ 102 
6.4.1 Representative of Myeloma UK ....................................................................... 102 
6.4.2 Representative of a Swedish patient representative organisation ................. 105 
6.4.3 Representative of multiple sclerosis (MS) patients in the UK ......................... 106 
6.4.4 Representative from European multiple sclerosis (MS) platform ................... 107 
6.4.5 Representative of melanoma in Belgium ........................................................ 109 
6.4.6 Representative of Cittadinanza Attiva in Italy ................................................. 110 
6.4.7 Summary of patient representative experiences with MEAs .......................... 111 
7 Discussion....................................................................................................................... 112 
7.1 Managing budget impact ........................................................................................ 112 
7.2 Managing uncertainty relating to clinical and/or cost-effectiveness ..................... 112 
7.3 Managing utilisation to optimise performance ...................................................... 113 
7.4 Advantages and disadvantages of MEAs as reported in the literature .................. 114 
7.5 Perceptions .............................................................................................................. 115 
7.6 Limitations ............................................................................................................... 116 
8 SWOT analysis ................................................................................................................ 117 
9 Towards a new taxonomy to capture MEAs across EU Member States ....................... 121 
9.1.1 Available taxonomies ....................................................................................... 121 
9.1.2 Key issues ......................................................................................................... 121 
9.1.3 New taxonomy ................................................................................................. 122 
10 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 128 
 6 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 129 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 5.1: Results of the systematic literature review ........................................................... 28 
Figure 6.1: Percentage of MEAs across active compounds (ATC-5) on the positive list ......... 41 
Figure 6.2: Percentage of MEAs across newly introduced compounds (ATC-5) ..................... 42 
Figure 6.3: Objectives Member States are trying to achieve through MEAs overall and at 
country level ............................................................................................................................ 43 
Figure 6.4: Objectives Member States are trying to achieve in different disease areas ......... 44 
Figure 6.5: Instruments Member States are using to address their objectives in different 
disease areas ............................................................................................................................ 45 
Figure 6.6 Common elements of MEAs overall and at country level ...................................... 46 
Figure 6.7: Disease focus of MEAs by country ......................................................................... 47 
Figure 6.8: Reimbursement procedure in Belgium .................................................................. 61 
Figure 6.9: Reimbursement decisions in Belgium according to the value of a drug ............... 62 
Figure 6.10: The Danish drug reimbursement system ............................................................ 66 
Figure 6.11 The Italian reimbursement landscape and the application of MEAs ................... 76 
Figure 6.12 Italian models of MEAs between pharmaceutical companies and the NHS ........ 77 
Figure 6.13 Coverage with evidence development as part of the expensive hospital drug 
policy in the Netherlands ......................................................................................................... 83 
Figure 6.14 The Netherlands: Conditional reimbursement for expensive hospital drugs from 
2012 onwards .......................................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 6.15: Conditional reimbursement decisions in Sweden ............................................... 91 
Figure 6.16 PAS proposal process (simplified) ......................................................................... 93 
Figure 6.17: EFPIA’s perspective on the situations where MEAs may be applied .................. 99 
Figure 9.1: MEA analysis by means of objectives countries are trying to achieve ................ 123 
Figure 9.2: MEA analysis by monitoring means ..................................................................... 124 
Figure 9.3: MEA analysis by type of instrument .................................................................... 125 
 8 
Figure 9.4: MEA analysis by impact ....................................................................................... 126 
Figure 9.5: Proposed taxonomy for MEAs ............................................................................. 127 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 5.1: Comparison between findings of the survey and the literature ............................ 31 
Table 6.1: Models of managed entry agreement in EU Member States (based on survey 1 
and 2) ....................................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 6.2: Most frequent drugs part of MEAs in the study countries ..................................... 48 
Table 6.3: Member States where a legal framework for MEAs is in place .............................. 53 
Table 6.4: Member states where a legislation for MEAs is in place ........................................ 54 
Table 6.5: Member States perspectives on the most important aspects of MEAs as they are 
currently implemented in each country .................................................................................. 97 
  
 9 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ADHD Attention Deficit & Hyperactivity Disorder 
AHTAPol Agency for Health Technology Assessment in Poland (Agencja Oceny Technologii 
Medycznych (AOTM)) 
AIFA Italian Medicines Agency (Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco) 
ASMR Amélioration du Service Médical Rendu (Improvement of Medical Benefit 
assessment) 
ATC Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical  
CED Coverage with Evidence Development 
CEPS Comité Economique des Produits de Santé (France) 
CVZ Health Insurance Board (College voor zorgverzekeringen) 
CC 
EMA 
County Council (Sweden) 
European Medicines Agency 
EMINet European Medicines Information Network 
EU European Union 
EUnetHTA European network for Health Technology Assessment 
DH Department of Health (UK) 
HTA Health Technology Assessment 
INFARMED National Authority of Medicines and Health Product (Autoridade Nacional do 
Medicamento e Produtos de Saúde), (Portugal) 
INN International Non-proprietary Name 
MEAs Managed Entry Agreements 
MS Member States 
NICE National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (England) 
NIHDI National Institute of Health and Disability Insurance (Belgium) 
NHF National Health Fund (Poland) 
NHS National Health Service 
OIR Only in Research 
PAS Patient Access Scheme 
PASLU Patient Access Scheme Liaison Unit (UK) 
PBA Performance-Based Agreement 
PVAs Price-Volume Agreements 
PPRS Pharmaceutical pricing regulation scheme 
RSA Risk-Sharing Agreement 
SUKL State Institute for Drug Control (Státní ústav pro kontrolu léčiv), (Czech Republic) 
TLV Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (Tandvårds- och 
 10 
läkemedelsförmånsverket) 
VBP Value-based pricing 





Stretched health care budgets, increasing availability of potentially life-saving high-cost 
drugs and increasing patient expectations, mean that manufacturers seeking inclusion in 
reimbursement lists need to demonstrate that their drugs can provide additional benefit in 
relation to current therapies and value-for-money in order to obtain coverage. Data and the 
overall evidence base available at registration are often insufficient to accurately estimate 
the clinical and cost-effectiveness of a drug in clinical practice or its budget impact in real 
life. Uncertainty, due to lack of information on effectiveness, may delay reimbursement 
decisions and patient access. Delays together with the threat of non-inclusion in positive 
lists may dis-incentivise industry from investing in high-risk areas with low market potential 
such as orphan drugs.  
Against this background, formal arrangements between payers and manufacturers with the 
aim of sharing the financial risk due to uncertainty surrounding the introduction of new 
technologies have been developed and introduced in order to enable access to new 
medicines. These agreements can take different forms, including price-volume agreements 
(PVAs), outcome guarantee, coverage with evidence development (CED), and disease 
management programmes. A variety of names have been used to describe these schemes 
(e.g. risk-sharing agreements (RSAs), performance-based agreements (PBAs), patient access 
schemes (PAS), etc.), which have been recently summarised with the concept of “managed 
entry agreements (MEAs)”. 
Objectives 
The aim of this study is threefold. First, to collect quantitative information on MEAs such as 
the number of agreements by therapeutic area and the types of agreement implemented. 
Based on this information draw some conclusions on the kind of uncertainty (related to 
budget impact, clinical and cost-effectiveness or both) payers are trying to address. Second, 
to develop a taxonomy for MEAs which will be used to classify the identified agreements. 
Third, to assess MEAs’ ability to address uncertainty, maximise effective use of technology, 




Data on MEAs implemented in the EU were collected between October 2011 and January 
2012 using an online survey developed by EMINet. 
Further insights and materials were obtained during the meetings and interviews with drug 
reimbursement authorities, industry and patients representatives.   
Results 
Three-quarters (75%) of all the agreements in the study countries aimed to address budget 
impact, either alone (42%) or in combination with cost effectiveness (16%), use (15%) or 
both (2%). At country level, two main trends seem to emerge. In some countries, Italy, 
Portugal, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Belgium there was a strong focus on budget 
impact. While in others, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK, cost effectiveness seems to 
be the driving force when deciding to engage in a MEA.  
The most common features of MEA across countries were PVAs (40%), followed by 
requirement for data collection (29.4%), and limited access to eligible patients (12.6%). PVAs 
are widely used in Italy, Portugal, and Lithuania; data collection is a common requirement in 
Italy, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Sweden. Further, Italy, the Czech Republic 
and Belgium, limit access of certain medicines to eligible patients in an attempt to manage 
budget impact and use.  
In terms of therapeutic groups, antineoplastic and immune-modulating agents represented 
37.3% of all the MEAs implemented in the study countries, followed by alimentary tract and 
metabolism 16.5% and nervous system 9.8%. All member states apart from Sweden (only 
one MEA for ATC-L vs. 3 MEA for both ATC-B and ATC-N) the greatest proportion of 
agreement involved ATC-L drugs.  
Discussion 
Managing budget impact is one the main objectives of MEAs in Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, and the UK. This is reflected in the design of MEAs in these 
countries which includes features of PVAs, budget caps, and a compensation mechanism in 
Belgium, limited access through specialised healthcare centres in the Czech Republic, PVAs, 
discounts and conditional treatment continuation in Italy, PVAs, payback, and expenditure 
cap in Lithuania, PVAs in Portugal PVAs, and discounts, dose capping, initial free doses in the 
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UK. Sweden takes a more indirect approach by requesting the manufacturer to submit 
utilisation data to TLV which will be used at the end of the conditional reimbursement 
period to update the reimbursement decision. 
There are two main ways to address uncertainty relating to clinical and/or cost-
effectiveness. The first is to grant reimbursement for a limited time period during which 
additional evidence on the drug effectiveness will be collected and to update the 
reimbursement decision afterwards based on the new cost-effectiveness results. This model 
is used in the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal. The second way is to decrease the price or 
to limit utilisation so that the cost-effective ratio is improved because of lower costs. 
Discounts are very common in the UK as part of patient access schemes while Italy uses a 
combination of discounts, payment-by-result and conditional treatment continuation to 
improve cost-effectiveness. However, this option does not address the underlying issue of 
uncertainty in cost-effectiveness unless linked with data collection which is intended for 
updating coverage decision.   
The main strategy used to optimise utilisation is to limit prescribing and reimbursement to 
specific therapeutic indication and to those patients sub-groups who are most likely to 
benefit. The instruments used include limiting prescribing to specialised healthcare centres, 
use of biomarkers, and physician certification that the patient meets the eligibility 
requirements together with monitoring. The Czech Republic for example limits access to 
specific patient subgroups and to specialised healthcare centres. In Italy, patients eligibility 
is monitored through the registries and physician are request to certify that a patient meets 
the prescribing requirements in order for him to obtain the drug at the pharmacy.   
Conclusions 
European countries are using a variety of instruments to tackle uncertainty arising from lack 
of information about budget impact, cost-effectiveness, use in real life, and access. Despite 
the non-negligible number of agreements implemented, little information is available on the 
impact of these schemes and whether they are meeting their objectives. Moreover, the 
little amount of information available in the public domain is hampering cross-country 
learning and the ability of patients to engage in the process.  
Previously proposed taxonomies do not well suit the reality at country level, where complex 
agreements with financial and health outcomes features are implemented. While there is 
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scope for improvement, the taxonomy employed in this study aims to address this issue by 
using a more versatile classification system which on one level focuses on the objectives 
countries are trying to achieve through MEAs and on a second level highlights and 
summarises the features of the implemented agreements. Further there is the need to 





Stretched health care budgets, increasing availability of potentially life-saving high-cost 
drugs and increasing patient expectations, mean that manufacturers seeking inclusion in 
reimbursement lists need to demonstrate that their drugs can provide additional benefit 
and value-for-money in order to obtain coverage. Achieving value for money in health care 
is high in the health reform literature and agenda; particularly in the area of introducing 
new technologies and therapies (Scottish Medicines Consortium 2011; OECD 2010; UK 
Department of Health and ABPI 2008; Network 2007). Countries increasingly try to achieve 
this by using health technology assessment (HTA) as a tool to evaluate the clinical and cost-
effectiveness of new drugs. However, data and the overall evidence base available at 
registration are often insufficient to accurately estimate the clinical and cost-effectiveness 
of a drug in clinical practice or its budget impact in real life. Uncertainty, due to lack of 
information on effectiveness, may delay reimbursement decisions and patient access. 
Delays together with the threat of non-inclusion in positive lists may dis-incentivise industry 
from investing in high-risk areas with low market potential such as orphan drugs.  
Against this background, formal arrangements between payers and manufacturers with the 
aim of sharing the financial risk due to uncertainty surrounding the introduction of new 
technologies have been developed and introduced in order to enable access to new 
medicines. These agreements can take different forms, including price-volume agreements 
(PVAs), outcome guarantee, coverage with evidence development (CED), and disease 
management programmes. A variety of names have been used to describe these schemes 
(e.g. risk-sharing agreements (RSAs), performance-based agreements (PBAs), patient access 
schemes (PAS), etc.), which have been recently summarised with the concept of “managed 
entry agreements (MEAs)” (Klemp, Frønsdal, Facey, and HTAi Policy Forum 2011). 
The literature on MEAs is mainly discursive given the lack of publicly available data to 
evaluate them. One suggestion emerging from the literature is that MEAs have the potential 
to deliver benefits such as faster access to new medicines (Russo et al. 2010), coverage, and 
an instrument to deal with uncertainty. However, for this to occur, several challenges need 
to be overcome. Among them are the current general lack of transparency and evidence 
surrounding these schemes (Adamski et al. 2010), the potential threat of resistance on the 
provider side described as provider push-back (Carlson, Garrison, and Sullivan 2009; Carlson 
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et al. 2010), the need for good information systems (Carlson, Garrison, and Sullivan 2009; 
Carlson et al. 2010) together with the ability to monitor outcome and resource use (McCabe 
et al. 2009), the responsibility for funding additional data collection (Trueman, Grainger, and 
Downs 2010) and for conducting the analysis (taking into account potential conflicts of 
interest), and, very importantly, the development of clear and objective decision-making 
criteria to guide data collection, evaluation and the final reimbursement decision (de 
Pouvourville 2006; Stafinski, McCabe, and Menon 2010; Breckenridge and Walley 2008; 
Carlson et al. 2010; de Pouvourville 2006).   
MEAs have also received increasing attention at EU level in recent years. In this context, one 
of the three independent platforms within the EU process on corporate responsibility in the 
field of pharmaceuticals looks at access to medicines in Europe.  The aim of this platform is 
to foster collaboration between Member States and relevant stakeholders in order to find 
common, non-regulatory approaches to timely and equitable access to medicines after their 
marketing authorisation. This is achieved through the implementation of several projects 
chaired by the EC and implemented by Member States.  One of these projects (“Capacity 
building on managed entry agreements for innovative medicines”) examines specifically 
MEAs and aims to investigate agreements currently implemented in EU Member States in 
order to draw lessons based on their experience.  
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2 Conceptual framework and objectives 
Several authors have contributed to the development of frameworks for classification, 
design and evaluation of MEAs. A widely used taxonomy for MEAs divides them in two main 
types: non-health outcome and health-outcome-based agreements (Carlson et al. 2010). 
These two groups are then further divided into sub-groups based on their individual 
characteristics. Non-health outcome agreements, for example, are divided according to the 
level of application, population vs. patient level. These two groups are further divided 
according to the financial outcome of the agreement, market share or price-volume 
agreement for population level agreement and utilisation caps or manufacturer funded 
treatment initiation for patient level agreements. The main distinction among health-
outcome agreements is based on the nature of reimbursement, notably conditional or 
performance-based. Conditional coverage can be implemented either as coverage with 
evidence development (e.g. in research only or with research only) or as conditional 
treatment continuation. The main aim of the first is to generate additional evidence to 
address uncertainty highlighted during the drug review process while the main aim of the 
second is to treat only patients who benefit of the drug. Performance-linked reimbursement 
can be implemented either as an outcome guarantee or pattern or process of care. 
Outcome guarantee protects payers from potentially wasting resources on poorly 
performing drugs by making manufacturers liable for their products’ performance. Patterns 
or process of care agreement could be described as types of disease management 
programmes since they investigate elements such as patient adherence to treatment. An 
alternative taxonomy has been proposed recently (Klemp, Frønsdal, Facey, and HTAi Policy 
Forum 2011), providing a simpler classification than the previous one and allows more 
flexibility when applied to individual schemes. A further taxonomy distinguishes between 
commercial agreements (discount agreements), payment for performance and coverage 
with evidence development (Jaroslawski and Toumi 2011). Despite the apparent diversity in 
these taxonomies, they are all based on the same basic structure, notably the separation of 
non-health outcome (financial) from health-outcome agreements.  
Other frameworks focus on features and critical elements of MEAs with the aim of 
contributing to a better understanding and evaluation of existing systems and improving the 
design of future ones. Features and critical elements have been analysed (Carbonneil, 
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Quentin, and Lee-Robin 2009; Towse and Garrison 2010) and evaluation frameworks have 
been proposed (McCabe, Stafinski, et al. 2010; Menon et al. 2010). A checklist to guide the 
design and evaluation of MEAs (health-outcome based MEAs) has been recently proposed 
(Menon et al. 2010). The checklist analyses three main areas, notably, system level 
characteristics, scheme organisational characteristics, and study design characteristics. An 
earlier framework looked at elements such as governance procedures, manufacturer’s level 
of engagement, scope, level of operation, evaluation criteria, changes in reimbursement as 
a result of the agreement, evaluation criteria and scheme financing (McCabe, Stafinski, et al. 
2010).   
Theoretical approaches to the study of MEAs are also growing. In 2005, a study analysed 
budget impact from a supplier’s perspective (Zaric and O'Brien 2005), while in 2009 delisting 
was compared after a trial period vs. rebates based on net monetary benefit (NMB) to 
investigate the conditions under which either arrangement is preferable from the 
perspective of the payer and the manufacturer (Zaric and Xie 2009). Using a theoretical 
approach, another study analysed situations in which payers will prefer a managed entry 
agreement over non-managed entry agreement and concluded that payers’ decisions will 
depend on monitoring costs, marginal production costs, and the utility patients will derive 
from treatment. In this context, a payer will prefer a MEA when the cost of treating a 
patient who should not be treated is high and the monitoring costs relatively low; on the 
other hand, if the treatment costs are low, a payer will prefer a non-MEA (Antonanzas, 
Juarez-Castello, and Rodriguez-Ibeas 2011). A recent study looked at the economics of MEAs 
to determine if these arrangements are beneficial to payers from an economic welfare 
perspective with reference to the UK (Barros 2011). The study concluded that the overall 
welfare effects of these schemes are ambiguous because more patients than necessary may 
be treated and because manufacturers, anticipating such agreements, are likely to raise 
prices and therefore caution against their use was urged (Barros 2011).  
Whether MEAs can meet payer, industry, and patient expectations is still unclear, mainly 
because of the scant evidence available on their outcomes and their performance often 
available on a case-by-case basis. Performance evaluation is further constrained by limited 
availability of information on the existing schemes and the details of such arrangements 
(timeframe, patient eligibility, indicators used to monitor outcomes).  
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In the light of that, the aim of this study is threefold. First, to collect quantitative 
information on MEAs such as the number of agreements by therapeutic area and the types 
of agreement implemented. Based on this information draw some conclusions on the kind 
of uncertainty (related to budget impact, clinical and cost-effectiveness or both) payers are 
trying to address. Second, to develop a taxonomy for MEAs which will be used to classify the 
identified agreements. Third, to assess MEAs’ ability to address uncertainty, maximise 
effective use of technology, limit budget impact.  
The analysis focuses on two levels, country level and supra-national level with the aim of 
highlighting emerging trends. Section 3 outlines the methodology for the EU survey and 
stakeholder’s interviews, section 4 presents the quantitative results from the EU survey, 
while section 5 presents qualitative evidence from interviews with stakeholder. Section 6, 
discusses the findings of the study. Finally, section 7 provides an analysis of strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) while section 8 draws the main conclusions.  
This survey is the third in a series of studies conducted by European Medicines Information 
Network (EMINet) in collaboration with the European Union (EU) and Member States. The 
first study was a literature review on the subject and aimed to provide an overview of the 
status of MEAs implementation in Europe. The second study investigated availability of 
MEAs for oncological drugs. This study aims to add this previous work by providing the latest 
available information on MEAs in EU Member States and to develop a taxonomy which 




The report contains a variety of information arrived at through primary and secondary data 
collection.  Secondary data relates to a systematic review of the literature, whereas primary 
data collection was conducted through an EU-wide survey of Member States (The EU 
Survey) and a wider stakeholder analysis through semi-structured interviews. The methods 
employed are discussed below in further detail. 
3.1 Systematic literature review  
A systematic literature review was conducted to collect information on MEAs in EU Member 
States. After having reviewed and tested an extensive list of relevant key words used in the 
literature to define MEAs (39 different combination of words plus variants), we retained the 
following key words: “access with evidence”, “conditional coverage” , “conditional 
reimbursement”, “cost sharing scheme” , “cost sharing schemes” , “coverage with evidence” 
, “evidence development” , “money back” ,” outcomes based contracting” , “outcome/s 
guarantee” , “patient access scheme/s”, “payment by results” , “pharmaceutical risk 
sharing” , “price volume agreement/s”, “risk sharing agreement/s”, “risk sharing deals” , 
“risk sharing scheme/s”.  
For the peer-reviewed literature, the following databases were searched: PubMed, Web of 
Science, and Scopus. Google and Google Scholar were used to retrieve information from the 
grey literature. For Google and Google Scholar, the first three and four pages respectively 
were screened beyond which the items retrieved became redundant and increasingly 
irrelevant. Official websites of national health authorities such as Ministries of Health and 
HTA agencies were also searched. Country reports of the pharmaceutical price information 
network were also searched. Only schemes relating to pharmaceuticals were included while 
medical devices and diagnostic tools were excluded. The search did not apply any language 
or time limit and all study, newspaper article, report, or document containing information 
about existing MEA in the study countries was included. The search was first conducted in 
April 2011 and was updated in October 2011.  
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3.2 The EU survey 
Primary data on MEAs implemented in EU Member States and Norway were collected 
between October 2011 and January 2012 by using an online survey developed by EMINet 
and discussed with the European Commission and AIFA, who chairs the MEA working group. 
The survey comprised two parts; the first part was designed to collect information on the 
different types of MEAs available (e.g. definition, availability of a legal framework and 
legislation, and administrative requirements, among others) (see Appendix 1). The second 
part aimed to identify the characteristics of individual agreements (e.g. drug involved, 
duration and objective of the agreement, implementation requirements, etc.) (see Appendix 
2), to the extent possible.  
In October 2011, invitation emails were sent to all the MEAs focal points of the nineteen2 
countries participating in the activities of the EU platform on access to medicines (MEA 
working group)3 to invite them to participate to the online survey. Responses were received 
between October 2011 and January 2012.  
The following countries submitted information on MEAs:  Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark 
(MEAs are not implemented), Finland (MEAs are not implemented), France (only survey 1), 
Italy, Lithuania, Malta (survey 2 incomplete), the Netherlands, Norway (two MEAs have 
been implemented but have now come to an end), Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom (Appendix 3). 
Country responses were downloaded and entered into a common database. The analysis 
that ensued was performed using Excel and Stata.  
3.3 Stakeholder input 
In addition to the officially requested input from Member States plus Norway on their use of 
MEAs, further input was requested from stakeholders, as follows: 
                                                      
2 Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom  
3 The EU platform on access to medicines is one of the three working areas of the Process on Corporate 
Responsibility in the field of Pharmaceuticals. 
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Interviews with reimbursement authorities  
To supplement the official data received from national respondents, further insights on the 
implementation of MEAs were obtained (a) during the meeting of the working group on 
MEAs in Rome on November 14th, 2011, (b) telephone interviews and email correspondence 
between December 2011 and April 2012, and (c) a meeting in Paris on the 14th of May, 
2012. Semi-structured interviews focused on a series of questions as shown in Appendix 4. 
Interviewees from whom further insights were obtained, included official representatives of 
Ministries of Health (France, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK), regulatory and 
HTA/Medicines agencies (Italy, Denmark, Germany, Portugal, Sweden), an expert from 
academia (Spain), and representatives from a large sickness fund in Germany. Based on this 
information, a number of case studies have been added as a separate section to this study 
building on discussions and interviews with officials and insights obtained from these.   
Interviews with manufacturers 
Input from EFPIA has been requested. This was discussed both with EFPIA and individually 
through a number of EFPIA member companies and the industry input was provided by 
EFPIA. The industry questionnaire is available in Appendix 5.   
Interviews with patient representative groups 
Semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted with patient representative 
organisations in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and the UK in April and May 2012. The patient 
questionnaire is available in the Appendix 6.   
3.4 Taxonomy 
In terms of typology, countries have designed a variety of different MEAs in an attempt to 
achieve three main objectives namely (a) managing budget impact, (b) achieving cost-
effective purchasing and (c) monitoring (rational) use. Because creating different groups 
based on the type of agreement (e.g. PVAs, cost capping, discount, etc.) would have led to 
the creation of too many group types and to classification issues for agreements whose 
design entails features of more than one type of agreement, it was decided to base the 
taxonomy on the objectives countries are trying to achieve through MEAs as proposed in 
the literature (Klemp, Frønsdal, Facey, and HTAi Policy Forum 2011).  
 23 
To illustrate the range of different instruments countries are using to achieve these three 
objectives (budget impact, cost-effective use and monitoring use), the core features of the 
implemented agreements have been summarised in seven different groups, notably, (a) 
PVAs, (b) discount, (c) price capping, (d) paying-for-performance, (e) price-match, (f) data 
collection, and (g) conditional treatment continuation. In this way, it was possible to assign 
more than one feature to each agreement and therefore addressing the classification issue, 
which would have arisen if these groups were used for taxonomy rather than 
characterisation purposes. 
A number of terms are used in the literature to identify MEAs and the same agreement can 
be associated with different names depending on the sources of reference. Therefore, it was 
felt that some harmonisation of the terminology employed was needed. The taxonomy 
employed to re-classify the schemes into systematic categories broadly follows the 
taxonomy proposed in 2010 (Carlson et al. 2010) by distinguishing between non-health and 
health outcome based schemes but uses a different sub-category classification system 
because it is more appropriately suited to classify the schemes identified.  
Within the first group (non-health outcome-based schemes) there are schemes which aim 
to contain the cost without taking into consideration health outcomes, notably: discount, 
price-capping, dose-capping schemes and price-volume agreements (PVAs).  
In the second group (health outcome-based schemes), health outcomes are part of the 
agreement and any discount or reimbursement depends on them. This group comprises 
outcome-guarantee schemes (e.g. rebates or reimbursement if the medicine fails to achieve 
the expected results), CED4 (may not be linked to any discount or reimbursement and its 
primary objective is to collect additional clinical data to address knowledge gaps affecting 
the cost-effectiveness of the product) and disease management programmes which are 
based on a more holistic approach to a particular disease and its management.  
 
                                                      
4 CED in the UK include “only in research” recommendations (OIR), though it should be noted that these arrangements do 
not meet the definition of a Patient Access Scheme).   
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4 MEAs in context  
Although MEA are implemented at country level and in some cases even at subnational level 
(e.g. at sickness fund level in Germany), it is essential to see them in their supra-national/EU 
dimension. The context in this dimension is provided by the EU Transparency Directive5 and 
its current revision, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) proposal to introduce adaptive 
licensing, EU initiatives to harmonise registries at EU level, and discussions in the literature 
around the need to introduce a model of managed introduction of new medicines which 
spans from horizon scan activities to post-marketing studies and surveillance. 
4.1 EMA: Adaptive licencing 
Adaptive licensing has recently been proposed by the EMA as an instrument to balance early 
access to new medicines to patients with the need of collecting information on the drug 
benefits and harms. To achieve that, a “staggered approval” is suggested6, based on an 
iterative process of evidence collection followed by regulatory evaluation and license 
adaptation (EMA 2010; Eichler et al. 2008). The idea would be to initially focus on a 
population of good responders, followed by adaptation of the licensing conditions as more 
evidence becomes available (Eichler et al. 2008; EMA 2010). Similar adaptive approaches to 
drug licensing have been suggested in other countries such as Canada, the US, Singapore 
(Eichler et al. 2012).  
The rationale behind adaptive licensing is the same which led to the development of 
coverage with evidence development MEAs: enabling patients early to access new drugs 
while collecting real-life data in order to update the final decision. What is different is the 
type of decision, for MEAs it is the final reimbursement decision and the related restrictions 
or recommendations on how a medicines should be used within a health service (UK7), for 
licensing it is about whether the drug should be make accessible at all to patients or sub-
                                                      
5 For which the Commission has published its proposals and these are currently under discussion. 
6 This “staggered approach” is suggested for situations not covered by conditional marketing authorisations or 
marketing authorisations under exceptional circumstances. 
7 In the UK, PAS are not part of pricing & reimbursement decisions. PAS are separate from P&R decisions, PAS 
are offered in the context of NICE appraisals, which produce guidance for the NHS but do not constitute 
reimbursement decisions.  
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groups of patients in the first place. Another difference is the scope, since licensing is partly 
centralised at EU level, adaptive licensing has the potential to impact all MS in the same 
way, while the outcome of MEAs, which concerns coverage decisions or recommendations 
on the use of a medicine, affects each MS in a different way, especially because not all 
countries are implementing MEA and the drugs concerned vary across MS.   
4.2 EUnetHTA 
New Technologies is one of the eight work packages (WP) of EUnetHTA Joint Action 2010-
12. The aim of this WP is to promote collaboration on new technologies and contribute to 
reduce duplicative work by fostering exchange of information on and developing tools to 
facilitate evidence generation (Strand A) and to exchange information on current 
assessments of new technologies (Strand B). This WP is co-led by the La Haute Autorité de 
santé in France and the Ludwig Boltzmann Institut in Germany. 
4.3 EU initiatives in the field of registries for rare diseases 
There are four complementary EU initiatives to improve patient registries for rare diseases: 
the EPIRARE project, the PARENT joint action, the EUCERD joint action and the International 
Rare Disease Research Consortium (IRDiRC). The overall aim of these initiatives is to 
establish common data sets, quality criteria, and a political framework (EUCERD 2011). 
4.3.1 The Joint Action on Patient Registries (PARENT)  
Starting in September 2012, this initiative will include partners from health ministries and 
HTA agencies with the aim of rationalising and harmonising the development and 
governance of patient registries, and enabling the analysis of secondary data for public 
health and research purposes. This will be achieved by supporting MS in developing 
comparable and coherent patient registries in fields where this need has been identified 
(e.g. chronic diseases, rare diseases, medical technology), and supporting MS in the 
provision of objective, reliable, timely, transparent, comparable and transferable 
information on the relative efficacy and effectiveness of health technologies.  
4.3.2 The European Union Committee of Experts on Rare Diseases 
Since January 2012, EUCERD’s work to promote exchange of experiences, practices, and 
policies in the area of rare diseases is supported by a Joint Action. Building on previous work 
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of the EC Rare disease task force, one of EUCERD’s tasks will be to investigate issues around 
registries such as post-marketing data collection, multi-purpose registries, and sustainability 
of registries. 
4.3.3 The International Rare Disease Research Consortium (IRDiRC) 
The IRDiRC was launched in 2011 to promote international collaboration in the area of rare 
diseases research (IRDiRC). Specific challenges which will be dealt with by the consortium 
are lack of an exhaustive rare disease classification system including standard terms of 
reference and common ontologies, as well as harmonised regulatory requirements (IRDiRC). 
Tacking these issues will greatly enhance potential for international data sharing and 
research in the area of rare diseases which is currently hampered by limited access to 
harmonised data/samples, molecular and clinical characterisation, translational/preclinical 
research, clinical research and cross-cutting aspects (EUCERD 2011). Working together with 
researchers and organisations working in the field, the IRDiRC goal for 2020 is to deliver 200 
new therapies and diagnostic tests for all rare diseases (IRDiRC).    
4.3.4 European Platform for Rare Disease Registries (EPIRARE) 
EPIRARE started as a three-year project in 2011. It aims to build on the adoption of the EU 
Council Recommendation on rare diseases (2009/872/CE), which recommends support of 
registries and databases for epidemiological purpose. The specific aims are first, to define 
the needs of the EU registries and databases on rare disease; second, to identify key issues 
from a legal perspective; third to agree on a common data set and data validation; and 
fourth, to agree on the platform scope, governance and long-term sustainability (EpiRare). 
The platform comprises 23 partners (academia, international organisations, national health 
agencies, health care providers, etc.) from 14 countries. 
4.4 Managed entry of new pharmaceuticals 
The concept of managed entry of new medicines goes from horizon scanning for new 
compounds which are likely to enter the market within the next 1 to 3 years, to forecasting 
use and expenditure of the new medicine, to HTA assessment, to pricing and 
reimbursement, to the development of MEAs and continues with post marketing studies 
and surveillance (Joppi et al. 2009). However, evidence from a recent literature review on 
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the subject showed that despite several European countries are implementing parts of this 
model, no European country is currently implementing the full-model (Wettermark et al. 
2010).  
Following a drug from its pre-market days through HTA assessment and up to post-
marketing studies allows more time to collect evidence which will feed into HTA, it enables 
to assess early the likely budget impact of the new drug and to verify forecasts with post-
marketing data. Finally, information from post-launch studies can be used to update 
national recommendation on the use of the drug. If linked with adaptive licensing this can 
become a powerful instrument to manage the introduction of new medicines so as to 
minimise the impact on the healthcare system.   
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5 Results of the systematic literature review 
We retrieved 43 items, 34 from the peer-reviewed literature and 9 from the grey literature 
(including websites of country medicines and HTA agencies). As shown in Figure 5.1, of 
these 43 items, 27 contained quantitative (number and type of MEAs) information only, 19 
provided quantitative and qualitative information and 1 study presented qualitative 
(impact) only.  
Figure 5.1: Results of the systematic literature review 
 




Table 5.1 highlights a few differences between findings from the survey and those from the 
systematic literature review. For some countries who reported implementing MEAs in the 
survey, there was no information in the literature (e.g. Czech Republic, Malta); other 
countries implemented MEAs according to the literature but did not participate in the 
survey (Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Spain). In these countries, the number of agreements 
reported to exist in the literature may be incomplete or include agreements, which have 
now come to an end.  
For some of the member states who participated in the survey, no direct comparison 
between the numbers of MEAs reported by the literature and survey was possible because 
the former only mentioned the use of MEAs but not the number of agreements 
implemented (Belgium). 
For countries where a comparison of the number of MEA reported by primary and 
secondary evidence was possible, some discrepancies were evident. Denmark did not 
consider the two payback schemes implemented in by Roche and Novartis for valsartan and 
vardenafil respectively as MEA. The reason is that these were campaigns targeted to patient 
and there was no agreement with the NHS (Engraff 2011). In fact vardenafil is not even 
covered by the NHS. 
In the UK, the 2009 Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) includes the option for 
pharmaceutical companies to propose Patient Access Schemes (PAS), which are national 
level arrangements to improve the cost-effectiveness of a medicine being considered as part 
of a NICE technology appraisal. A scheme is only classified as a PAS if it forms part of NICE 
appraisal guidance. Pharmaceutical companies may, in addition, offer schemes or discounts 
to the local NHS outside NICE appraisals as long as these do not contravene any aspect of 
the PPRS, but decisions on whether to participate in such schemes are a matter for the local 
NHS and such arrangements are not classified as PAS. The Department of Health does not 
hold information on these local arrangements and information on them was not included in 
the list of PAS submitted as part of the survey. Similarly, information was not provided on 
NICE guidance including “only-in-research” recommendations as these do not meet the 
definition of a Patient Access Scheme, though some commentators have suggested that 
they can be seen as CED agreements.    
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In Italy, information from the literature and the AIFA website included PVAs (although the 
exact number was not available) and the monitoring registries (full list available on the AIFA 
website) but did not mention therapeutic plans or the AIFA restricting notes for prescribing. 
The number of MEAs from the literature was therefore significantly lower than the number 




Table 5.1: Comparison between findings of the survey and the literature 
Country 
No. MEAs identified in 
the literature 
No. MEAs reported in 
the EMINet EU survey 
Literature references 
Belgium Total no. of MEAs: NA 
A payback system was 
in place between 2002-
2006 which was 
replaced by a provision 
fund was developed in 
2006 
8 (de Swaef and 
Antonissen 2007) 
Cyprus 0 5  
Czech Republic 0 21  
Denmark Total no. of MEAs: 2 
Both outcome 
guarantee 
0 (Moldrup 2004) 
England and Wales Total no. of MEAs: 43  
15 PAS featured in 
NICE guidance.  
13 sets of local 
arrangements 
including 4 based on 
PAS proposals which 
were not included in 
NICE guidance (so did 
not  become 
operational PAS) but 
are implemented in 
some primary care 
trusts (PCTs).  
11 sets of NICE 
guidance including 
“only in research” 
recommendations. 
Another 2 were not 
part of any of these 
groups. 
15 PAS, featured in 18 
sets of NICE 
technology appraisal 
guidance (some PAS 
apply to a drug’s use in 
more than one 
indication). 
Information accurate 
at time of submission 
(Dec 2011). 
(Anon 2007; Boggild et 
al. 2009; Breckenridge 
and Walley 2008; 
Briggs et al. 2010; 
Carroll and Wasiak 
2009; Carlson et al. 
2010; Chapman et al. 
2003; Chapman and 
Reeve 2002; Chapman 
et al. 2004; Dobson 
2008; Duerden et al. 
2004; Fogarty et al. 
2010; Garber and 
McClellan 2007; IMS 
2007; Jarosławski and 
Toumi 2011; Lexchin 
2011; Lilford 2010; 
McCabe, Chilcott, et al. 
2010; Muston, Perard, 
and Nixon 2008; 
Wlodarczyk et al. 2006; 
NHS Devon 2011; 
Raftery 2010; Richards 
2010; Scolding 2010; 
Stafinski, McCabe, and 
Menon 2010; Sudlow 
and Counsell 2003; 
Bellelli, Lucchi, and 
Minicuci 2005; Towse 
2010; Towse and 
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Country 
No. MEAs identified in 
the literature 
No. MEAs reported in 




and Downs 2010; 
Pickin et al. 2009) 
Country official 
website: 
(National Institute for 
Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) 2011; 
Anon 2007)  
Estonia Total no. of MEAs: NA 
PVAs are in place 
NA (Pudersell et al. 2007) 
France Total no. of MEAs: 7 
PVA (1), Payback (2), 
CED (4) 
Number of MEAs: NA 
(only submitted survey 
1) 
PVA, daily treatment 




and Lee-Robin 2009; 
Stafinski, McCabe, and 
Menon 2010; Whalen 
2007) 
Germany Total no. of MEAs: 15 
PVA (3), Utilisation cap 
(1), Cost capping (1), 
Discount (1), Outcome-
guarantee (4), Disease 
management (5) 
NA Literature: 
(Adamski et al. 2010; 
Anonym 2008; Carlson 
et al. 2010; Hogan & 
Hartson 2008; IMS 
2007; Pugatch, Healy, 
and Chu 2010; Rutten, 
Uyl-de Groot, and 
Vulto 2009; Senior 
2009) 
Hungary Total no. of MEAs: NA 
A payback scheme is in 
place since 2003  
NA (Kovács et al. 2007) 
Italy Total no. of MEAs: 78 
monitoring registries 
PVAs are in place 
Number of MEAs: 227 




registries (for 78 
therapeutic 
Literature: 
(Agenzia Italiana del 
Farmaco 2008; 
Carbonneil, Quentin, 
and Lee-Robin 2009; 
De Ambrosis 2008; 
Garattini and Casadei 
2011; IMS 2007; 
Messori, Fadda, and 
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Country 
No. MEAs identified in 
the literature 
No. MEAs reported in 





limited to data 
collection or can 
also include cost-
sharing and 
payment by result 
agreements) 




according to the 
2nd ATC level and 
resulting in 32 
categories) 
 PVAs (85) 
Trippoli 2011; Russo et 
al. 2010; Martini, 




(Agenzia Italiana del 
Farmaco (AIFA) 2011) 
Lithuania Total no. of MEAs: NA 
PVAs are in place 
Number of MEAs: 35  
PVAs (26), payment by 
result (9) 
(Adamski et al. 2010) 
Malta NA 1 dose cap scheme  
Netherlands 45 39 CED Literature: 
(Carbonneil et al. 2009; 




Poland NA NA   
Portugal Total no. of MEAs: NA 
PVAs are in place 
Number of MEAs: 84  
PVAs (74), CED (2), 
PVAs and CED (8)  
Literature: 
(Teixeira and Vieira 
2008) 
Scotland Total no. of MEAs: 14 
Discount (8), free 
doses (4), outcome-
guarantee (1), NA (1) 
The survey was 
completed by the 
Department of Health 
(in England) which 
does not hold 
information on PAS in 
Literature: 






No. MEAs identified in 
the literature 
No. MEAs reported in 
the EMINet EU survey 
Literature references 
Scotland. (In many 
cases, but not all, the 
same PAS will be in 
place across the UK). 
Consortium 2011) 
Spain Total no. of MEAs: 2 
Both outcome 
guarantee 
PVAs are in place 
NA Literature: 
(Gaceta Médica 2011; 
Kovács et al. 2007; 
PortalFarma 2011; 
Vogler, Espin, and Habl 
2009) 
Sweden 18 CED 15 CED Literature: 
(Carlson et al. 2010; 
Persson, Willis, and 
Odegaard 2010; Anell 
and Persson 2005) 




6 Results of the EU survey and stakeholder interviews  
6.1 The EU Survey 
This section presents the results of the EMINet survey on MEAs in EU member states. First, 
we will present the qualitative results from survey 1 on the main features of MEA models 
implemented in Europe. In the subsequent sections we will present quantitative and 
qualitative information from survey 2 including the objectives, common elements, disease 
focus, legal requirements, and so on.  
6.1.1 Overview 
Table 6.1 outlines the evidence provided by Member States as part of survey 1 on the types 
of schemes available in their territory. Evidence shows that a large variety of schemes are 
implemented across Europe to achieve four main objectives, notably limiting budget impact, 
improving cost-effectiveness, improving drug use, and increasing access. These schemes 
range from simple financial schemes (e.g. discount, pay-back, budget cap, PVAs) to more 
complex schemes involving data collection (e.g. coverage with evidence development) and 
performance-based schemes. 
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Table 6.1: Models of managed entry agreement in EU Member States (based on survey 1 and 2) 
Name and description  Objectives Features 
Belgium   
Budget capping  1,2 - Budget cap  
- May be linked to data collection as part of an observational study 
or risk-sharing 
Compensation mechanism 1,2 - Compensation mechanism 
- Data collection 
Price-volume agreement 1  
Cyprus   
Price-volume agreement upfront  agreement: price  
reduction as the number of  cases increases (within the 
same indication) 
1,2 - Registry  
 
Price-volume agreement upfront  agreement: payments 
according to Dose capping due to dosage scheme 
uncertainty or wastage uncertainty 
1 - Patients registry  
Price-volume agreement upfront agreement: Discounts 
or free goods requested in case of uncertain and/ or 
unfavourable efficacy or cost effectiveness data 
1,2 - Patients registry  
- Usually in line with NICE decisions - Patient access scheme if 
available 
Discounts  for  usage extension 1,2 - Registry  
Czech Republic   
Very innovative products (VILP) + AIFA notes: Conditional 
reimbursement for 12 months for specific indications 
where the data on efficiency are to be collected. 
1,2 - Limited reimbursement (specific patient subgroups, after failure of 
alternative treatment, limited number of doses) 
- Data collection 
France   
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Price/volume agreement: For each drug, different levels 
of sales are and associated repayments are defined. 
Repayments are later converted into a price cut. 
1,2  
Agreement on daily cost of treatment: A target of daily 
cost of treatment is set. If it is exceeded, the company 
repays the excess. 
1  
Study requirement: The company is required to carry on 
a specific study concerning the real-life use of the drug. 
The price can be revised on the basis of its results. 
3  
Risk-sharing agreement: A price is set on higher basis 
than the existing evaluation of the product. If after 
additional studies, the product gets a better evaluation, 
the price is maintained. If not, it is decreased and the 







Italy   
Risk sharing: Discount on price of initial therapy cycle(s) 
for non- responder patients, identified following clinical 
evaluation in a pre-set time frame. 
2 - Discount for non-responders 
- Conditional treatment continuation (only for patients who 
positively respond to the drug) 
- Monitoring Registry 
Payment by results: Initial cycle(s) fully reimbursed by 
manufacturer for non-responder patients (fully 
reimbursed by the National Health Service for 
responders), identified following clinical evaluation in a 
pre-set time frame. 
2 - Full reimbursement for non-responders 
- Conditional treatment continuation (only for patients who 
positively respond to the drug) 
- Monitoring Registry 
Cost sharing: Discount on price of initial therapy cycle(s) 
for all eligible patients. 
1 
 
- Initial discount for all eligible patients 
- Conditional treatment continuation (only for patients who 
positively respond to the drug) 
- Monitoring Registry 
Monitoring Registries: Registries track the eligibility of 
patients and the complete flow of treatments. This 
2 - Collection of patient level data including information on eligibility 
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guarantees appropriateness of use of medicines 
according to their approved indications. 
for treatment, length of treatment, administered doses, 
epidemiological data, adverse drug reactions. 
Volume based agreements: The Italian Medicines Agency 
negotiates a volume of sales, related to a target 
population, with the manufacturer. The volume of sales, 
exceeding the pre-set threshold, will have to be paid 
back by the manufacturer to the National Health Service. 
1 - Monitoring databases providing sales and expenditures of 
pharmaceuticals 
AIFA-Notes: reimbursement is limited to specific patient 
sub-groups. The AIFA Note is reported by the general 
practitioner on the prescription form and this will allow 
the patient to get the medicinal product free of charge. 
3  
Therapeutic Plans: diagnosis and treatment must be 
reported exclusively by specialised health care centres 
identified at regional level. This tool guarantees the 
reimbursement of certain medicines for the authorised 
therapeutic indications only under close monitoring of 
the specialists.  
3  
Lithuania   
Price volume agreements 1 - The manufacturer has to return a part of the excess expenditure to 
the NHIF.  
- Collection of information about medicines consumption and 
expenditure 
Pay back agreements 1 - Pay back mechanism is applied to pharmaceuticals, when 
reimbursed price is too high compared with similar 
pharmaceuticals.  
- Collection of information about medicines consumption and 
expenditure 
Expenditure cap agreement 1 - The manufacturer has to return the excess expenditure to the 
NHIF entirely. 
- For drugs which are already on the market and whose expenditure 
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is more than 1 million and 1 percent of all expenditure for drug 
reimbursement.  
- Collection of information about medicines consumption and 
expenditure 
Malta   
Dose capping NA - Dose capping 
The Netherlands   
Coverage with evidence development: Coverage is 
granted under the condition that cost-effectiveness is 
determined within a four-year period. 
2 - Submission of a cost-utility analysis to support continued 
reimbursement after the initial 4-year study period. 
Portugal   
Price-volume agreement: The manufacturer is required 
to reimburse the NHS if expenditure has exceeded the 
agreed budget 
1 - Definition of the universe of patients eligible patients  
- Establishment of an annual budget limit for NHS.  
- Re-evaluation of therapeutic added-value and cost-effectiveness at 
the end of the first two year period.  
- If the re-evaluation is positive, the agreement is extended for 
another two-year (for hospital medicines) and new budget limits 
are established, based on previous sales data, new maximum 
prices (if they changed) and forecasted evolution of the medicine 
and the market.  
- Alternatively, the medicine is included in a global list of reimbursed 
medicines (without agreement). The manufacturer must submit 
quarterly data on sales (volume, expenditure and prices) to 
Infarmed  
- Promotional activities are limited to the therapeutic indications 
approved for the medicine  
- Some agreements have an additional pay-back scheme, in order to 
guarantee acceptable prices for NHS, while maintaining list prices. 
For these agreements, the manufacturer must reimburse the NHS 
of the difference between approved list price and discounted price 
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Legend: Objectives 1. Budget impact (BI); 2. Cost-effectiveness (CE); 3. Use; 4. Facilitating access for patients by improving CE 
Source: The authors from the EMINet survey.  
for NHS. 
Coverage with evidence development: reimbursement 
extension after the initial two-year period is conditional 




- Re-evaluation of therapeutic added-value and cost-effectiveness at 
the end of the first two year period.  
- If the re-evaluation is positive, the agreement is extended for 
another two-year (for hospital medicines) and new budget limits 
are established, based on previous sales data, new maximum 
prices (if they changed) and forecasted evolution of the medicine 
and the market.  
- Alternatively, the medicine is included in a global list of reimbursed 
medicines (without agreement). The manufacturer must submit 
quarterly data on sales (volume, expenditure and prices) to 
Infarmed  
- Promotional activities are limited to the therapeutic indications 
approved for the medicine  
- Some agreements have an additional pay-back scheme, in order to 
guarantee acceptable prices for NHS, while maintaining list prices. 
For these agreements, the manufacturer must reimburse the NHS 
of the difference between approved list price and discounted price 
for NHS. 
Sweden   
Coverage with evidence development: 1,2 - Depending on the type of uncertainty the manufacturer is required 
to submit data on use and/or cost-effectiveness  
UK - England and Wales   
Patient access schemes: are schemes proposed by a 
pharmaceutical company and agreed between the 
company and the Department of Health, with input from 
NICE, in order to facilitate patient access to cost-effective 
innovative medicines. 
1,4 - Discount 
- Initial free doses 
- Dose capping 
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6.1.2 Implementation of MEAs in EU Member States 
In Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 an attempt is made to provide two generic but complementary 
indicators of the prevalence of MEAs in some MS. Figure 6.1 shows that the percentage of 
MEAs across newly introduced compounds (ATC-5 level) was 93% in Lithuania, followed by 
Belgium (45%), Portugal (43%), and Sweden (21%) in 2011. Data for Belgium indicate that 
this percentage has increased quite significanlty over time from 12.5% in 2009 to 18% in 
2010 and 45 in 2011. 
6.1.3 Prevalence of MEAs in EU Member States 
Figure 6.1: Percentage of MEAs across active compounds (ATC-5) on the positive list  
 
Note: Drugs on the positive list are counted at ATC-5 level. If more than one agreement was available for a 
particular active compound, this was counted as one. For Portugal and for Sweden only data for 2011 were 
available. 
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Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of MEAs across active compounds in the positive list (ATC-
level 5). These data suggest that in 2011 Portugal had the highest percentage (12%) of MEAs 
in its positive list, followed Lithuania (3.6%), Belgium (1.4%), and Sweden (0.5%). 
Figure 6.2: Percentage of MEAs across newly introduced compounds (ATC-5) 
 
Note: New drugs are counted at ATC-5 level. If more than one agreement was available for a particular active 
compound, this was counted as one. For Portugal, only data for 2011 and 2010 were available while for 
Sweden only data for 2011. 
 
Main objectives  
Findings from survey 2 show that three-quarters (73.5%) of all the agreements in the study 
countries aimed to address budget impact, either alone (30.5%) or in combination with use 
(26.0%), cost effectiveness (15.2%), or both (1.8%) ( 
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Figure 6.3). At country level, two main trends seem to emerge. In some countries, Portugal, 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Belgium there was a strong focus on budget impact. In 
Italy about 43% of all agreements focus on budget impact but improving use of medicines 
emerges as the main objective overall. While in others, Sweden, the Netherlands and the 
UK, cost effectiveness seems to be the driving force when deciding to engage in a MEA.  
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Legend: BI: Limit budget impact, CE: Address uncertainties regarding the cost-effectiveness, Use: Monitor use 
in clinical practice, Access+CE: Improve patient access and cost-effectiveness. BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ: 
Czech Republic, EN: England, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden 
 
As shown in  
Figure 6.4 the objectives countries are trying to achieve in different disease areas seem to 
be distributed across different disease areas proportionally to the number of agreement in 
each objective group and the number of agreement per ATC-group. The only objective 
which appears to be disproportionately represented among oncological and immune-
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are very often linked with high degree of uncertainty in relation to their effectiveness in real 
life resulting in cost-effectiveness estimates with large confidence intervals. Hence, there is 
need to collect additional evidence in order to obtain more precise estimates. 
Figure 6.4: Objectives Member States are trying to achieve in different disease areas 
 
Legend: A: Alimentary tract and metabolism; B: Blood and blood forming organs; C: Cardiovascular system; D: 
Dermatologicals; G: Genito urinary system and sex hormones; H: Systemic hormonal preparations, excl. sex 
hormones and insulins; J: Anti-infectives for systemic use; L: Antineoplastic and immuno-modulating agents; 
M: Musculo-skeletal system; N: Nervous system; R: Respiratory system; S: Sensory organs; V: Various; 
ATC_Mix: There was one case in Italy where a particular AIFA-note contained medicines from different ATC-
groups. ATC-index 2011. 
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Figure 6.5 presents the distribution of instruments across different disease groups. Similar 
to the objectives, the distribution seems to be proportional to the overall use of a particular 
instrument and to the number of agreement in each disease group. As one would expect, 
data collection, conditional treatment continuation, payment by result, and discounts seem 
to be over-represented in the oncological and immune-modulating treatment group which 
can be explained the fact that uncertainty around the treatment effectiveness is one of the 
main concerns in this therapeutic group and that these instruments are very suitable to 
tackle this issue. 
Figure 6.5: Instruments Member States are using to address their objectives in different 
disease areas 
 
Legend: A: Alimentary tract and metabolism; B: Blood and blood forming organs; C: Cardiovascular system; D: 
Dermatologicals; G: Genito urinary system and sex hormones; H: Systemic hormonal preparations, excl. sex 
hormones and insulins; J: Anti-infectives for systemic use; L: Antineoplastic and immuno-modulating agents; 
M: Musculo-skeletal system; N: Nervous system; R: Respiratory system; S: Sensory organs; V: Various; 
ATC_Mix: There was one case in Italy where a particular AIFA-note contained medicines from different ATC-
groups. ATC-index 2011. 
Notes: There is no one to one correspondence between the instruments used and the number of agreement as 
every agreement generally uses more than one instrument to achieve its objectives.  
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6.1.4 Common elements of MEAs  
As shown in  
Figure 6.6 the most common features of MEA across countries were PVAs (39%), followed 
by requirement for data collection (29.5%), and limited access to eligible patients (13.1%). 
PVAs are widely used in Italy, Portugal, and Lithuania; while data collection is a common 
requirement in Italy, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Sweden. Further, Italy, the 
Czech Republic and Belgium, limit access of certain medicines to eligible patients in an 
attempt to manage budget impact and use.  
Figure 6.6: Common elements of MEAs overall and at country level 
 
 
Legend: Only eligible patients: There are specific requirements in place to access treatment; Data collection: 
collection of additional evidence to inform the final reimbursement decision and/or monitor use in clinical 
practice; Conditional continuation: Conditional treatment continuation, only for patient responding to the 
treatment; Price match: Price match with comparator product; Paying by result: reimbursement or discount 
for non-responder patients; Discount: General discount on all doses or initial discount or free first doses; Dose 
  48 
price patient cap pp: Cap on the number of doses or price or treatment time on a per patient basis; PVAs: 
Price-volume agreements. 
6.1.5 Disease focus 
In terms of therapeutic groups, Figure 6.7 shows that antineoplastic and immune-
modulating agents represented 37.3% of all the MEAs implemented in the study countries, 
followed by alimentary tract and metabolism 14.7% and nervous system 10%. All member 
states apart from Sweden (only one MEA for ATC-L vs. 3 MEA for both ATC-B and ATC-N) the 
greatest proportion of agreement involved ATC-L drugs.  
Figure 6.7: Disease focus of MEAs by country 
 
 
Legend: A: Alimentary tract and metabolism; B: Blood and blood forming organs; C: Cardiovascular system; D: 
Dermatologicals; G: Genito urinary system and sex hormones; H: Systemic hormonal preparations, excl. sex 
hormones and insulins; J: Anti-infectives for systemic use; L: Antineoplastic and immuno-modulating agents; 
M: Musculo-skeletal system; N: Nervous system; R: Respiratory system; S: Sensory organs; V: Various; 
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ATC_Mix: There was one case in Italy where a particular AIFA-note contained medicines from different ATC-
groups. ATC-index 2011. 
6.1.6 Most common drugs part of a MEA 
Results showed that some drugs were often part of a MEA in different countries. Table 6.2 
shows that insulins were very often part of MEA in Italy and Portugal, while vidagliptin and 
vidagliptin + metformin were part of nine agreements in Italy, two therapeutic plans 
restricting patient eligibility and provider of care in Italy and in six PVAs in Portugal. 
Vidagliptin was part of six PVAs and two monitoring registries for different indications in 
Italy. Cetuximab was part of paying by result and conditional treatment continuation for two 
different indications in Italy, a CED in the Netherlands, and a discount agreement in the UK. 
Table 6.2: Most frequent drugs part of MEAs in the study countries   







Avastin bevacizumab L01XC07 7 2 
Italy 
- Four discount + monitoring 
registry for four different 
indications: breast cancer, 
colorectal cancer, non-small-cell 
lung carcinoma, renal cell 
cancer 
Netherlands 
- Three CED for three different 
indications: breast cancer, for 
non-small-cell lung carcinoma, 
for renal cell cancer  
Erbitux cetuximab L01XC06 6 4 
Italy 
- Payment by result + monitoring 
registry for head and neck 
cancer  
- Risk sharing + monitoring 
registry for colorectal cancer 
Netherlands 
- Three CED for three different 
indications: metastatic 
colorectal cancer, metastatic 
squamous cell carcinoma, 
locally advanced squamous cell 
carcinoma 
UK  
- Discount for metastatic 
colorectal cancer 
Nplate romiplostim B02BX04 6 5 Czech Republic 
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- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, only eligible 
patient, access limited to 
specialised health care centres 
Italy   
- Monitoring Registry  
- PVA 
Portugal 




- Discount  
Vidaza azacitidine L01BC07 5 5 
Czech Republic 
- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, only eligible 
patient, access limited to 
specialised health care centres  
Italy  




- PVA  
UK 
- Discount  
Velcade bortezomib L01XX32 5 3 
Italy  
- Monitoring registry for 
Amyloidosis; 
refractory/relapsed multiple 
myeloma in association with 
dexamethasone  
- Monitoring registry for the pre-
treated multiple myeloma 
- Discount + monitoring registry 
for non-treated multiple 
myeloma in association with 
melphalan and prednisone 
Netherlands  
- CED for multiple myeloma 
UK 
- paying by result for multiple 
myeloma  
Votrient pazopanib L01XE11 6 6 
Czech Republic 
- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, only eligible 
patient, access limited to 
specialised health care centres 
  51 








- Payment by Results + 
monitoring registry  
Portugal 
- PVA  
Netherlands 




- Discount + expected value 
rebate (only implemented if 
expected results are not shown 









- PVA  
- Monitoring registry  
- Therapeutic plan 
Lithuania  










- PVA  
- Monitoring registry  
- Therapeutic plan 
Yondelis trabectedin L01CX01 5 5 
Czech Republic 
- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, only eligible 
patient, access limited to 
specialised health care centres  
Italy  
- Payment by results + monitoring 
registry  
Malta  
- Dose cap 
Portugal 
- PVA  
UK 
- Dose cap 
Prolia denosumab M05BX04 4 3 
Belgium 
- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, study, only 
eligible patients   
Italy  
- PVA  
- Monitoring registry  
Lithuania  
- Payment by result  
Revolade eltrombopag B02BX05 4 4 Czech Republic 
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- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, only eligible 
patient, access limited to 
specialised health care centres  
Italy 
- Monitoring registry 
- PVA  
Sweden 
- CED  
Iressa gefitinib L01XE02 4 4 
Czech Republic 
- Data collection, reimbursement 
limited in time, only eligible 
patient, access limited to 
specialised health care centres  
Italy  
- Paying by result + monitoring 
registry  
Lithuania  
- Paying by result  
UK  
- Price cap  
Lucentis ranibizumab S01LA04 4 4 
Italy 







- Discount  
Mabthera rituximab L01XC02 4 2 
Italy 
- Two monitoring registries for 
two different indications: B-cell 
(CD20+) non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma in association with 
polychemotherapy and non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma and 
chronic lymphocytic leukaemia   
Netherlands 
- Two CED for two different 
indications: non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma and rheumatoid 
arthritis 
Torisel temsirolimus L01XE09 4 4 
Belgium 
- Expenditure cap  
Italy 
- paying by result + monitoring 
registry  
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- CED   
Portugal 
- PVA  
Roactemra tocilizumab L04AC07 4 3 
Italy 
- Monitoring Registry  
- PVA  
Netherlands  
- CED  
Portugal 
- PVA 
Revlimid lenalidomide L04AX04 4 3 
Italy 
- Discount + monitoring registry 
for multiple myeloma 
- Monitoring registry for 
syndrome myelodysplastic; 
mantle cell lymphoma; Diffuse 
large B-cell lymphomas; 
amyloidosis 
Portugal 
- PVA for multiple myeloma 
UK 
- Dose cap for multiple myeloma 
 
Most of the most popular drugs for MEA where for the treatment of anti-neoplastic diseases 
(ATC-L: 11) and immune-modulating diseases followed by metabolic drugs (ATC-A: 4), blood 
and blood forming organs (ATC-B: 2), sensory organ (ATC-S: 1), and musculoskeletal 
treatments (ATC-M: 1).  
6.1.7 Features of MEAs in EU Member States 
6.1.8 Existence of a legal framework and legislation 
Most countries have a legal framework in place (8 out of 13, Table 6.3) as well as legislation 
in place (7 out of 13, Table 6.4). There is no legal framework in Cyprus, Malta, Portugal 
Sweden, and in the UK. In Portugal, MEAs are based on the reimbursement legislation while 
in the UK PAS proposals are made within the terms set out in the 2009 Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS), a voluntary agreement negotiated between the UK Government 
and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI).  
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Table 6.3: Member States where a legal framework for MEAs is in place 
Country Legal framework 
Belgium 
Yes. In the reimbursement procedure of 180 days, a final decision is taken by the CRM (Commission for Reimbursement 
of Medicines) at day 150. There are three conditions in the decision that can lead to a MEA.  Currently, the applicant 
can introduce a motion for reimbursement by convention and the procedure stops for a maximum of 120 days. During 
this period, negotiations on conditions/text agreements take place between the applicant, the insurers, the health 
minister and the pharmaceutical industry. At the end of the negotiation period, a contract is signed between NIHDI and 
the applicant with the agreement of the Minister of Social Affairs and the Minister of Budget. 
France The company and the committee in charge of pricing sign a contract 
Lithuania Order of Ministry of Health N v-634 
Norway There is a general legal framework, and separate contracts for each pharmaceutical. 
Italy Yes. The official decision concerning the type of MEA is made publicly available by AIFA. 
Slovakia Act No. 363/2011 which is coming into force on 1.12.2011 
Netherlands 
Up to 2011, the CED was part of a policy rule for budgeting of hospitals. From 2012 onwards the CED requirement is 
linked to the healthcare benefit scheme decision-making. The legal framework is that the MoH is legally entitled to 
exclude interventions that are not cost-effective.  
Czech 
Republic 
The MAH applies for the conditional reimbursement in case that the clinical efficiency and cost effectiveness data are 
not sufficient for permanent reimbursement. Can be utilized only in "very innovative products (VILP)". 
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Table 6.4: Member states where a legislation for MEAs is in place 
Country Legalisation 
Belgium 
Yes. The Law on Compulsory Health Insurance (July 7, 1994). 
Art 35bis § 7 - If the CRM (Commission for Reimbursement of Medicines) considers the proposed basis for 
reimbursement disproportionate to the assessment of the criteria mentioned in § 2 or if the CRM is of the 
opinion that including the medicine in the list of reimbursable medicines is linked with uncertainties on a 
budgetary level, the Commission, or the applicant can propose to the Minister to establish an agreement 
with the Institute […], providing with compensation rules for the compulsory health and disability insurance. 
Royal Decree on Procedures, Time Limits and Conditions (December 21, 2001). 
Art 81 and following, as modified by the RD of February 11, 2010. 
Czech Republic Sec 39d and 39b of the Act on Public health insurance No 48/1997 Coll.  
France 
No special legislation for MEAs, however, the law does allow for the price to be set according to the 
expected volume of sales. 
Lithuania Order of Ministry of Health N v-634 
Norway 
Yes, in the general legislation on Pharmaceuticals, there is a possibility to use MEA. But there is no 
obligation. 
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Portugal 
Yes, there is a specific national legislation regarding reimbursement/financing, that includes legal framework 
for the MEA. Decree-Law nr. 48-A/2010, 13th May, article nr. 6 out-patient,  Decree-Law nr. 195/2006, 
article nr. 5 in-patient medicines 
Slovakia Act No. 363/2011 which is coming into force on 1.12.2011 
Note: No explicit legislation for MEAs is available in Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Sweden, and the UK. 
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To gain more insights in the voluntary and non-voluntary nature of MEAs, MS were asked to 
comment on whether MEAs in their constituencies represent a voluntary or a non-voluntary 
form of agreement. Six out of twelve countries replied. Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and the UK 
reported that MEAs are voluntary agreements in their countries. Lithuania reported that 
expenditure caps and price volume agreements are obligatory in Lithuania while pay back 
agreements are voluntary. This definition does not really apply to Sweden as in this case, 
MEA are not strictly speaking an agreement but more of an unilateral request and condition 
for obtaining reimbursement expressed by TLV. The manufacturer can decide whether to 
accept or reject the agreement proposed by TLV but in the case he does not accept it, 
reimbursement will not be continued. 
6.1.9 Average duration 
The average duration of MEAs varies between Member States, ranging from one year in 
Belgium (renewable) to up to four years in the Netherlands or for an indefinite period of 
time subject to review (France, Malta, UK).   
6.1.10 Instruments used 
The most common instruments attached to MEAs in EU MS are: sales and expenditure 
databases (198), patient registries (119), studies (64), and online systems for reimbursement 
(11)8. Sales and expenditure registries are essential for PVAs agreements and therefore 
widely used in Italy (85), Portugal (76), Lithuania (35), and Sweden (2). Patient registries are 
particularly common in Italy (78), followed by the Czech Republic (21), Belgium (13), and 
Sweden (7). It is important to notice that the type of data collected through these registries 
was in most cases not specified. While it is known that Italy collects data on patients 
eligibility, duration of treatment, epidemiological data, treatment cost, and adverse effect 
(De Nigro 2011), it is not always clear which type of data other countries collect at patient 
level (for example a country could simply collect data on the number of doses received by 
each patient in the frame of a does capping scheme but not collect any other useful data on 
patient outcomes) and most importantly what they use is made this data and whether or 
                                                      
8 Please note that more than one instrument might be used for the same MEA and that not all the agreements 
were linked to instrument (or at least it was not reported) 
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not they are used to inform decision-making regarding reimbursement. Economic and 
impact studies are linked to MEAs in the Netherlands (39), Portugal (10), and Sweden (8), 
Belgium (7). Finally, the UK reports using online systems provided by the manufacturer for 
administrative purposes (and it seems sensible to think that probably most other countries 
have similar systems in place as well).  
6.1.11 Stakeholder in charge of MEAs functioning and control 
The main stakeholders involved are payers, drug assessment agencies, and physicians. 
Payers (e.g. NIHDI in Belgium), drug assessment agencies (e.g. AIFA in Italy, TLV in Sweden) 
or the Department of Health (UK) are responsible for negotiating the agreement with the 
manufacturer, or assessing9 (UK) the offer made by manufacturer, while physicians are 
responsible for filling in the patient registries usually in collaboration with other 
stakeholders (e.g. monitoring registries in Italy are managed by AIFA, an advisor physician 
from the National Health Insurer controls the implementation of MEAs in Belgium). Payers 
or drug reimbursement agencies might require manufacturers to submit additional evidence 
on drug effectiveness to obtain permanent reimbursement in which case companies are 
responsible for patient data collection. More often companies are required to submit 
regular information to payers on sales and expenditure as part of PVAs or budget impact 
studies.   
6.1.12 Financial and administrative burden 
Only a few countries provided information on the administrative burden of MEAs. Countries 
who provided information mostly did so by providing the number of staff working on MEAs. 
Although this is informative, it is not clear whether this staff is working full-time on MEA 
implementation or if MEA is just one of their duties. Another issue in estimating the 
resources needed to develop and implement MEAs is the number of different stakeholders 
involved. Italy for example reports that about ten people are working on MEAs within AIFA. 
However, in order to estimate the actual financial and administrative burden, the time 
                                                      
9 In the UK, pharmaceutical companies decide whether they wish to make a proposal, and the Department of 
Health confirms whether the proposal meets the criteria set out in the PPRS. So, in the UK, the process is an 
assessment not a negotiation.  
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physicians spend filling in the monitoring registries should also be included as well as the 
time local NHS authorities spent in administrative procedures to receive reimbursement for 
non-responders.  
In Portugal, the number of people involved in MEAs ranges from two to four depending on 
whether an economic study is involved. If the agreement only involves monitoring sales and 
expenditure, then two internal technicians, a pharmacist and an economist are required. If 
an economic evaluation is required then an expert economist and a physician are also 
involved in addition to the two internal technicians.    
In the UK, the financial and administrative burden of each agreement is assessed as part of 
the NICE appraisal. In order to be approved the administrative and financial burden needs to 
be proportionate to the benefits of the scheme.  
In addition to the financial and administrative resources needed at the implementation 
stage, the resources needed to conclude a MEA should not be neglected. In Belgium for 
example, five members of staff in the National Institute of Health and Disability Insurance 
(NIHDI) are involved during the 120-day negotiation procedure. Up to four meetings of 2-3 
hours are needed before the agreement is concluded (the latest agreements took 2 to 3 
meetings which seems to suggest that as a country acquires experience in concluding these 
agreements, negotiation times can be reduced). These meetings include also external 
representatives from health insurance companies, the pharmaceutical industry, and a 
delegation of the Minister of Social Affairs and Budget.  
6.1.13 Administrative requirements  
The question about the specific administrative requirements of each MEAs model was 
interpreted in different ways among MS. Partly also due to the different MEAs models used 
in MS, some countries described the administrative requirements to conclude a MEA (e.g. 
contractual specifications), while others specified the conditions for their implementation 
(e.g. regular supply of sales data by the manufacturer) and others illustrated the conditions 
manufacturers need to meet for obtaining permanent reimbursement.  
In terms of contractual specifications Belgium requires inclusion of price, compensatory 
measures for budgetary risk, reporting modalities, and other legal requirements in the each 
MEA contract. Regarding implementation conditions to be met, France, Lithuania, and 
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Portugal require the regular submission of sales data by the manufacturer, while four of the 
seven Italian MEAs require the creation of a patient registry for data collection sponsored by 
the manufacturer. To obtain permanent reimbursement after conditional reimbursement 
through MEA comes to an end, manufacturers need to provide Czech, Dutch, Portuguese 
(only for some CED schemes) and Swedish authorities of the evidence (usually on cost-
effectiveness or use) initially requested by the agency. The Portuguese National Authority of 
Medicines and Health Product (IFARMED), the Czech State Institute for Drug Control (SUKL) 
and the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) specified their keen interest in 
making decisions based on evidence from their own healthcare setting. The UK presented 
an overview of the PAS process from its onset as part of the NICE technology appraisal to its 
lifetime until the next NICE review of the drug. At this stage, the manufacturer can decide to 
continue offering the scheme, propose its modification, withdraw it (but not before the first 
review of the relevant NICE guidance), or make alternative pricing arrangements with the 
DH.  
6.1.14 Regional differences in MEAs implementation 
According to information from Belgium, Italy, and Sweden, there are no regional differences 
in the implementation of national MEAs. Although these countries have a decentralised 
health care system, MEAs are subject to national decision and as such MEAs become 
immediately available in all regions or counties after they are approved at national level.  
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6.2 Stakeholder input: Competent authorities  
Information presented in this section is based on material retrieved from official 
presentations and seminars, e.g. the 2nd Annual Risk-Sharing World, April 2011 (Webinar).   
Further insights were obtained from personal communication with Member State and 
sickness fund representatives via email correspondence, telephone communication, 
interviews conducted during two meeting of the EU working group on MEA in Rome on 
November 14th 2001 and May 21st 2012 and additional material received subsequently.  
6.2.1 Belgium  
The rational for introducing MEAs in Belgium is to address unmet medical need. For this 
reason, MEAs include only medicines which are either expected to bring additional 
therapeutic value, orphan drugs, or for extension of existing therapeutic indications when 
an unmet therapeutic or social need exists. The specific objectives pursued are to provide 
patients access to promising therapies and to provide an additional option for facilitate 
pharmaceutical companies to access the market. Reimbursement through a MEA is limited 
in the time.    
MEAs are exclusively introduced on initiative of the Minister following the procedures, time 
limits, and conditions outlined in the article 81 and following of the Royal Decree as 
modified in February 2010. There are three situations when a MEA may come into play, on 
the request of the pharmaceutical company after a negative motion, if there is no motion 
for reimbursement by the Commission for Reimbursement of Medicines (CRM), or on the 
request of the CRM itself after a negative motion for reimbursement. On the 150th day of 
the reimbursement the CRM releases its final proposition. In case of negative decision by 
the Commission the applicant can apply for reimbursement through a MEA, alternatively 
the Commission may suggest reimbursement through a MEA issued by the Minister.  
In any case, the time clock is stopped and a 120 days' negotiation process between the 
applicant, the pharmaceutical industry board, health insurers, the NIHDI, the Minister of 
Social Affairs and the Minister of Budget starts. If negotiations are successful, a MEA is 
signed between the NIHDI and the applicant with the agreement of the Minister of Social 
Affairs and the Minister of Budget. Figure 6.8 shows the main steps of the reimbursement 
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process in Belgium from marketing authorisation to the final reimbursement decision (Van 
der Meersch 2012). 
Figure 6.8: Reimbursement procedure in Belgium 
 
Source: (Van der Meersch 2012). 
 
In order to ask for reimbursement through a MEA, there needs to be some evidence to 
support the applicant claim that the drug is effective but because it was either not cost-
effective or there was uncertainty around it, the CRM issued either a negative 
recommendation, no recommendation, or a recommendation for reimbursement through 
MEAs. As outlined inFigure 6.9, a MEA may be concluded to manage the risk of high budget 
impact due to the high cost of the drug and/or the uncertainty around its effectiveness, 
cost-effectiveness or expected volume of use.  
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Figure 6.9: Reimbursement decisions in Belgium according to the value of a drug  
 
Source: (Van der Meersch 2012) 
 
In Belgium, available options to address price issues through MEAs include the following 
financial instruments: off-list discounts, PVAs, compensation mechanisms for the price of 
other drugs from the same applicant, and budget caps. If the issue is price and value, then a 
combination of financial and non-financial instruments is used. The latter include requests 
for additional data collection and risk-sharing.  
Since the first MEA was introduced in April 2010, 37 negotiations for MEAs have taken 
place, of these 19 MEAs have been positively concluded, 15 negotiations resulted in no 
MEA, and 3 are still pending. In addition to that one MEA which was concluded according 
the old legislation. Of these 37 negotiations, 22 were for drugs of potential added value (15 
positive, 1 on-going, 6 negative), six for orphan drugs (1 positive, 1 on-going, 4 negative), 
and ten for new indications (4 positive, 1 on-going, 5 negative). 
Reasons for failure included the dissatisfaction of the applicant about the agreement (e.g. 
because of uncertainty about the price after MEA ends), uncertainty about which additional 
evidence is needed, or because no agreement was reached on the budgetary conditions of 
reimbursement by MEA such as the financial compensations to be paid by the applicant. 
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Further, other issues related to uncertainty are loss of orphan status in the future and re-
evaluation of the risk/benefit ratio by the EMA.    
Challenges remain even for positively concluded agreement and include the workload 
involved in negotiating the agreement, the difficulty for the Minister to refuse negotiating 
and thus conclude with a negative proposal, the decision on which type of information is 
needed to answer the initial questions, the limited timeframe of three years to collect data 
and address all open questions, the limited availability of epidemiological data at national 
level, and the challenge of evaluating the on-going clinical study at the end of the MEA 
(after one, two or maximum three years). In addition to the practical implementation 
challenges it is important to consider what will happen after an MEA has come to an end, 
was enough information obtained to answer key questions. Further issues include the lack 
of price transparency arising from off-list discounts and the fact that by allowing de facto to 
by-pass the CRM decision through a MEA, the impact of their decisions might be 
undermined.   
Despite the issues involved with implementing MEAs, their implementation features several 
positive aspects for the Belgian healthcare system: first, the availability of a clear framework 
outlining legal aspects and timelines, the availability of a template for MEAs, and the 
intensive negotiation process which allows for flexible solutions; second, the transparency 
of the process in terms of procedures and knowledge about the existence of MEAs. The 
latter, however, is limited by the lack of a publicly available list of all agreements 
(information on MEA is only available on request) and by the lack of publicly available 
details of the MEA. Finally, it offers a financial safeguard for health insurers in terms of 
managing budget impact in the short future and for pharmaceutical companies the fact that 
listed prices are not affected. 
6.2.2 Czech Republic  
Since 2008, The State Institute of Drug Control (SÚKL) is responsible for pricing and 
reimbursement decisions in the Czech Republic. Clinical-effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, 
and budget impact are taken into consideration for reimbursement decisions. The Czech 
pharmaceutical system is characterised by value-based reimbursement rather than value-
based pricing (Kotrba 2011).  
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Uncertainty concerning clinical and/or cost-effectiveness of new drugs is addressed through 
conditional reimbursement while uncertainty regarding its budget impact is managed 
through restricted use by specialised health centres (approx. 14 in the country).  
Reimbursement of approximately 80 per cent of all drugs in the positive list is linked to 
some form of conditionality such as restricted access to particular patient subgroups and 
budget caps. All highly innovative drugs are subject to conditional reimbursement and 
demonstrating innovativeness of new drugs is crucial to obtain reimbursement. Another 
crucial element for obtaining reimbursement is that the drug has been previously accepted 
for reimbursement in at least two reference basket countries10. However, this is usually not 
an issue given the very large number of new drugs reimbursed in France. 
Highly innovative medicines are defined as new medicines addressing very serious diseases 
(as defined in the ministerial decree no. 376/2011 Coll.11) for which unmet medical need 
exists either because no treatment was previously available or because available treatments 
were insufficiently effective or presented important side effects. In cases where not enough 
information on treatment effectiveness in real clinical settings and its cost effectiveness is 
available, temporary conditional reimbursement is used. 
Since December 2011, temporary reimbursement is granted for a minimum of two years 
renewable for another year (before December 2011 agreements were concluded for a 
minimum 1 year renewable on an annual basis for up to 3 years). To renew an agreement, 
the manufacturer needs to submit a request to SÚKL. Extension is granted if insufficient data 
on the drugs innovativeness have been collected to take a final reimbursement decision.  
By concluding a temporary conditional reimbursement with SÚKL the manufacturer 
commits to set up a registry to collect information on the clinical effectiveness of the new 
drug, treatment costs, and use. Registries are managed in collaboration with the specialised 
                                                      
10 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
11 Diseases demanding permanent or long-lasting hospitalization, diseases leading to often recurring 
hospitalizations for the period of several years or leading to invalidity or diseases that result in permanent 
serious damage of health, full or almost full loss of sight, hearing, speech or motion, or diseases that shorten 
life expectancy of more than 20%.    
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health centres where drugs are made available to patients. Centres need to have a specific 
contract with payers and are required to collect information on patient treatment and 
outcomes. This information will enable to manufacturer to submit evidence on budget 
impact and cost-effectiveness when an agreement comes to an end, which will provide the 
basis for SÚKL final reimbursement decision.  
If the drug is found not be cost-effective, reimbursement is terminated. On the other hand, 
for drugs, which are found to be effective but with positive budget impact, the law allows 
for the conclusion of other types of MEAs (e.g. PVAs, dose capping, reimbursement for non-
responders, etc.). These agreements can be used for any drugs, they are not limited to 
highly innovative ones. However, given the legislation allowing for these types of agreement 
has only been available since December 2011, such agreements have not yet been 
implemented (Katzerová 2012; Kotrba 2011). 
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6.2.3 Denmark 
In Denmark, reimbursement of a particular medicine can be achieved as either general 
reimbursement or individual reimbursement that are both divided into subcategories as 
illustrated in Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10: The Danish drug reimbursement system 
  
Source: Based on information from the Danish Health and Medicines Authority website (Danish Health and 
Medicines Authority 2011). 
 
Most drugs in Denmark are reimbursed as part of general reimbursement - positively listed 
drugs. Single reimbursement is a possibility for drugs without general reimbursement, but 
requires an application from a doctor.  Reimbursement of prescription drugs in the general 
reimbursement group may be attached to specific conditions such as belonging to a 
particular disease or patient sub-group (Lægemiddelstyrelsen [The Danish Health and 
Medicines Authority] 2012).  
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Conditional reimbursement is used in Denmark to deal with high cost drugs and drugs with 
significant budget impact when the criteria are fulfilled; while single reimbursement is used 
when the criteria for general or conditional reimbursement are not fulfilled. In addition, 
reimbursement decisions are reassessed regularly in Denmark. Priority for reassessment is 
established based on the primary care and particularly general practice importance of a 
particular medicine, the availability of new evidence-based recommendations, and high 
costs and/or use for patients and regions (Danish Health and Medicines Authority 2012). 
Although MEAs are not formally part of the Danish public reimbursement system, there 
have been a few cases where MEAs have been implemented in Denmark (Møldrup 2005). 
However, these cases has been very limited as there was no agreement with the National 
Health Service (NHS) and the main target were patients (Engraff 2011).  
In comparison to other MEAs implemented in other EU countries, particularly the discount 
or free-doses agreement implemented in the UK which aim to lower the price to improve 
the cost-effectiveness of new drugs and to obtain a positive recommendation by NICE, 
Valsartan (Diovan®) already enjoyed general reimbursement when this agreement was 
launched by the manufacturer. Vardenafil on the other hand did not benefit and still does 
not benefit from general reimbursement although it was part of the individual 
reimbursement possibility at the time. This means that these two MEAs were not intended 
to achieve inclusion in the Danish positive list but rather to gain a competitive advantage in 
a crowded market leveraging on the “no cure no pay” formula. A similar agreement is 
implemented in Germany for the treatment of osteoporosis with zolendronic acid 
(Aclasta®). The manufacturer offered to reimburse the costs of the drug for patients 
experiencing a fracture while under treatment in exchange for the insurer switching 
osteoporosis treatment from competitor products to Aclasta® (Hogan & Hartson 2008).  
Denmark has limited experience with MEAs but the experience of countries currently 
implementing MEAs will be part of further Danish considerations to meet possible MEA 
proposals from companies to obtain reimbursement. 
6.2.4 France 
France uses a common approach for all MEAs that is based on a framework agreement 
between LEEM (Les Entreprises du médicament - Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association) 
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and CEPS (Comité Economique Des Produits De Santé - Healthcare Products Pricing 
Committee). This framework covers all MEAs based on financial results, but does not cover 
those based on clinical results (whose number is very limited). 
There are four main types of MEA for pharmaceutical products in France: PVAs, agreement 
on daily cost of treatment, study requirement, and risk-sharing agreements. It is also 
possible to combine different types of agreement, a price-volume agreement and a study 
requirement agreement for example. 
 
Price-volume agreements 
PVAs are the most frequently used, indeed nearly all innovative drugs entering the French 
market are part of such an agreement. The aim is to limit treatment to the target treatment 
population by defining, for each drug, a tiered repayment structure for different levels of 
sales. At the end of an agreed period of time, repayments are converted into a price cut. 
Although it is not possible to ensure that use will be limited to the approved indication/s, 
PVAs are an instrument for limiting budget impact due to non-approved use. 
Examples of PVAs include an oncology medicine whose name could not be disclosed due to 
a confidentiality clause in the contract (Espin, Rovira, and Garcia 2010). The main objective 
of this agreement, which will be in effect from 2010 to 2015, is overall budget control.  
Two other examples implemented in 2008 involved Naglazyme (treatment for 
mucopolysaccharide type VI disease) and Soliris (for paroxysmal nocturnal haemoglobinuria) 
(Espin, Rovira, and Garcia 2010). In both cases, an agreement on prices was reached up to a 
fixed maximum budget ceiling, which required the companies to supply the medicine, 
without restrictions, to all patients who might benefit from it while also paying back to 
national health insurance any turnover made above the maximum budget ceiling. These 
agreements are in force until 2013. 
 
Daily cost of treatment 
A similar type of agreement focuses on daily cost of treatment rather than yearly sales level. 
The aim of this type of agreement is to ensure that the actual treatment cost per patient 
remains the same as the forecasted one. In practice, a target of daily cost of treatment is set 
based either on the range of doses or on posology. If the range of doses or posology used in 
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clinical practice differs from the one used to establish the selling price, the daily cost of 
treatment is revised. 
 
Study requirement 
In a limited number of cases, a specific study on the real-life use of a new drug might be 
requested to the manufacturer in an attempt to limit budget impact due to higher than 
forecasted use. These agreements are generally used for drugs which have shown to bring 
additional benefit but for which there still some element of uncertainty on the payer side. 




In contrast to the previous types of agreement, which do not involve measurement of 
clinical outcomes, risk-sharing agreements (RSAs) in the French context involve assessment 
of real-life effectiveness. This type of agreement has so far been used in a very limited 
number of cases, probably five or six agreements (including for medicines used for the 
treatment of diabetes or mental illness but there is no relationship between the pathology 
and the likelihood of concluding such an agreement), which have received an Amélioration 
du Service Médical Rendu12 (ASMR) V, but, which have claimed that they (may) have 
improvements which cannot be seen from the clinical evidence provided. Very specific 
conditions need to hold for such an agreement to be concluded: first, the benefit must be 
such that it could not be proven during pre-licensing clinical trials and only real-life 
evaluation will be able to prove evidence on its actual effectiveness; second, the claimed 
benefit must represent a clear advantage; and third, the company must be willing to bear 
the financial risk if the medicine fails. For reimbursement to be extended after the end of 
the trial period, the proposed study must unequivocally demonstrate that the claimed 
benefit exists and is considerable.  In concluding such an agreement, the authorities are 
giving the manufacturer the benefit of the doubt, but the onus is on the manufacturer to 
                                                      
12 Improvement of Medical Benefit (Amélioration de Service Médical Rendu, ASMR) refers to the additional 
therapeutic benefit versus current standards. This is measured on a I-V scale where I represents a major, II an 
important, III a moderate, IV a minor clinical improvement, and V no clinical improvement.   
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prove in a real-life setting that better than currently available results can be obtained. If this 
is the case, the negotiated price remains, if not, a price reduction is unavoidable.  
Examples of RSA which have been completed include an agreement for risperidone 
(Risperdal®) an antipsychotic drug for schizophrenia, a risk-sharing agreements for a class of 
diabetes drugs, glitazones, and three other risk-sharing agreements for type 2 diabetes 
drugs (Renaudin 2010). This health outcomes-based agreement that falls under the category 
of conditional reimbursement price and takes into account the results of clinical or 
observational studies established for the period 2006-2013. In this agreement, consensus 
was reached that the reimbursement price would only be maintained if the medicine 
achieved a higher ASMR rating depending on the results of observational/clinical studies 
(Espin, Rovira, and Garcia 2010). If the results of those studies are negative, the company is 
required to pay back the difference for past utilisation and apply a price reduction on future 
sales. In this case, the main objective is to generate additional evidence on which price 
and/or reimbursement should be established. 
 
Scale of implementation of the different types of agreement 
The vast majority of MEAs in France are price-volume agreements, followed by daily cost of 
treatment, study requirement, and RSA. There also seems to be some relationship between 
price levels and the probability of contracting a PVA as the introduction of new high cost 
drugs almost always leads to the conclusion of such an agreement. Concerning 
implementation responsibilities, CEPS monitors the performance of all price-volume and 
daily cost of treatment contracts on an annual basis (aggregate saving results are published 
in CEPS’ annual report (CEPS 2011)) while social security is responsible for collecting 
paybacks, should agreed-upon volumes be exceeded. Data for evaluating the agreements 
are supplied by manufacturers (sales and volume data), commercial sources such as the IMS 
(sales and volume data), and sickness funds (daily cost of treatment). When multiple 




  72 
Policy options for patients to access drugs which have been excluded from reimbursement 
There are no policy options to make drugs which have been excluded from reimbursement 
available. However, this is largely explained by the relative generosity of the French positive 
list in comparison to other European countries. 
 
Future developments  
PVAs are very well established in France and will always be a core element of the French 
reimbursement system. They will continue to be a popular way of controlling price and 
volume in the future, also because the cost of monitoring each scheme is low and the 
payback (in case of exceeding target volumes) is immediate. Agreements on study 
requirement are just beginning but it they are very likely to grow particularly after the new 
reimbursement law, which was approved at the end of 2011 but has not yet been 
implemented, will be introduced. As part of the new law, two evaluations will be conducted 
before a reimbursement decision will be taken. Two different committees will be 
responsible to evaluate the product from a medical perspective (as it is already done) and 
from an economic perspective (new). These reforms are likely to increase the number of 
request for real-life study to companies and authorities are currently improving their ability 
to ask for very specific studies. 
In principle, expanding implementation of RSAs is desirable on the condition that there will 
be agreed-upon clinical benchmarks to be measured, therefore, alluding to some type of 
performance based agreement (if introduced, their use should expected to remain limited). 
Requirements for evidence will also need to be produced focusing on specific metrics. This is 
already part of the framework agreement between CEPS and industry, which will currently 
under re-negotiation and will possibly be concluded by the end of 2012. 
Study requirements also do have a future in France, particularly in what concerns real-life 
studies and the ability to conduct economic analysis and economic evaluations; this is 
already foreseen in the legislation and leveraging this in the near future, is a priority. 
6.2.5 Germany 
Little control over prices of innovative medicines prior to the reform in 2011 led to 
tremendous increase in expenditure on prices of new medicines in Germany. The 
introduction of the new system of early assessment (effective 2012) (Der Bundestag 2010) is 
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trying to change the situation towards a value-based pricing model by setting the price of 
new medicines according to the added value of the drug. Aside from the challenges of 
implementing such reform (e.g. how is additional benefit to be translated into different 
price level?) it does not address the issue of drug performance in real-life. The latter can 
only be achieved post-marketing. 
From a literature perspective, fifteen MEAs have been identified; five of these are disease 
management programmes, four outcome-guarantee agreements, three PVAs, one 
utilisation cap, one cost capping, and one discount scheme (Rutten, Uyl-de Groot, and Vulto 
2009; Anonym 2008; Senior 2009; Hogan & Hartson 2008; Pugatch, Healy, and Chu 2010). 
This information is most likely incomplete (and some of the agreements might have in the 
meantime come to an end) given the lack of information and transparency on the subject 
and the decentralised nature of these agreements, which take place at sickness fund level. 
Of interest are a small number of what were defined as “disease management 
programmes”. One example is the compliance programme for the rheumatoid arthritis and 
psoriasis injectable drug etanercept (Enbrel). In 2008, the manufacturer (Wyeth) agreed to 
develop and finance a programme to increase patient compliance among BKK (the third 
largest sickness fund in Germany) patients (Senior 2009). The programme, whose cost is 
estimated to be EUR500 per patient per year, includes homecare visits by a nurse, a 
telephone-line for support, and promotion of patient communication (Senior 2009). 
Considering the very low-compliance rates of injection drugs and the high price for 
etanercept, it must still be profitable for the manufacturer to invest considerable resources 
in keeping patients on treatment. 
Interviewees from the sickness funds pointed that managed entry of new drugs (as a 
process and in comparison to the conclusion of drug specific agreements) in Germany is 
currently addressed mainly by recent legal approaches surrounding AMNOG (Der Bundestag 
2010), therefore, this is not organised at sickness fund level but at the statutory health care 
level. Despite many positive aspects of these recent reforms, Germany is far behind in 
horizon scanning activities as implemented by Italy and Sweden. 
Interviewees were rather critical with respect to sickness fund-specific solutions, as adding 
nothing of substance, and mentioned that the most prominent example is the case of insulin 
analogues, for which several or most sickness funds have discount contracts in place. There 
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was agreement that such discount contracts were not necessary due to a negative 
assessment of cost-effectiveness by IQWiG at the price proposed by the manufacturer. 
However, because one of the smaller sickness funds made a discount agreement which 
ensured cost of insulin analogues at the level of human insulins, all other sickness funds had 
to follow suit due to the logic of competition. The key point is that the other sickness funds 
did not conclude rebate contracts for insulin analogues because they thought these drugs 
constitute a valuable addition to therapeutic options. Rather, these contracts were mainly 
concluded because this first rebate contract practically forced them to keep up with the 
rest. 
MEAs over and above the AMNOG provisions seem to be limited to a few isolated cases in 
Germany. The main reason for this is probably the lack of incentives for sickness funds and 
manufacturers. If a drug is approved for general reimbursement by G-BA (subsequent to 
assessment by IQWiG), then all the sickness funds are mandated to reimburse it; so the 
manufacturer does not have an incentive to engage in such an agreement. On the other 
hand, if the drug is not approved for general reimbursement, the sickness funds are by law 
not allowed to reimburse it. Further, sickness funds tend to be suspicious of this type of 
agreement because they fear that once it comes to an end and a number of patients is 
already on treatment, the manufacturer might either not be willing to continue providing 
the drug as part of a MEA or the conditions of it will be less favourable in comparison to 
when the drug was first introduced. The need for good negotiation skills and the uneven 
balance of these between industry and sickness funds is another element of caution from a 
payer’s perspective. 
Initially sickness funds were not allowed to enter into contracts with pharmaceutical 
companies. The law was then adapted in 2003 to allow for the introduction of discount 
agreements (rebate contracts) (Bundesministerium der Justiz). Section 8 this article (§ 130a) 
directly concerns discount agreements. The wording explicitly mentions the possibility to 
take into account volume-based agreements, allowing for pay-back agreements in case of 
over-shooting a predefined target, and agreements for “measurably successful therapy”. 
The future of managing the introduction of new drugs in Germany will probably be limited 
to the implementation of the new AMNOG law. Although this is a speculation, it is sensible 
to expect that whatever the outcome of the new elections next year will be, no revolutions 
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would take place but rather different levels of efforts (depending on the elected party) in 
implementing the new AMNOG law.  
The idea of updating reimbursement decisions as new evidence becomes available is in 
principle good; however, it requires a framework to assess the value of the drug and such an 
exercise touches on a highly sensitive topic in Germany which is attaching specific values to 
life.  
Another issue with such system is fear on the sickness fund’s side that prices might increase 
and resistance on the industry side for fear that prices might decrease as new evidence 
becomes available.  
6.2.6 Italy 
The Italian drug reimbursement landscape (Figure 6.11) is characterised by the following 
reimbursement options: no reimbursement, unconditional reimbursement or 
reimbursement in the frame of a managed entry agreement (MEA). Within a MEA context 
various instruments such as price-volume agreements (PVAs), cost-sharing, budget cap, 
monitoring registries, payment by results, risk-sharing, therapeutic plans, and “AIFA notes” 
are used to manage budget impact, uncertainty around clinical- and cost-effectiveness, and 
use.  
One of the most important instruments for MEAs in the Italian context is drug-monitoring 
registries. These registries aim to asses and track patient eligibility, evaluate utilisation in 
clinical practice, collect epidemiological data including data on the safety profile and collect 
additional information which was missing at the first evaluation stage. This should 
guarantee appropriate use of medicines according to its therapeutic indication while 
providing important information on the tolerability of a new drug and prescribing 
appropriateness.  
As of December 2011, 78 therapeutic indications (corresponding to 66 active compounds) 
were part of the Italian monitoring registry scheme, broken down into 30 for anti-neoplastic 
drugs, 14 for orphan drugs, 1 project for the treatment of psoriasis, 1 for a cardiovascular 
drug, 2 for ophthalmic drugs, 2 for rheumatoid arthritis drugs, 2 for diabetes drugs, 2 for 
dermatological drugs, 2 for respiratory drugs, 1 for an osteoporosis drug, and 2 specific 
projects for multiple sclerosis and attention deficit & hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  
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Of the 78 therapeutic indications part of a monitoring registry, 28 are also part of a 
conditional reimbursement agreement such as cost-sharing (12 indications), risk-sharing 
(discount scheme) (2 indications) or payment by result (14 indications) (results from survey 
2). Figure 6.12 illustrates how these three different models are implemented. All three 
models include a health outcome element in the form of evaluation of the treatment 
efficacy and continuation of treatment conditional on a positive response to the drug. The 
main differences lie in the financial arrangements. Cost sharing applies a general discount to 
all eligible patients at the beginning of treatment whereas both risk sharing and payment by 
result use a payback mechanism to compensate for the treatment costs of non-responders. 
In the case of risk sharing a discount is calculated and paid back by the manufacturer to the 
NHS while for payment by result the full cost of treatment for non-responders is reimbursed 
to the NHS.  In terms of implementation, the system of applying an initial discount to all 
eligible patients used in the cost-sharing scheme is simpler to administer than the system of 
reimbursement for non-responders used in the risk sharing and payback scheme.  
In terms of outcomes, 8 monitoring registries (7 for oncological drugs and 1 for a 
cardiovascular drug) have now been closed. Based on the data collected, a report has been 
published on the use of Ivabrandine in clinical practice (Tomino et al. 2010). Results include 
the epidemiological characterisation of patients with angina with contra-indication or 
intolerance to beta-blockers, identification of causes for non-administration, evaluation of 
the drug effectiveness in clinical practice and definition of the safety and tolerability profile 
of the new drug. A second report has been published on the use of diabetic drugs (Tomino 
et al. 2011). The data collected have enabled to identify reasons for treatment interruption, 
to collect information on adverse drug reaction, off-label use, patients’ clinical profile by 
active principle, treatment switch, and to analyse the therapeutic effects of different 
treatments. 
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Figure 6.11 The Italian reimbursement landscape and the application of MEAs 
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Figure 6.12 Italian models of MEAs between pharmaceutical companies and the NHS
Source: (Siviero 2011) 
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6.2.7 Latvia 
The National Health Service of Latvia is responsible for making decisions about inclusion of 
pharmaceuticals in the positive list and these are based on clinical and economic criteria. 
The main therapeutic criteria for a pharmaceutical to be reimbursed are (a) the relative 
therapeutic value of a new product based on the evidence level from published clinical 
trials; the relevance to the way the disease is managed and international guidelines for the 
treatment of the disease; (b) the place in the treatment pathway of the disease (e.g. 
first/second-line treatment, specific patient group); and (c) the relevance of the dosage, 
pharmaceutical form and pack size to the treatment course. The main economic criteria for 
a pharmaceutical to be reimbursed are a justified price, based on comparison with other 
available treatments and prices in other Baltic states and certain EU Member States; 
evidence on cost-effectiveness data and expected budget impact. 
 
There are three main reimbursement options, general reimbursement, which is linked with 
reimbursement rates of either 100%, 75%, or 50% depending on the severity of the disease; 
prescribing limited to specialists or specialised centres; and limited reimbursement for 
certain patient groups which are likely to benefit more. 
 
In terms of ways to manage entry of new expensive drugs, within the limited 
reimbursement budget there are few possibilities to introduce even new cost-effective 
expensive medicines. If there is uncertainty regarding cost-effectiveness and/or budget 
impact of a new product, most probably it will not be included in the positive list. However, 
the manufacturer can submit a new application for reimbursement when new evidence is 
available. 
For certain expensive products in the positive list, there are agreements in place between 
the NHS and the manufacturer concerning the number of treated patients per year. As part 
of these agreements, manufacturer pays either part of the expenses for each patient or the 
full treatment cost for certain number of patients. 
As part of legislation changes introduced in January 2013, the NHS can now conclude other 
types of agreement with manufacturer, including financial agreements, payment for 
performance, etc. 
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Thinking at future sustainable options to introduce new drugs, long term agreements, 
especially performance-related, could be a temporary solution in case of uncertain cost-
effectiveness and/or budget impact, while more evidence is gathered by manufacturer 
regarding effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the product. Patient databases are 
essential prerequisite of collecting effectiveness data, and these databases are rather 
underdeveloped in Latvia. However, the additional human resources needed for managing 
these agreements might render the introduction of these agreements cost-ineffective. In 
the end, it appears as if the most viable solution for Latvia to manage the budget impact of 
expensive, yet cost-effective medicines is through financial agreements. 
6.2.8 Lithuania  
The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) is responsible for medicines reimbursement in 
Lithuania together with the Minister of Health. There are two groups of reimbursed drugs, 
list A includes 250 reimbursed INN and eligibility is based on diagnosis while list B 
reimburses 56 INN and eligibility is restricted to vulnerable groups. Decisions on 
reimbursement are taken by the reimbursement committee together with the obligatory 
health insurance council, and the Health Minister. There are three reimbursement criteria, 
first therapeutic value, second pharmacoeconomic value, and third budget impact for the 
NHIF.     
Drugs demonstrating added therapeutic value and negative impact on the NHIF budget are 
included in reimbursement list A or B while drugs showing added therapeutic value but 
positive budget impact are put on a waiting list. If a drug shows low therapeutic and 
pharmacoeconomic value it is excluded from reimbursement.    
For drugs, which demonstrated added value but positive budget impact and are therefore 
put on the waiting list there are two options to obtain reimbursement, either to engage in a 
PVA or in a pay-back agreement. If expenditure exceeds the pre-agreed threshold 
pharmaceutical companies must refund all or part of the difference. There is a third type of 
MEA which is used for medicines already reimbursed as part of list A or B whose 
expenditure was more than LTL 1 million (EUR 0.3 million) in the previous year and more 
than 1 percent of total expenditure for drug reimbursement for ambulatory care. 
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As of December 2011, there were 35 MEAs, focusing mainly on antineoplastic and immuno-
modulating drugs (ATC-L: 11), followed by alimentary tract and metabolism drugs (ATC-A: 6) 
and neurological drugs (ATC-N: 6). Nine are subject to a payback agreement, six are PVAs, 
twenty are expenditure caps for drugs which exceeded expenditure (results from survey 2). 
These agreements are administered by the NHIF under the Ministry of Health. From 2008, 
such schemes are obligatory for all new pharmaceuticals that will have a positive budget 
impact compared with current treatment approaches for the target patient population. 
The minimum duration for an MEA agreement in Lithuania is three years (Garuoliene 2012). 
6.2.6 Poland 
In an attempt to limit public expenditure on drugs while extending the drug reimbursement 
list, MEAs have been introduced in Poland. Before the new pharmaceutical law came into 
force in January 2012, not all MEAs were translated into legal contracts and most are 
implemented as „gentlemen’s agreements”. However, there were some binding MEAs 
which include dose-capping, patient-capping, rebates, and free samples. 
Since January 2012, the new law on drug reimbursent provides the legal basis for 
implementing MEAs, which have so far been implemented in a rather informal and 
confidential way. There are various changes which will affect MEAs. For example, according 
to the new law, the President of the National health Fund (NHF) will be responsible for 
monitoring the results of the reimbursement decision that contained the risk-sharing 
instruments. 
The new law foresees MEAs to involve the following characteristics (Article 11, paragraph 5): 
(1) making the size of the applicant's income dependent on health outcomes generated by 
the drug; (2) making the official manufacturer price dependent on the applicant’s assurance 
to supply the drug at a reduced price determined in negotiations; (3) making the official 
manufacturer price dependent on the size of the sales of the drug; (4) making the official 
manufacturer price dependent on the partial repayment of the reimbursed amount to the 
public payer; (5) arrangement of other conditions improving access to healthcare services or 
reducing the cost of these services (Wilk 2012). These descriptions correspond can be linked 
to following MEA models: (1) payment by result, (2) discounts, (3) PVAs, (4) payback 
agreements, and (5) other.  
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Two further changes introduced by the reimbursement reform are relevant to MEAs. The 
first is the establishment of an Economic Commission within the Ministy of Health with 
responsiblity for pricing, negotiating with applicants, fixing official retail prices, and defining 
risk-sharing instruments. 
The second is the replacement of the Consultative Council in AHTAPol13 with a Transparency 
Council, which will be responsible for reimbursement decisions and for defining the relative 
conditions such as reimbursement levels, internal reference pricing, drug programmes, and 
risk-sharing instruments.  
In terms of measuring the performance of these agreements, there are currently two 
committees, one for ultra-orphan products and one on rheumatoid arthritis, which 
ultimately decide on patient eligibility based on clinical effectiveness. The work of these 
committees is indirectly assisted by 50 or so registries, which are currently in place in as 
many disease areas (Adamski 2011). 
Despite the fact that the new law provides a legal framework for implementing MEAs, 
important implementation challenges remain. First, although provision is made for certain 
types of MEAs to be implemented, MEAs templates for the design of such agreements are 
available; second, there are no executive regulations so far; third, it is not clear whether 
AHTAPol will assess these agreements; and fourth, there are high expectations on industry 
who is meant to present solutions applied in other countries and to propose models to be 
implemented in Poland (Wilk 2012; Brzezińska 2012).  
6.2.9 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the Health Minister decides on drug reimbursement based on advice 
from the Health Insurance Board (CVZ). There are three types of decision the Health 
Minister may take: to reimburse the drug as part of the basic insurance package, not to 
                                                      
13 The Agency for Health Technology Assessment in Poland (AHTAPol) is the Polish agency responsible for 
assessing the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical products introduces in Poland and 
to make recommendations to the Health Minister. For out-patient drugs, AHTAPol may recommend that a new 
drug is reimbursed either unconditionally, conditionally, or not reimbursed. Depending on which of the 
reimbursement lists the drug is assigned to, different reimbursement rates apply. For in-patient drugs there 
are additional options such as the drug being listed as part the National Health Fund (NHF) therapeutic 
programmes (such programmes make special budgets available for financing innovative and high cost drugs) or 
as part of individual agreement for oncology treatment.  
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reimburse or to conditionally reimburse a new drug. Conditionality refers to the eligible 
patients and who can provide it (e.g. authorised physicians or prior authorisation must be 
obtained from the health insurance company).  
Despite the steady growth of total pharmaceutical expenditure in the Netherlands, 
expenditure on hospital drugs has increased sharply in the past years. Increasing costs for 
hospital drugs together with tight hospital budgets (hospitals need to cover the medicines 
costs with their allocated budget), have led to geographical inequities in access (given that 
not all the hospitals can afford to pay for these expensive drugs).     
In an attempt to address issues in access to expensive drugs, the Government introduced a 
policy for hospital drugs (2006-2011) whereby it covers 80% of the cost of expensive drugs 
(budget impact>2.5 million) and 100% for orphan drugs.  
However, coverage comes with certain conditions; it is temporary (4 years) and conditional 
on the design of a study to collect additional evidence on the drug effectiveness in clinical 
practice. At the end of the four year funding period, if the results of the study demonstrate 
that the drug is cost-effective funding will continue and this time unconditionally (Figure 
6.13).  
As of November 2011, 45 expensive hospital drugs (including 10 orphan drugs) are part of 
coverage with evidence development in the Netherlands. The final coverage decisions are 
expected in December 2011.  
This system is expected to change from 2012 onwards as it will transit to healthcare benefit 
scheme decision-making. Further developments include the introduction of financial based 
agreements and outcome-based agreements in 2013 (Figure 6.14).  
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Figure 6.13 Coverage with evidence development as part of the expensive hospital drug policy in the Netherlands 
 
Source: (Kooijman 2011)
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Figure 6.14 The Netherlands: Conditional reimbursement for expensive hospital drugs from 2012 onwards 
 
 
Source: (Kooijman 2011) 
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6.2.10 Portugal 
In Portugal, health technology assessment (HTA) has been used since 1998 as an instrument 
to support evidence-based reimbursement decisions for out-patient drugs and since 2007 
for hospital drugs. Reimbursement decisions include reimbursed or not reimbursed. 
Reimbursed drugs are assigned to different reimbursement groups depending on whether 
they are essential, non-essential medicines, or new pharmaceutical whose therapeutic value 
has not been proven yet (Teixeira and Vieira 2008). Essential medicines are further divided 
depending on the type of illness they treat (chronic vs. serious illness). Each reimbursement 
group is linked to a different reimbursement rate.  
The main sources of uncertainty identified during the HTA assessment in Portugal are 
budget impact and uncertainty around relative effectiveness and/ or cost-effectiveness of a 
new drug. In an attempt to address these challenges, Portugal introduced price-volume 
agreements (PVA) and coverage with evidence development (CED) agreements. As of 
November 2011, there were 73 PVAs and 10 CED agreements in Portugal.  
The legal basis to introduce MEAs for out-patient medicines is provided by the Decree-Law 
nr. 48-A/2010 while the Decree-Law nr. 195/2006 provides the legal framework for MEAs in-
patient-medicines.  
PVAs aim to limit budget impact and to restrict drug use to the approved therapeutic 
indications and target patient population. After defining the eligible patient population, an 
annual budget limit for the NHS is set. If this budget threshold is breached, manufacturers 
need to reimburse the difference to the NHS. The initial agreement terminates after 2 years 
at which stage the therapeutic added value and cost-effectiveness of the drug is re-
evaluated. If the drug is found to provide added therapeutic value and to be cost-effective, a 
new budget limit may be set and the agreement may be extended for another 2-year 
period. 
CED agreements are implemented to address uncertainty about relative effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness. These agreement offer temporary coverage, which can become be 
extended or become permanent if the manufacturer provides additional data supporting 
the drug’s effectiveness at the end of the 2-year conditional reimbursement period. When 
the initial agreement period expires, the drug’s therapeutic added value and cost-
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effectiveness is re-evaluated and coverage decision updated. CED can be used in 
combination with a PVA if there is uncertainty about both effectiveness and budget impact. 
The Portuguese experience with MEAs has highlighted several challenges mainly related to 
the availability of sound data for decision making. Challenges include the definition of the 
population of patients who could benefit from the drug, paucity of clinical evidence 
particularly for rare diseases and orphan drugs and the challenges in conducting CE studies 
given the small patient numbers, inconsistencies between different data sources, evidence 
from other countries which is not transferable to Portugal, and the time required to 
generate additional evidence. Further challenges are more specific to hospital medicines 
and include complaints from manufacturers about the legal mandate to define PVAs for 
medicines with value-added therapeutic and cheaper than therapeutic alternatives, 
difficulties in establishing which medicines need to be evaluated and which not (the 
evaluation requirement was introduced in 2007 and applies to all agreement introduced 
thereafter but not to those introduced before 2007), and difficulties in evaluating 
indications.  Finally, as the number of agreement increases so does the number of people to 
be monitored thus posing significant challenges from a logistical perspective.   
6.2.11 Slovakia 
The reimbursement system in Slovakia is defined in the legislation and is in line with EU 
legistlation. The Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic (MoH) is responsible for pricing 
and reimbursement. An advisory body – so called „Categorization committee (CC)“ is 
established by the Minister of Health. The main task of CC is to evaluate applications for 
reimbursement of new pharmaceuticals, applications for the change of indication 
restrictions, prescription restrictions and  health insurance companies reimbursements, 
based on clinical evidence and cost-effectiveness with a focus on safety and positive 
influence on population health status. After evaluation by CC, the expert elaborates the 
opinions for the MoH, which subsequently decides on it. Criteria according which 
applications are evaluated are clearly defined in relevant norms regarding drugs 
reimbursement. These norms also describe processes and procedures regarding 
communication with the applicant or participant in the proceedings. The main focus is 
transparency and objectivity of decisions made and also there is possibility for the 
participant to object or appeal against the decision.  The whole process is transparent and 
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decisions are published online.  Composition of the advisory body (CC) is defined in the Law 
and includes representative from all relevant sectors, physicians, health insurance 
companies, and the MoH. 
Criteria for reimbursement of new drugs or changing indications and prescription 
restrictions are defined in relevant legislative acts and include clinical, social or pharmaco-
economic criteria. The price of a drug cannot exceed the average of 3 lowest prices from 
among all prices of drugs officially set in other EU member states. Drugs for inpatient 
healthcare are procured by means of tenders. Decree 365/2009 on drugs and medical 
devices, which can be procured by health insurance companies, stipulates which drugs can 
be centrally procured.  
There are several ways to set reimbursements on the basis of the above mentioned criteria. 
Drugs can be included in the positive list without limitations, with conditions or for a limited 
time period (e.g. 24 months).  
The legislation also defines the criteria for introducing orphan drugs. As mentioned before 
two of the most important criteria are pharmaco-economic aspects and cost effectiveness. 
Slovakia is one of 2 EU countries, which has QALY directly defined in the Law. The value of 
such indicator is one of the most important after pharmaco-economic aspects.  
The basic principle of state health policy in the field of drugs is to ensure the most modern, 
quality and safe pharmacotherapy, the use of which is medically reasonable and leads to the 
improved health status of population or saving lives. This state function must be fulfilled 
alongside with another state function - providing sustainability of public finance. For this 
reason, the MoH does not take into consideration only clinical or social aspect in its 
assessments of new drugs but also considers pharmaco – economic aspects.  
6.2.12 Spain 
In Spain MEAs are concluded at the regional level. PVAs agreements are usually applied to 
single new products where the negotiated price is conditioned by the expected number of 
units sold. Four performance-based agreements were identified in the literature, one in 
Catalonia (gefitinib) and three in a hospital in Granada, Andalusia (ambrisentan, 
pegfilgrastim, somatropin).  
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The pilot programme for gefitinib (Iressa®) in Catalonia started in 2011 with the duration of 
one year. Depending on the results of the pilot it is foreseen that the payment-by-
performance formula could progressively be extended to other drugs starting from 2012 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2011).  
All the three payment for performance agreements in Granada were initiated because of 
concerns around the high price of the drugs. Accordingly, the price of ambrisentan 
(Volbris®) (Gaceta Médica 2011), pegfilgrastim (Neulasta®) and growth hormone somatropin 
(Norditropin®) is dependent on the effectiveness of the drug. A technical committee 
(formed of a doctor, an industry representative, the hospital manager, a representative of 
the hospital pharmacy department, and representative of the Andalusian School of Public 
Health) is responsible for monitoring the functioning, control and monitoring of the 
agreements and the annual cost for running these agreements totals to approximately 1% of 
the annual drug cost (about EUR 15,000 per drug). The most important cost component is 
data collection.   
In 2011, the regional HTA body AETSA recommended that in areas where there is 
uncertainty about Soliris® (eculizumab)’s efficacy in terms of health-related outcomes (in 
this case reduction of thrombosis rates) an agreement based on shared risks should be 
concluded with the manufacturer (AETSA 2011). 
There are no conditions to encourage the hospital to engage a MEA. In every hospital, it is 
the pharmacist (director) who decides how to manage the available budget. Some of 
hospitals engage in confidential agreements, while others make information publicly 
available.  
6.2.13 Sweden  
The Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) is responsible to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of all new out-patients medicines introduced in the Swedish healthcare 
market. Since a couple of years, as part of a pilot project, TLV is also reviewing some 
hospital medicines although lacking of a mandate of making decisions in this area, thus its 
recommendations are not binding. All the data from Sweden presented in this report refer 
to those drugs for which TLV decides on reimbursement (i.e. out-patient drugs). 
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After reviewing all the available evidence, TLV makes one of the following three 
recommendations based on three principles: the principle of human value, the need and 
solidarity principle and the cost-effectiveness principle.  
1. To unconditionally reimburse the drug (no restrictions on indications or patient 
eligibility) 
2. To conditionally reimburse the drug (with restrictions on indications or patient 
eligibility) 
3. Not to reimburse the drug 
Conditionality refers to three main situations:  
a) Reimbursement is limited to specific indications, and/or level of severity of a particular 
condition, and/or specific patients subgroups, there is no requirement for the manufacturer 
to submit additional data;  
b) Similar to a) but with the requirement for the manufacturer to submit additional data;  
c) There are no limitations on indications, and/or level of disease severity, and/or patient 
eligibility but there is a requirement for the manufacturer to submit additional data. 
Conditional reimbursement without submission of additional data is a definitive decision 
with the aim of limiting coverage to those patients who are going to benefit the most from 
treatment. Differently, conditional reimbursement with data collection is a temporary 
coverage decision, which enables patients to access a new drug and at the same time gives 
the manufacturer the opportunity of collecting real world data on the effectiveness of the 
drug with the aim of resubmitting the cost-effectiveness model. The updated model should 
allow TLV to make a final decision.    
Most MEAs in Sweden fall in the second category of conditional reimbursement. Drugs in 
this group are recommended for use in specific patient sub-groups (those in which the drug 
is most cost-effective). In addition to coverage being limited to eligible patients, for certain 
drugs, TLV may request the manufacturer to collect additional data based on clinical 
practice and to re-submit the cost-effectiveness model. As of November 2011, there were 
15 MEAs in Sweden. All these MEAs agreements were coverage with evidence development, 
there are no financial agreements. These agreements are initiated by TLV, which requires 
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the manufacturer to submit additional evidence in order to obtain definitive coverage after 
the initial period of conditional coverage. In fact there is no real formal agreement between 
the manufacturer and TLV. TLV requires the manufacturer to accept specific reimbursement 
conditions and in certain cases requests additional data and manufacturer’s acceptance of 
these conditions is the requirement to obtain reimbursement.  




The type of risk addressed by MEA varies, the main focus is on cost-effectiveness and use in 
real-life including compliance with prescribing restrictions but some agreements also look at 
long term effects on morbidity and mortality or risk of stroke for example.  
Data on the number of decision by the decision’s degree of complexity presented suggests a 
trend towards less complex decisions. The number of decisions including presentation of 
evidence on effect and a non-interventional study decreased from 11 to 4 between 2003-
2007 and 2008-2012. In 2003-2007 there were no decisions based on the number of 
patients treated and sales volume while in 2008-2012 two such decisions were made. This 
type of decision is relatively simple to implement given the ready availability of the data 
required while non-interventional study requires the collection of a number of additional 




with request to submit 
new data 
Agreement life-time 
New decision made by TLV: 
Maintenance or loss of 
reimbursement status 
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Figure 6.15: Conditional reimbursement decisions in Sweden 
 
Notes: 1: number of patients, sales volume; 2: treatment duration; 3: patient characteristics; 4: effect RCT + 
new health economic model; 5: effect, non-interventional study (Arnberg 2012). 
6.2.14 UK - England and Wales 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is responsible for assessing 
the clinical and cost-effectiveness of medicines, medical devices, diagnostic techniques, 
surgical procedures and health promotion activities. NICE can be asked to review a drug, 
device, technology or intervention for a number of reasons, for example, when availability 
varies across the country. This may be due to different local prescribing practices, funding 
policies or confusion or uncertainty over its value. After reviewing available clinical and 
economic evidence, NICE makes a recommendation over the use of the technology:    
1. Recommended  
2. Optimised: the technology is recommended for more restricted patient group than 
the one prescribed by the marketing authorisation   
3. Only in research  
4. Not recommended 
The NHS in England is legally obliged to provide funding for treatments and drugs 
recommended by NICE technology appraisal guidance. It is important to note that NICE 
appraisal guidance does not, however, constitute a reimbursement decision for a medicine. 
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Where NICE guidance does not recommend a drug, NHS clinicians remain able to prescribe 
the product, subject to local decisions about funding.    
Patient access schemes (PAS) are arrangements within the 2009 Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS – the current UK pricing scheme for branded medicines), which 
may be considered to be a form of MEA. To be classified as a PAS, a scheme must feature in 
positive NICE guidance. PAS can be associated with both ‘full’ and optimised 
recommendations (categories 1 and 2 above).  The 2009 Pharmaceutical Price Regulation 
Scheme (PPRS) first introduced the concept of PAS by making provisions and outlining the 
principles for the development and implementation of PAS. Prior to that, a few 
arrangements that can be considered to be MEAs had been implemented in the UK (notably 
the Multiple Sclerosis Risk Sharing Scheme) but in the absence a formal regulatory 
framework.  After the implementation of the 2009 PPRS, the DH commissioned NICE to set 
up the Patient Access Scheme Liaison Unit (PASLU) with the mandate of advising the DH on 
PAS proposals submitted by manufacturers. Figure 6.16 provides a simplified representation 
of the process through which a PAS is developed. As indicated in the figure, PAS are always 
proposed by the manufacturer. The proposed PAS may be accepted as part of the NICE 
appraisal process conditional on the approval of both DH and a positive recommendation by 
NICE. This process applies to all PAS proposals. The main impact of PAS in the UK so far has 
been to facilitate patient access to some drugs that might not otherwise have been 
recommended by NICE due to low cost-effectiveness or uncertainty about costs (e.g. where 
treatment duration is uncertain). Apart from the Multiple Sclerosis Risk-Sharing Scheme 
(which preceded the PAS arrangements and is not classified as a PAS), which explicitly aims 
to generate additional evidence on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of interferon-
beta, there is no emphasis on generating additional evidence mainly because evidence 
showed that such arrangements can be very burdensome for health staff to manage.   
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Figure 6.16 PAS proposal process (simplified) 
 
Source: (Bowden 2011) 
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Generally, NICE-approved PAS do not involve data collection because they are not meant to 
generate additional evidence since these drugs have already received a positive 
recommendation by NICE. On the contrary, these schemes were the pre-condition for NICE 
to recommend the drug because they enabled to improve the cost-effectiveness by e.g. 
lowering the drug price through discounts.  
However, as described above, pharmaceutical companies may offer schemes or discounts to 
the local NHS outside NICE appraisals as long as these do not contravene any aspect of the 
PPRS, and some local schemes are offered for drugs which have either not been reviewed or 
have received a negative recommendation by NICE (NHS Devon 2011). For example, 
Erlotinib (Tarceva®) for the maintenance treatment of non-small cell lung cancer, advanced 
or metastatic, was rejected by NICE on cost-effectiveness grounds (National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence 2011) but is available to NHS Devon patients through local 
arrangements14. Eligibility criteria set by NHS Devon include: the patient being stable 
disease after platinum-based first-line chemotherapy and the availability of individual 
funding before prescribing (obtainable upon completion of an Individual Funding Panel 
Request and following positive response by the Panel). Funding decisions for drugs, which 
have not been reviewed by NICE are made by local NHS organisations. Degarelix 
(Firmagon®) for advanced hormone dependent prostate cancer has currently not been 
reviewed by NICE and is available in the NHS Devon through local arrangements (NHS Devon 
2011). NHS Devon criteria for patient eligibility include being an adult male patient with 
advanced hormone dependent prostate cancer, availability of individual funding before 
prescribing (obtainable by completing an Individual Funding Panel Request and following 
positive response by the Panel), approval by the panel. Further, according to the Peninsula 
Health Technology Commissioning Group (PHTCG)15, degarelix will not be routinely 
commissioned for this indication. The NHS Devon local arrangement for Firmagon® 
                                                      
14 Erlotinib as an alternative treatment to docetaxel for patients with non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC) who 
have already tried one chemotherapy regimen but it has not worked is available to all eligible NHS patients 
under a NICE-approved PAS (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2010). 
15 The Peninsula Health Technology Commissioning Group is a collaborative decision making group with 
delegated decision making from the four Primary Care Trusts in the South West Peninsula - NHS Devon, NHS 
Plymouth, Torbay Care Trust and NHS Cornwall and Isles of Scilly (NHS Devon 2011).   
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(degarelix) is a 5 year agreement which aims to remove the financial barrier to degarelix 
within primary care by paying a 30% discount to the PCT based on primary care spend (NHS 
Devon 2011). Further, agreements between local NHS organizations and manufacturers may 
be initiated (e.g. Lipitor, North Staffordshire health authority, Pfizer with the participation of 
Academia to ensure robustness and independency of data collection and analysis (Chapman 
et al. 2003; Chapman et al. 2004)). 
In addition to fully recommending, not recommending or recommending limited access to a 
new drug, NICE may also recommend its use in research only (“only in research” 
recommendation (OIR)). It has been suggested that this recommendation could be used as a 
“polite no” by NICE (Chalkidou, Hoy, and Littlejohns 2007). It is debatable whether OIR 
recommendations should be considered as MEAs, some authors have classified them as a 
form of coverage with evidence development (Carlson et al. 2010; Carbonneil, Quentin, and 
Lee-Robin 2009), while others have excluded them from the definition of MEAs (Staffinski 
2010). If we consider a MEA as a two-party agreement between payers and manufacturers 
then OIR should not be considered as MEAs due to the absence of such a formal agreement. 
However, there are examples where a drug, which was recommended as OIR has later been 
recommended by NICE after submission of new evidence by the manufacturer.  In 2000, 
docetaxel as an option for the adjuvant treatment of women with early-node positive breast 
cancer was recommended as OIR. In 2006, after submission of additional evidence by the 
sponsor, it received a positive recommendation (Scottish Medicines Consortium 2011). 
Irinotecan and oxaliplatin for the treatment of advanced colorectal cancer had also been 
initially recommended as OIR but received a positive recommendation in 2003 thanks to the 
availability of new evidence generated as part of clinical trial (Chalkidou, Hoy, and 
Littlejohns 2007). 
The aim of PAS in England is to manage uncertainty and to improve patient access to cost-
effective innovative drugs. There are concerns about administrative burdens for the NHS 
and the industry and this was also the reason for focussing on financially-based PAS mainly 
involving discounts, rebates or dose capping without requiring additional monitoring such as 
an outcome-guarantee agreement requires. The PPRS includes the option of outcome-based 
agreements, but these are considered only in exceptional circumstances, and there is only 
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one operational PAS, which includes an outcome-based element (for bortezomib (Velcade) 
in the treatment of multiple myeloma).  
The introduction of the new value-based pricing system in January 2014 will lead to major 
changes in the pricing landscape for branded medicines in the UK. The main change is the 
move from a price regulation system based on controlling manufacturers’ profits to a 
system of value-based pricing (VBP), though the intention is that VBP will focus primarily on 
new active substances, at least in the short term. It is possible that this new system could 
make PAS redundant as the prices of new drugs will be based on their value, which in turn 
implies understanding how a drug works in practice and what (clinical) benefits it delivers 
along the disease trajectory. However, no decision has yet been made on whether there 
might be a role for some type of PAS or ‘PAS-like’ arrangements in the new arrangements 
for pricing branded medicines.  
6.2.15 Overview of Member States perspective on MEAs contribution  
This section presents results of an email survey conducted in June-July 2012 and asking 
Member States to share their views on the most important contribution of MEAs. 
Results from Table 6.5 show that access to new therapies which might have otherwise not 
been accepted for reimbursement or not been recommended by NICE in the UK, limiting 
budget impact, and managing uncertainties related to cost-effectiveness and use at the 
point of decision-making are seen as key contributions of MEAs according to MS.  
Table 6.5: Member States perspectives on the most important aspects of MEAs as they are 
currently implemented in each country  
Belgium 
Patients 
Access to promising new therapies 
Health payers (NHDI) 
Financial safeguards in terms of budget management and control 
Manufacturer 
Access to the market with a list price = financial guarantees 
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Italy 
MEAs aim at guaranteeing access to medicines for patients and budget sustainability at the 
same time. 
Lithuania 
The most important contribution of MEAs in Lithuania is to manage budget impact for the 
NHIF. In addition to that, MEAs can be very important managing uncertainty relating to 
clinical or cost-effectiveness. 
Portugal 
The most important contribution of MEAs is to provide a legal framework in which 
INFARMED can provide access to medicines that in other way would not be provided, 
because of the uncertainty related to their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.  
Therefore the main benefit is to provide a mechanism of access/reimbursement that 
addresses the uncertainty and at the same time maximises an adequate and effective use of 
the medicine and limits the budget impact generated by his use. 
Sweden 
The most important contribution of MEAs, as they are used today in Sweden, is that they 
can alleviate some of the uncertainties regarding cost-effectiveness at the point of decision 
(e.g. will the product be used by the “correct” patients? Will the outcomes in real practice 
be in line with the assumptions?). 
UK 
The 2009 Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) includes the option for 
pharmaceutical companies to propose Patient Access Schemes (PAS), which are national 
level arrangements to improve the cost-effectiveness of a medicine being considered as part 
of a NICE technology appraisal. PAS have proven a useful tool within the 2009 PPRS in 
facilitating patient access to some medicines that might not otherwise have been 
recommended by NICE. (Though it is important to note that NICE appraisal guidance does 
not constitute a reimbursement decision. Where NICE does not recommend a drug, NHS 
clinicians remain able to prescribe the product, subject to local decisions about funding). 
Source: EMINet survey 
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6.3 Stakeholder input: Manufacturers  
The research-based manufacturers’ position on MEAs is captured in this section and is based 
on an internal survey conducted by EFPIA among its members, the results of which were 
subsequently communicated for inclusion in this study. This section reflects, as a 
consequence, EFPIA’s positions on behalf of the manufacturers it represents. 
EFPIA’s position is based on the right for manufacturers to freely set drug prices based on 
their value, and on the payer’s right to assess the drug and decide whether the price asked 
by the manufacturer represents “value for money”. 
In reality there can be considerable uncertainty over a product’s performance in real life at 
the time of launch and EFPIA sees higher than normal levels of uncertainty, especially where 
a more significant budget impact is expected, as the motivation which should drive the 
introduction of these schemes. Used in this way, contractual agreements are perceived as a 
useful instrument to improve patient access to new medicines. Contractual agreements that 
do not consider the value of a particular product (whether based on an assessment of 
clinical added value or including economic evaluation, such as cost-effectiveness) are 
considered as not justified by EFPIA. This includes schemes that are more about “risk-
shifting” than true “risk-sharing”, price-volume agreements, claw-back policies or budget 
caps that do not incorporate the notion of value.  
Further, because the available evidence at the time a new drug is launched is often limited 
to data from RCTs, the value of a newly-launched product may not be fully demonstrated 
yet. In this respect, specific areas of uncertainty may include the patient sub-groups who are 
most likely to benefit from the drug, whether surrogate parameters used in clinical trials will 
be validated in post-launch studies, and uncertainty around the transferability of clinical trial 
results to real-life situation within a specific healthcare system.  
EFPIA recognises the existence of different types of uncertainty which include scientific 
uncertainty (e.g. risk-benefit may change over the life-cycle, effectiveness in real life, which 
patients will benefit the most and who will respond), financial uncertainty (e.g. number of 
doses required per treatment, duration of treatment, need for treatment combinations, 
need for supportive care, aggregate budget impact), utilisation uncertainty (e.g. are health 
care providers and prescribers able to target the patients in which the product is found “of 
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value”? Will patients adhere to treatment?). For many new medicines there is limited 
uncertainty, and hence no need for agreements from EFPIA’s point of view. In other cases 
agreements can ensure “value for money” (figure 6.17). 
 
Figure 6.17: EFPIA’s perspective on the situations where MEAs may be applied 
 
The duration of the agreement should be set in relation to the uncertainty to be addressed, 
particularly if data on long-term efficacy/effectiveness is sought (e.g. on disease 
progression). 
Where agreements seek to collect additional evidence on the value “in real life” through 
registries, observational studies and similar schemes, it is desirable that also the 
pharmaceutical company has access to data – without jeopardising data privacy.  
 
MEAs and differential pricing 
Contractual agreements have also been suggested as a mechanism for improving access to 
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to reflect affordability across countries. Pharmaceutical companies are today effectively 
discouraged from price differentiation due to international reference pricing and parallel 
trade. To work in practice, such patient access agreements must be protected from extra-
territorial effects and the inherent conflict between transparency and efficiency needs to be 
addressed. The 2008 OECD report of global pricing policies suggests that contractual B2B-
solutions on price and usage (=volume) are the natural evolution of value-based pricing. It 
also states that the confidentiality of agreements is a cornerstone for successful contracting. 
Contractual agreements are still in their infancy in Europe and approaches to regulate these, 
such as inclusion in a possible revision of the Transparency Directive, would be counter-
productive from EFPIA’s perspective. Nevertheless, EFPIA thinks that there are principles in 
the Directive which should apply to these agreements, most notably the non-discrimination 
towards foreign companies. Another issue that the European Commission has identified, 
and that EFPIA appreciates, relates to what happens after the expiry of contracts. 
EFPIA suggests that the EU discussion should aim to seek agreement on terms (taxonomy) 
and good principles for contractual agreements. 
Managed entry agreements - Principles 
Harmonisation of MEAs would be counter-productive in EFPIA’s view. At the same time, 
EFPIA believes there are general conditions that will greatly enhance a scheme’s success and 
ensure that ultimately the patients who will most benefit from the new drug will access it; 
these conditions are outlined below. First, there should be flexibility in, and clarity about, 
the circumstances under which a scheme might apply. A particular type of agreement 
cannot be applied indiscriminately to all products. Second, to facilitate the undertaking of 
further outcomes studies and to minimise their additional cost, payers and healthcare 
bodies should improve the provision of data and should cooperate with industry to develop 
and maintain efficient data-collection systems. Third, for the agreement lifetime not to 
become a protracted series of price/reimbursement renegotiations, there needs to be a 
clear agreement on what is going to be measured and a clear assignment of responsibilities 
on how this is going to be achieved (required outcomes, specified time period for 
subsequent review of the reimbursement agreements, criteria, data collection capabilities, 
volume targets, etc.). Fourth, schemes should not lead to ever higher hurdles in terms of 
value expectation and burden of data provision. Fifth, payers should accept evidence from 
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different sources, e.g. both phase IV clinical studies and observational/epidemiological 
studies. Sixth, data requirements should remain proportional to the agreed target outcomes 
to be demonstrated, the timeframes set, and considerations around the costs vs. benefits of 
additional data. Clear understanding between payers and manufacturers on quantifying 
uncertainty, defining a “confidence interval” for the demonstration of target outcomes, and 
accepting residual margins of uncertainty (which are almost inevitable in real-life use) are 
key to address these concerns. Seventh, payers/healthcare authorities should ensure that 
the appropriate infrastructure and expertise is in place to enable schemes to be properly 
conducted and evaluated. Eighth, there should not be any ad hoc cost-containment 
mechanisms applicable to a medicine in addition to the scheme. Finally, information on 
MEAs should be accessible to the public with certain elements of such agreements covered 
by confidentiality rules that enable manufacturers to make the best offer. A climate of 
mutual trust and understanding based on the acceptance that some of the contractual 
details are covered by confidentiality obligations will ultimately lead to better outcomes for 
the negotiating parties because it offers the highest degree of willingness to put the best 
possible offer on the table.  
Conclusions 
EFPIA believes the following three key objectives should be achieved through a discussion 
on MEAs. First, the identification of concrete success factors (including health policy, legal, 
regulatory and political factors) for contractual schemes, looking at existing examples and 
define the general conditions needed to ensure schemes are clear, fair and achieve effective 
and timely access for patients. Second, to explore ways in which existing data collection 
systems at national and European level can be further leveraged in Europe. Third, to identify 
pricing and reimbursement system hurdles to access, in particular with regards to the 
impact of international price referencing. 
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6.4 Stakeholder input: Patient representatives 
Interviews with six representatives from Belgium, Italy, Sweden and the UK were conducted 
in April-May 2012. Three of these patient representatives are active in the area of cancer 
diseases, one in the area of immune disorders, while Cittadinanza Attiva is a consumer 
organisation promoting civic participation and protection of consumer’s rights in Italy and in 
Europe. The views presented in the sections that follow reflect those of the interviewees 
and are also reflective of the setting or the country where the interviewees and their 
organisations are operating. 
6.4.1 Representative of Myeloma UK  
The interviewee was very well familiar with the concept of MEAs. Indeed Myeloma UK 
pioneered the concept of patient access scheme (PAS) with bortezomib (Velcade). The 
bortezomib scheme was the first of NICE’s PAS and set the scene for subsequent schemes as 
a means to gain access to new medicines where the QALY/ICER was above the accepted 
threshold.  
Myeloma UK knew the drug would bring benefits to myeloma patients and that it 
underperformed in the appraisal because of the uncertainty surrounding the data due to 
the fact of the companion crossover design of the pivotal clinical trial.  
Given the uncertainty with the data, the ideal solution was to share the risk caused by the 
uncertainty between the NHS and the manufacturer. Myeloma UK worked with the drug 
company and the Department of Health to find a solution to make bortezomib available to 
NHS patients. While the drug company worked on the details and the technicalities of the 
scheme, Myeloma UK was absolutely instrumental to make this happen.  
The risk-share scheme is essentially a money back guarantee. If patients do not reach a 
partial response or better, treatment is stopped and the NHS reimbursed for the cost of the 
drug. If patients receive a partial response or better after four cycles, treatment continues 
to a maximum of eight cycles with the NHS bearing the full cost. 
In clinical practice, many more patients than projected achieved a partial response due to 
the fact that the drug is always given in combination with the steroid dexamethasone plus 
or minus cyclophosphamide. These additional drugs, although very cheap, increase 
response rates from about 30% to 60%. 
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The manufacturer is responsible for auditing and collecting the data on how the scheme is 
working but it was a slow process in the beginning because some health staff would not fill 
out the required form to obtain reimbursement for non-respondent patients. It took some 
time before the scheme was efficiently monitored and implemented. 
Benefits 
In terms of benefits for patients and manufacturers, PAS can bring advantages to patients 
because often they apply to drugs which would not otherwise fall within NICE’s cost-
effectiveness criteria and therefore would be unlikely to receive a positive recommendation 
by NICE. Further, PAS offer a way to manufacturer to provide a discount without changing 
list prices (and there are not many other mechanisms available) and improve the cost-
effectiveness of the drug. 
However, PAS should be limited to the short-term and that they should not become a long-
term solution for industry to access the market.  
In the long term manufacturers should deliver a better value proposition to obtain inclusion 
in positive reimbursement lists through for example more creative pricing mechanisms 
which reflect value and innovation. Drug companies will need to work harder and produce 
more robust evidence in order to justify the price. Through such requirements, the appetite 
for patient access schemes will eventually decrease and PAS will be very much seen as 
exception rather the norm. 
Eligibility criteria 
Regarding fairness or restrictiveness of eligibility criteria, it is hard to generalise as they 
need to be seen in the context of the drug, disease, the appraisal and what the most 
appropriate benchmark for the scheme is. If there is uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
the drug for example, then a response-scheme is suitable. With lenalidomide there was less 
uncertainty about the effectiveness instead the price was too high. In this context, putting a 
cap to the number of doses per patient was probably the simplest and most straightforward 
solution.  
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Monitoring requirements 
One of the major flaws in the UK is that nobody really concentrates on efficiency. No-one 
collects data on how, for example, NICE appraisals work in practice. This means that there is 
no evidence of the cost-effectiveness of for instance bortezomib or lenalidomide in clinical 
practice because no one collects this information. Collecting data on treatment 
performance is critical and it should be captured in an outcome registry which can be used 
to understand how the drug performs and is used in clinical practice. 
Evaluation process 
Myeloma UK has not been really involved in the evaluation process. Part of the reason is 
because this is a more administrative type of process. What is really important to patients is 
accepting to stop treatment because according to NICE guidance they did not obtain a 
sufficient response to treatment. In the eyes of patients, this is just penny-pinching but in 
reality a doctor would never keep treating a patient with a drug if the patient was not 
responding. However, because this happens in the frame of NICE guidance, patients 
perceive it is as a non-justified cost-saving measure not allowing their doctor to continue 
treatment.  
This suspicion on patients’ side goes back to communication problems between patients 
and doctors. Evidence from patient satisfaction surveys in the UK shows that what patients 
are most upset about is poor communication with their physicians. Better communication 
and better management of expectations (in general this should be not limited to 
communication about PAS) could help making patients accept NICE guidance stopping 
criteria.  
Mutual benefits for all the parties involved 
There are most definitely benefits for patients and drug manufacturers. Patients benefit 
from accessing medicines, which would have otherwise probably been rejected by NICE 
because of low cost-effectiveness; while the benefit for manufacturers is to receive a 
positive NICE recommendation for their drug. For the NHS the balance might be more 
unfavourable because of the administrative burden of managing the schemes.  
Further, there are also 2 pregnancy prevention schemes that accompany two common 
treatments for myeloma, so in any given clinic you have 4 types of schemes being 
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implemented only for myeloma PAS. This additional workload for hospital pharmacists and 
doctors goes without counting that 20% of the patients will be on clinical trials. All this 
linked back to the communication issues mentioned before because the administrative 
requirements of these schemes draw time away from doctors and other clinical staff (in 
particular hospital pharmacy staff) to communicate with patients.   
MEAs as the way forward for introducing new and expensive drugs  
No. The existence of PAS is due to the failures with the current pricing and drug evaluation 
process. If these failures did not exist, there would be no need for PAS, individual funding 
requests, and cancer drug fund. Their existence is a clear sign of the existing issues with the 
current system. The introduction of value-based-pricing (VBP), which is meant to address 
these issues, will make PAS redundant and eventually led to their disappearing. 
6.4.2 Representative of a Swedish patient representative organisation 
The concept of MEAs was new to the interviewee. For this reason, the interview focussed on 
options to enable access to high cost-drugs, which have been rejected by TLV in Sweden. 
As a matter of fact there is mainly one option, which is funding through the County Council 
(CC). This generally happens for expensive drugs, targeted at a small patient group, when 
there is lack of alternative treatment options.  
However, reimbursement at CC level leads to disparities in access across the country 
because not all CC are likely to grant special reimbursement. The process of obtaining 
reimbursement from the CC can be initiated by an individual patient or a group of patients 
who lobby the CC for reimbursement, by the CC itself if they think TLV rejected a drug which 
should be available to patients, but the most common way in which this process is stated is 
probably on request of the doctor responsible for treatment to the CC. Funding decision are 
taken by a special medicine committee in each CC. 
An example of a drug which was rejected by TLV and which received reimbursement 
through the CC (the interviewee had no information about how many CC reimbursed it) is 
velaglucerase alfa (VPRIV) for the treatment of a rare inherited disorder called Gaucher’s 
disease. This drug fulfilled the general CC criteria for reimbursement: it is an expensive drug, 
it is directed to a small patient population, and has no available treatment alternatives. For 
this reasons, the County Council accepted to fund the drug.  
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However, use of lapatinib (Tyverb®) for second line treatment of a very difficult breast 
cancer, was refused by the CC (the interviewee does not exclude that some CC may have 
been able to pay for it) because alternative medicines were available.  
6.4.3 Representative of multiple sclerosis (MS) patients in the UK 
The interviewee was familiar with the concept of MEAs. Overall patients benefit from PAS as 
it enables them to access new and expensive drugs, which might otherwise not have been 
available to them. However, in order to ensure this, it is crucial that access is not limited to 
clinical trial participants.  
Eligibility criteria will always be there whether as part of a PAS or NICE positive 
recommendation with conditions. The MS Society accepts that as long as the criteria are 
wide enough to enable all patients who can benefit from the drug to access it. Further, it is 
important to adapt such criteria as new evidence of clinical benefit emerges.  
It is important to collect additional data on drug use and effectiveness in clinical practice 
and the healthcare system should be willing to bear the additional workload and resources 
needed to collect them. However, because resources are limited, it is essential that data 
collection is balanced against the benefits it can bring to avoid misplacing resources which 
could have otherwise been employed to enable patient access to treatment.  
This patient representative organisation has never really performed an evaluation of PAS in 
the UK.  
The issue with the evaluation of the risk-sharing scheme for beta interferon and glatiramer 
acetate for multiple sclerosis (MS) is that not enough time was planned for the evaluation of 
this scheme. In fact, the conclusion reached at the end of the first evaluation was that more 
time is needed to provide a definitive answer on the performance of these drugs.  
One important issue with this scheme is that even if and when a conclusion on the 
effectiveness of these drugs is reached, it will be very difficult to ask patients who do not 
classify as having a positive response according to the scheme criteria to stop treatment. 
Many patients are already on treatment and the evaluation of the drug performance is 
made difficult by the very nature of the disease. There is a grey area where it is difficult to 
establish whether the treatment is actually bringing a benefit to the patient. In addition to 
that views on treatment performance are likely to be different between patients and NICE. 
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Patients might think the drug is beneficial to them but from a NICE perspective these 
benefits are not necessarily sufficient to make the drug cost-effective. A possible solution to 
address the peculiarities of MS through a MEA is to develop a performance based scheme 
whereby the manufacturer reimburses treatment costs for patients who do not achieve a 
pre-agreed response level.  
PAS do offer mutual benefits to the involved parties as they enable patients to access drugs 
and manufacturers to obtain positive NICE recommendation and therefore increase their 
sales. Overall, the English experience with PAS is positive. For the MS Society the main 
underlying problem is access to treatment. Due to local prescribing practices and difficulties 
in establishing whether a patient meets NICE criteria, access to MS drugs differs 
substantially across England.  
PAS could be a possible way forward for introducing new and expensive drugs as they 
represent a win-win situation for all the parties involved.  
Whether value-based pricing (VBP) will make PAS redundant or not depends on what VBP is 
meant to be. If VBP is only about adding a few additional factors into NICE’s appraisals 
probably not. However, if it is about introducing a price negotiation platform and the issue is 
price, then negotiation as part of VBP would make the need for PAS redundant as the 
discount which would otherwise been granted as part of a PAS could be arranged at the 
negotiation stage. However, if the issue is poor evidence, then a system of VBP would not 
solve existing issues and PAS, which include collection of additional evidence would still be 
needed. 
6.4.4 Representative from European multiple sclerosis (MS) platform 
The interviewee was familiar with the concept of managed entry agreements (MEAs). 
Indeed, the European MS platform supported the MS Society in the UK campaigning for the 
interferon scheme in the UK and helped them to overcome NICE’s first negative reaction 
towards this new drug group. 
Any initiative to improve access is most welcome to patients and if negotiations between 
payers and manufacturers are stopped or delayed because of uncertainty issues, MEAs 
represent the second best solution to unconditional reimbursement. However, there is also 
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a danger for payer to continue funding a drug, which is not cost-effective if no clear 
conclusion is reached on the effectiveness of the drug at the end of the MEA study period. 
MEAs should be linked with the DG-Sanco Joint Action Patient Registries Initiative (PARENT), 
which would allow to bring together a large amount of data across Europe. Further, 
opportunities should be sought to link MEAs with post-marketing data collection. 
Patients benefit of improved access though MEAs, while manufacturer have chance to 
obtain reimbursement and therefore recover investment in R&D. The advantages for payers 
seem to be more limited based on the UK experience with MS scheme. An important issue, 
which needs to be considered for the successful implementation of MEA, is whether they 
are implemented as initially agreed. For example if healthcare provider receive 
reimbursement for unsuccessful treatment outcome.  
MEAs can definitely represent a solution for introducing new and expensive drugs if there is 
uncertainty about their effectiveness. However, this also raises issues in regards to how 
drugs are evaluated in HTA. For the interferon scheme in the UK, there is no clear evidence 
of the drug effectiveness on scientific grounds to date but substantial anecdotal evidence of 
the benefits for patients (“I would not be able to work if was not taking this drug”) exists. 
Apart from the specific issues involved with the evaluation of this scheme, broader issues 
common to the evaluation of all drugs remain. First of all, it is difficult to capture quality of 
life in the quality adjusted life year (QALY) indicator used in HTA. Second, patients are not 
sufficiently involved in setting the criteria of about the outcome measure, which will be 
used to evaluate the drug. 
Whether there will still be a place for MEAs in the era of value-based pricing (VBP) really 
depends on how VBP is going to be implemented. Issues around the right comparator drug 
for example are likely to remain. An important aspect to consider when issues about the 
financing of new and expensive drugs are discussed is the concept of holistic budgeting. This 
concept entails moving away from single drug budget to a more holistic budgeting 
approach. For example, if a drug enables a patient to avoid early retirement and stay in the 
workforce, it is reasonable that the pension fund would contribute to the treatment costs 
because in the end it will enable to save pension funds.  
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6.4.5 Representative of melanoma in Belgium 
The interviewee was familiar with the concept of managed entry agreements (MEAs). While 
it is not possible to generalise, MEAs is an instrument and as such it can be used and 
abused.  
It is difficult to express an opinion on eligibility criteria in Belgium, since patients are 
presented with the final decision and there we have no information on the elements which 
fed into the decision-making process. Monitoring requirements. 
Monitoring the drug effectiveness can be a controversial issue. Patients want real life data 
to see if results from Phase-3 clinical trials actually apply to all patients. However, some 
patients also fear that the drug might be taken away if the study does not show that the 
drug if effective. 
This patient representative organisation has so far never been involved in an evaluation of 
MEAs.  
There is no “yes” or “no” answer in terms of mutual benefits for all actors involved; it really 
depends on how this instrument (MEA) is used. One important issue for patients is the lack 
of knowledge about MEAs, about available options in terms of agreements, and experiences 
in implementing MEAs (from a patient, health service, and manufacturer perspective). One 
positive element is definitely access, however there are also threats linked with the use of 
diagnostic tools and how these tools are going to be evaluated. If the same manufacturer 
owns the drug and the diagnostic tool there are serious issues in terms of monopoly power.  
Another issue is the threat that MEAs might draw away attention from the real issue. For 
example, several oncologists and patients are not convinced about the recommended 
dosing and regime, of the monoclonal antibody ipilimumab (Yervoy). This immunotherapy is 
very expensive even for cancer therapy standards. Concentrating on how to make the drug 
available as part a MEA, may distract from the real issue which is to collect more evidence 
to improve dosing, regime, and use.  
MEA is an instrument, it is not a solution, and in order to make it work patients need to be 
informed about best practices, the process of developing MEA needs to be transparent, and 
most importantly it needs to include patients.  
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MEAs as the way forward for introducing new and expensive drugs 
At the moment there are few alternatives to MEA. However, for MEA to succeed cultural 
differences between countries, particularly in the way they perceive risk, need to be taken 
into consideration. The very transparent Anglo-Saxon model might not work in a country 
like Belgium for example. Regarding how VBP would change the landscape of MEA, there 
would most probably still be the need for them, particularly as most countries think a 
system of VBP is unaffordable and would therefore not help in making very expensive drugs 
more affordable.   
6.4.6 Representative of Cittadinanza Attiva in Italy 
The interviewee was familiar with the concept of managed entry agreement (MEAs).  
MEAs represent an innovative formula to introduce new medicines in a fast and transparent 
way, from this perspective they certainly bring benefits for patients. However, one issue 
with MEA is that patients are not involved in the decision-making process regarding 
eligibility criteria.  
In terms of monitoring treatment, the interviewee would welcome more registries. Data 
collection is essential to confirm the data submitted by the manufacturer and to support 
(and if relevant in the light of the new evidence to update) reimbursement decisions.   
Cittadinanza Attiva has never conducted an evaluation of MEAs in Italy.  
MEAs can offer mutual benefits to all the parties involved. Patients benefit of faster access 
to innovative treatments while the manufacturer, by taking responsibility for the outcome 
of its drugs, can improve its image in the eyes of the public, gains credibility for its products, 
and raise its reputation.  
MEAs can definitely represent the way forward for introducing expensive innovative drugs 
especially because there are not many other alternatives available. In cases where there are 
doubts about the effectiveness of a new drug, a MEA it is a worthwhile investment despite 
the additional resources needed to develop it. Even in the context of value-based pricing 
there will be always the need for MEA because it does not solve the problem of paucity of 
evidence at pricing and reimbursement level.   
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6.4.7 Summary of patient representative experiences with MEAs 
All apart from one of the patient representatives interviewed was familiar with the concept 
of MEA. Indeed some of them had been involved in promoting and facilitating the 
development of MEA (e.g. Myeloma UK and MS Society UK with the support of the 
European MS platform). 
There is general agreement that MEA bring advantages to patients in terms of access to 
treatment and to manufacturers in terms of reimbursement. Some interviewees 
acknowledged the possible disadvantages for those implementing the schemes such as 
doctor and pharmacists. 
Most interviewees think that there is still need for MEAs even in an era of VBP because of 
the many remaining issues (e.g. challenges in choosing the appropriate comparator product, 
lack of evidence at the time of pricing and reimbursement, etc.).  
Concerns include the lack of transparency surrounding MEA, the limited involvement of 
patients in designing the schemes and defining the relevant outcome measures.  
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7 Discussion 
Despite the diversity in the different models of MEAs implemented across EU Member 
States, all these agreements are introduced in an attempt to address one or more of three 
objectives: first, to limit budget impact, second, to address uncertainties regarding clinical 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness and/or in a specific context (e.g. validate cost-
effectiveness information from another country with local data), and third to manage 
utilisation to optimise performance.  
The following paragraphs will discuss the instruments used by EU Member States in an 
attempt to achieve these objectives. Some of the instruments used have application in more 
than one area, for example, conditional treatment continuation or limitation of 
reimbursement to specific patient sub-groups contribute to both managing budget impact 
(through reduced utilisation) and managing utilisation to optimise performance (by limiting 
reimbursement to the patient sub-groups who are likely to benefit the most). 
7.1 Managing budget impact  
Instruments to manage budget impact include PVAs, budget caps, dose caps, discounts, 
paying for performance, and price-match with comparator. Managing budget impact is one 
the main objectives of MEAs in Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Lithuania, 
Portugal, and the UK.  
This is reflected in the design of MEAs in these countries which includes features of PVAs, 
budget caps, and a compensation mechanism in Belgium, limited access through specialised 
healthcare centres in the Czech Republic, widespread use of PVAs in France, PVAs, discounts 
and conditional treatment continuation in Italy, PVAs, payback, and expenditure cap in 
Lithuania, PVAs in Portugal PVAs, and discounts, dose capping, initial free doses in the UK.  
Although these schemes are designed to address budget impact, without data on the target 
expenditure vs. the achieved expenditure, it is not possible to say whether the schemes 
implemented succeed in managing budget impact.  
7.2 Managing uncertainty relating to clinical and/or cost-effectiveness 
There are two main ways to address uncertainty relating to clinical and/or cost-
effectiveness. The first is to grant reimbursement for a limited time period during which 
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additional evidence on the drug effectiveness will be collected and to update the 
reimbursement decision afterwards based on the new cost-effectiveness results. The 
second way is to decrease the price or to limit utilisation so that the cost-effective ratio is 
improved because of lower costs. However, this option does not address the underlying 
issue of uncertainty in cost-effectiveness.   
Collection of real-life data to update the cost-effectiveness model is practiced in various 
countries. In the Netherlands a cost-utility analysis needs to be submitted after the initial 4-
year conditional reimbursement period. A similar system is in place in Sweden where 
manufacturers can be asked to submit additional evidence generated through coverage with 
evidence development schemes. Portugal also requires submission of additional evidence to 
evaluate the therapeutic value and cost-effectiveness of new drugs if there is uncertainty in 
the original date presented by the manufacturer (or if local data on cost-effectiveness are 
needed).  
Italy uses payment-by-result and discount or reimbursement for non-responders as a tool to 
address uncertainty issues. This is usually coupled with data collection as part of the 
monitoring registries. 
The UK tends to prefer using discounts, which do not require additional data collection to 
improve the drug’s cost-effectiveness in its patient access schemes (PAS). 
7.3 Managing utilisation to optimise performance 
The main strategy used to optimise utilisation is to limit prescribing and reimbursement to 
specific therapeutic indication and to those patients sub-groups who are most likely to 
benefit. The instruments used include limiting prescribing to specialised healthcare centres, 
use of biomarkers, and physician certification that the patient meets the eligibility 
requirements together with monitoring. The Czech Republic for example limits access to 
specific patient subgroups and to specialised healthcare centres. In Italy, patients eligibility 
is monitored through the registries and physician are request to certify that a patient meets 
the prescribing requirements in order for him to obtain the drug at the pharmacy.   
Although the schemes seemed to be designed to achieve optimal utilisation performance, it 
is not clear in how well they are implemented in practice, i.e. if they really succeed in 
limiting reimbursement to specific patient sub-groups.  
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Based the design and features of MEAs in Member States, overall it seems that these 
agreements are well equipped to achieve their objectives. However, implementation 
challenges are not to be excluded and only an impact analysis based on savings generated 
and challenges encountered in implementing MEAs (e.g. difficulties in obtaining 
reimbursement for non-responders from the manufacturer, feasibility of withdrawing drugs 
which proved not to be cost-effective) would allow establishing their actual impact.  
7.4 Advantages and disadvantages of MEAs as reported in the literature 
There seems to be a general agreement that MEAs can, under certain conditions, help 
address post-licencing uncertainty and enable patient early access to innovative treatments 
(Russo et al. 2010; Willis et al. 2010). However, the UK experience seems to support the 
view that despite offering improved access PAS have not addressed the issue of outcome 
uncertainty (Towse 2010). There is less agreement on whether MEAs actually offer 
incentives for innovation or not. On one side, it has been argued that they offer 
manufacturers some predictability in terms of initial price and the hope of future financial 
rewards (de Pouvourville 2006) thus encouraging innovation (Stafinski, McCabe, and Menon 
2010; Cook, Vernon, and Manning 2008). However, post-market shift of a significant portion 
in the experimental phase of the product development process and uncertainty about 
manufacturers’ future income stream (McCabe et al. 2009) might actually act as a 
disincentive for manufacturer. Additional disincentives have been discussed such as the risk 
manufacturers are required to assume in a MEA and which they may perceive as too high, 
potential disinvestment in disease areas with weak evidence-base, and delays in data 
collection and dissemination due to the small treatment population of a MEA (Trueman, 
Grainger, and Downs 2010).  
Regarding the disadvantages, several issues have been raised such as high transaction and 
administrative costs (Adamski et al. 2010; Carlson, Garrison, and Sullivan 2009; Carlson et al. 
2010), the introduction of additional uncertainty for manufacturers in terms of expected 
returns (Towse and Garrison 2010; McCabe et al. 2009) which may have the opposite effect 
of dis-incentivising additional data collection (Towse and Garrison 2010), the advantage 
competitors may take of data collected by the manufacturer (de Pouvourville 2006; Carlson, 
Garrison, and Sullivan 2009), and related to the this the problem of free-riding. Further, 
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there are challenges linked to the regulation of these agreements (Towse 2010) and the 
transferability of results from one country to another (Towse and Garrison 2010; de 
Pouvourville 2006). Moreover, if MEAs become increasingly common there is a risk that 
manufacturers may ask a high initial price in expectation of a MEA, in the context of an HTA 
appraisal (Towse 2010).  
In addition to this, there are a number of open questions which need to be addressed such 
as who should finance data collection, who should be responsible for it (and in this context 
it is essential that data collection is conducted by an independent party to avoid conflicts of 
interest), and how to streamline implementation of MEAs so as to reduce the management 
burden for health care staff.  
7.5 Perceptions 
During interviews with country representatives it became clear that what is considered to 
be a MEA in one Member State may not be perceived as such in another. Italy, for example, 
considers conditional reimbursement – through the AIFA notes - and restricted access – 
through the therapeutic plans - as MEAs (Figure 6.11). The same instruments are used in 
Denmark, however, the latter does not consider them to be MEAs. A similar situation is true 
for the UK, which imposes several restrictions in terms of defining patient eligibility for 
several drugs appraised by NICE but does not consider such restrictions as a form of MEA. 
Again, this raises issues in terms of classification and taxonomies as they both pre-suppose a 
common understanding and definition of what constitutes a MEA. 
The emerging opinion among patient representatives is that MEAs bring an important 
benefit to patients in terms of access to treatment. However, there were also some 
concerns on how these agreements will be implemented, in particular about the current 
lack of transparency in the field (notably, the UK is an exception here) and their impact on 
patients. Lack of transparency, especially towards patients, is particularly important in the 
case a drug under coverage with evidence development is found not to meet the criteria 
which would include it in the positive list and the health payer decides to stop conditional 
reimbursement. In such cases, it is essential that patients are informed from the beginning 
that the drug is made available for temporary reimbursement, under specific conditions, 
and subject to re-evaluation.  
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None of the patient representative groups interviewed conducted an evaluation of MEAs.  
The majority of interviewees thought that MEAs can represent a possible instrument for 
introducing new and expensive drugs and that the need for them will remain even in an era 
of value-based-pricing (VBP). However, one patient representative thought that the 
introduction of VBP in the UK will make redundant as the drug will be prices according to 
the additional benefit it brings to the patient. From a UK perspective, this view may be 
justified by the fact that the wide majority of PAS are discount agreements negotiated 
during the HTA assessment. In such cases, an ideal system of VBP would price the drug at a 
lower level instead of arranging a discount as part of a PAS. However, in cases where the 
agreement involves additional data collection to address uncertainty present at the time of 
the first HTA assessment and the aim is to take a final reimbursement decision after the 
initial cost-effectiveness model is updated with real-life data, there would be still a role for 
MEAs.  
Another observation from a participant of this working group was that if MEAs are to bring 
additional value, HTA should be the basis of every MEA. This is the case in some countries, 
particularly those countries which use coverage with evidence development to collect 
additional data with the objective of updating the final coverage decision based on the cost-
effectiveness results of the new HTA, but not all. 
7.6 Limitations 
Due to the open-nature of certain questions, one should not exclude that if a country did 
not mention for example patient co-payments as part the criteria to access a drug part of a 
MEA, this is not actually a requirement. It could well be that this criterion was simply 
omitted from the description since the question did not specifically ask for it. The same 
issue applies to other features of MEAs like administrative requirements or burden, which 
was not defined. 
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8 SWOT analysis 
Strengths of MEAs 
General strengths 
 
- From a literature perspective there seems to 
be a general agreement that MEAs can, under 
certain conditions, help to address post-
licencing uncertainty and enable patient early 
access to innovative treatments 
- In general, MEAs offer flexibility in dealing 
with new and often expensive technologies, 
which are characterised by significant levels of 
uncertainty 
- Different types of schemes exist in order to 
address different needs (budget impact, 
weaknesses in clinical evidence, etc.). Their 
potential is further amplified by the possibility 
to combine financial and non-financial 
elements in the same agreement and address 
different issues at the same time (e.g. budget 
impact and use, access and cost-effectiveness, 
etc.) 
 
Agreement including a health-outcome component (e.g. 
CED, payment for performance)16  
- Collection of information on drug use and 
effectiveness in different sub-groups of 
patients under real-life clinical conditions (i.e. 
outside a clinical trial), to update treatment 
guidance, reduce uncertainty and reach the 
final reimbursement decision (coverage with 
evidence development). 
Pure financial agreements, no health outcome 
component (PVAs, price/dose capping, price-match, 
Weaknesses of MEAs 
General weaknesses 
 
- There is little evidence to support the claimed 
benefits of MEAs and the extent to which 
some of the challenges involved in MEAs 
implementation (e.g. monitoring 
requirements, transaction costs, ) impact on 
the final outcome  
- Frequent lack of transparency on the 
agreements implemented, their objectives, 
and evaluation of their impact is preventing 
cross-country learning and severely limiting 
the ability of patients engage with MEA 
processes17. 
- Voluntary versus non-voluntary nature of 
MEAs varies across Member States and this 
can create confusion to different stakeholders 
- Variability in the perception of MEAs across 
countries and what actually is a MEA may 
differ across settings 
Agreement including a health-outcome component (e.g. 
CED, payment for performance) 
- Despite collecting very useful data, which 
would enable the drug to be re-assessed and 
its price re-negotiated according to its impact 
and cost-effectiveness in real-life, few 
countries actually leverage on this 
opportunity. 
- Discontinuity in assessing evidence in clinical 
                                                      
16 May or may not include a financial component 
17 Notably the UK is an exception here. NICE has a list of all the approved patient access schemes and the 
terms of the agreement are generally available (the exact amount of the discount is not always available)   
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etc.) 
- Improve the cost-effectiveness of the drug 
through a discount offered by the 
manufacturer on the official price or a payback 
agreement for non-responders. Higher cost-
effectiveness will increase the probability of 
the drug receiving a positive recommendation 
by HTA agencies. 
- Evidence of savings from PVA in France 
Strengths from a payer perspective: Depending on the 
type of agreement and its objective, it enables better 
control of budget impact, to increase cost-
effectiveness, and to improve use of and access to 
medicines. 
Strengths from a patient perspective: It improves 
access to medicines, which had been or were likely to 
be rejected on cost-effectiveness grounds. 
Strengths from a manufacturer perspective: MEAs 
enable manufacturers to obtain reimbursement for 
drugs, which were likely to be rejected by drug 
reimbursement agencies. Discounts can be granted 
without touching list prices. 
practice post-MEA implementation 
Pure financial agreements, no health outcome 
component (PVAs, price/dose capping, price-match, 
etc.) 
- Although these schemes are designed to 
address budget impact, without data on the 
target expenditure vs. the achieved 
expenditure, it is generally not possible to say 
whether the schemes implemented succeed in 
managing budget impact (notably France who 
publishes its savings estimates on an annual 
basis is an exception). 
Schemes aiming to manage utilisation to optimise 
performance 
- Although the schemes seem to be designed to 
achieve optimal utilisation performance, it is 
not clear if they really succeed in limiting 
reimbursement to specific patient sub-groups. 
PVAs for example are used in France in an 
attempt to limit use to the approved 
indication. However, the data collected does 
not enable to verify whether the reimbursed 
doses were prescribed for approved indication 
or not.      
Weaknesses from a payer perspective: 
- Additional efforts are required to make a new 
drug available to patients such as negotiation 
time, monitoring of patient response, data 
collection, development of registries, etc. 
- Limited capacity to implement and assess 
evidence – especially if clinical evidence needs 
to be assessed- if implementation takes place 
at regional or hospital level. 
Weaknesses from a patient perspective:  
- Generally limited opportunities to engage with 
the development of MEAs; 
- Not all patient groups are aware of what MEAs 
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do, let alone individual types of MEAs 
Weaknesses from a manufacturer perspective:  
- Concessions need to be made such as refund 
for non-respondent patients, discounts, 
collection of additional data, etc. 
Opportunities of MEAs 
General opportunities 
Coverage with evidence development 
Potential to increase efforts with regards to re-
evaluating the effectiveness of the drug at a later stage 
and re-negotiating the price based on the real-life 
effectiveness of the drug. 
Linking with other activities and initiatives 
To streamline post-marketing studies with data 
collection requirements as part of MEAs and adaptive 
licensing (EMA) in the light of reducing data the burden 
of data collection. 
To link data collection as part of MEAs with EU 
initiatives on registries. Pulling evidence from different 
countries will allow generating a large pool of data and 
increases the statistical significance of the results. In 
This context, registries should focus as much as possible 
on primary endpoints rather than secondary ones. 
Managed introduction of new medicines 
To limit the impact of introducing new drugs by 
integrating MEAs into a process of managed 
introduction of new medicines which starts from 
horizon scanning activities and continues all the way up 
to post-marketing studies and surveillance.  
Opportunities from a payer perspective: Re-evaluation 
of drugs and re-negotiation of the price as new 
evidence becomes available would enable to move 
towards a system of value-based pricing whereby a 
drug is reimbursed according to additional clinical 
benefits it brings to patients. 
Opportunities from a patient perspective: More 
Threats of MEAs 
General 
Proliferation of MEAs as quick-fix ad-hoc solutions 
which are not integrated into a comprehensive process 
of managed entry of new pharmaceuticals, is likely to 
cause additional burden to the healthcare system and 
manufacturers rather than providing a viable long-term 
solution to manage entry of new medicines. 
Threats from a payer perspective:  
If MEA agreements proliferate without integrating with 
other activities and initiatives, the burden of MEAs is 
likely to become too high.  
As MEA become more common, there is a threat that 
manufacturers could start proposing higher entry prices 
in expectation of having to engage in a MEA. 
If opportunities to synergise across initiatives (e.g. 
adaptive licensing, EU initiatives on registries, etc.) and 
to pull together evidence from and share evidence 
between countries are not seized, duplication of data 
collection efforts will occur and evidence available to 
individual countries is likely to remain weak and 
fragmentary.   
Threats from a patient perspective: If MEAs become 
too burdensome for payers and manufacturers, the 
latters might become less willing to engage. This means 
that fewer instruments will be available to facilitate 
access to patients. 
Threats from a manufacturer perspective: If MEAs are 
going to add to other requirements (e.g. post-
marketing data collection, surveillance) without 
reducing them, industry will become more and more 
reluctant to engage.  
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transparency and formal opportunities to engage in the 
MEA process would enable patients to make use of this 
instrument to obtain faster access to new medicines.  
Opportunities from a manufacturer perspective: Public 
image benefits from the willingness to take 
responsibility for the use of the drug in real-life. If 
integrated with post-marketing data collection and 
adaptive licensing there is the potential of reducing 
data collection requirements for industry. 
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9 Towards a new taxonomy to capture MEAs across EU Member 
States 
9.1.1 Available taxonomies 
Different systems to classify managed entry agreements (MEAs) have been proposed in the 
literature (Carlson et al. 2010; Klemp, Frønsdal, Facey, and on behalf of the HTAi Policy 
Forum 2011; Jaroslawski and Toumi 2011; Espin and Rovira 2009) in addition to country 
specific taxonomies (UK Department of Health and ABPI 2008; Siviero 2011) (see Appendix 
7).  
Although these taxonomies have different features, they can be broadly ascribed to two 
main classification systems: one classifying agreements based on their financial or health 
outcome nature while the other distinguishing them based on the objectives they are trying 
to achieve. 
9.1.2 Key issues 
The HTAi Policy Forum classifies agreements based on their objectives (HTAi 2011 
framework). In that it provides substantial flexibility in classifying agreements but it does 
not provide any information on the instruments used to achieve these objectives or the 
impact of monitoring.  
Leveraging from the experience developed with the EMINet survey, we developed a 
framework which can be used to classify MEAs in Europe. While developing its structure, at 
each level we have taken into account the evidence presented across countries as well as 
tools and instruments that are being used by policy makers in this context in order to 
negotiate a MEA. We have attempted to incorporate these pieces of information into a 
structure that can, hopefully, provide a workable framework for MEAs and the way they 
operate across EU Member States. 
The proposed taxonomy features four levels.  
The first level represents the objective a particular MEA is trying to achieve, financial or 
performance.  
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The second level focuses on what is being monitored, notably, the total cost for all patients, 
the total cost per patient, utilisation in real life, or evidence regarding decision uncertainty.  
The instruments used for achieving these objectives are illustrated in level three (e.g. 
discounts, price-volume agreements, CED, outcome guarantee) while level four presents the 
impact of MEAs on price, reimbursement and reassessment (figure 9.5). A brief analysis by 
level, as presented in this section is outlined below. 
9.1.3 New taxonomy 
Based on the new taxonomy proposed in the previous section and shown in Figure 9.5, all 
MEAs reported by Member States in the survey in the earlier parts of this report were 
subsequently re-classified. Whilst doing so, Member States also provided an update on the 
number of available schemes in their territory as of December 201218. 
Figure 9.1 shows the number of agreements or schemes based on the main objectives 
pursued by countries, notably financial, performance-related or a combination of the two. 
The figure highlights very clearly existing trends, with Portugal, Lithuania, England, Belgium, 
Cyprus and Malta focusing very explicitly on financial objectives while the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the Czech Republic focusing more on performance-related schemes. Italy has a 
greater number of performance-based agreements but also implements a considerable 
number of financial schemes. 
  
                                                      
18 The following countries provided updates on the number of their agreements as of December 2012: 
Belgium, Czech Republic, England, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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Figure 9.1: MEA analysis by means of objectives countries are trying to achieve 
 
Notes: BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, EN: England, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, MT: Malta, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden 
 
When examining the relevant monitoring means (level 2 of the new taxonomy), it becomes 
clear that among financial schemes, a large proportion focuses on the total cost for all 
patients, while only a minority focuses on the total cost per patient which could be 
explained by the simpler implementation of schemes focusing on the total sample of 
patients rather than on a per patient basis (Figure 9.2).  The trend for performance-based 
agreements varies: some countries concentrate on gathering evidence about decision 
uncertainty. This is prevaleny in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Sweden for the 
majority of its agreements. Italy, on the other hand, implements a number of agreements to 
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 Figure 9.2: MEA analysis by monitoring means 
 
Notes: BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, EN: England, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, MT: Malta, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden 
 
Moving on to the third level of the new taxonomy of MEAs (monitoring means), it appears 
that PVAs, followed by discounts, are the most common instrument for financial schemes 
while, coverage with evidence development, patient eligibility criteria linked to a registry to 
ensure compliance and country-specific instruments, such as AIFA notes and therapeutic 
groups in Italy, are the most common instruments for performance-based agreements 










IT PT LT NL SE CZ EN BE CY MT
Combination
Evidence regarding decision uncertainty
Utilisation in real life
Total cost per patient
Total cost for all patients
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Figure 9.3: MEA analysis by type of instrument 
 
Notes: BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, EN: England, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, MT: Malta, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden. 
 
The final level of the new taxonomy displays the impact of MEAs on expenditure, prices, and 
reassessment (Figure 9.4). As some of the MEAs implemented impact more than one area, a 
particular scheme may be associated with more than one area of impact. In comparison to 
the previous three figures there is therefore not always a 1 to 1 association between 
scheme and impact but sometime it may be a 1 to 2 or 1 to 3 association. The figure 
highlights that collection of additional evidence for reassessment is very prevalent in Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the Czech Republic. Discounts, reimbursement and free doses 
after an agreed threshold of spending has been reached, are common in Italy, Portugal, 










IT PT LT NL SE CZ EN BE CY MT
Combination
Coverage with evidence development
Country specific instruments
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Figure 9.4: MEA analysis by impact 
 
Notes: BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, EN: England, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, MT: Malta, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden 
 
In summary, by applying the proposed taxonomy to the data collected on MEAs in Europe 
we tested the feasibility of using the new framework in the European context and new lens 
of analysis which distinguishes between what the objectives are, what is being monitored, 









IT PT BE LT NL SE CZ EN CY MT
Reassessment which may lead to price change, conclusion of
new agreements, or new reimbursement decision
Treatment interruption if drug is not effective according to
pre-established targets
Discount if drug is not effective or less effective than
expected
Reimbursement if drug is not effective
Cap on number of doses/total cost reimbursed per patient
after which the manufacturer assumes the cost
Discount reimbursement or free doses after the agreed
spending/volume threshold is reached
Initial discount on all doses or free initial doses
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Figure 9.5: Proposed taxonomy for MEAs 
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10 Conclusions 
European countries are using a variety of instruments to tackle uncertainty arising from lack of 
information about budget impact, cost-effectiveness, use in real life, and access. Despite the non-
negligible number of agreements implemented, little information is available on the impact of 
these schemes and whether they are meeting their objectives. Moreover, the little amount of 
information available in the public domain is hampering cross-country learning and the ability of 
patients to engage in the process.  
Previously proposed taxonomies do not well suit the reality at country level, where complex 
agreements with financial and health outcomes features are implemented. While there is scope 
for improvement, the taxonomy employed in this study aims to address this issue by using a more 
versatile classification system which on one level focuses on the objectives countries are trying to 
achieve through MEAs and on a second level highlights and summarises the features of the 
implemented agreements. Further there is the need to agree on a common definition of MEAs and 
to define the boundaries between a MEA and a non-MEA.   
MEAs should not become a quick-fix solution to introduce expensive drugs but be integrated into a 
process of managed introduction of new medicines which starts from horizon scanning activities, 
moves to forecasting, HTA assessment, pricing and reimbursement, and continues with post-
marketing studies and surveillance.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Description of each MEA used in your country 
For each TYPE of MEA implemented, member states were asked to provide the following 
information: 
1. MEA definition  
2. Extensive description of MEA 
3. Is there a specific legal framework for the MEA? If yes, please specify. 
4. Is there a specific national legislation for the MEA? If yes, please specify. 
5. Duration of the MEA  
6. Specific administrative requirements  
7. Notes  
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Appendix 2: MEA for each therapeutic indication 
For each MEA implemented, member states were asked to provide the following information: 
1. Branded name   
2. INN 
3. ATC Code 
4. Therapeutic indication  
5. Type of MEA (e.g. cost sharing, risk sharing, payment by result/payment for performance, 
price by volume, cap to expenditure, volume based agreement)  
6. Starting year  
7. Year of completion (if available) 
8. Criteria on which MEA is based (e.g. numbers of therapeutic cycles for cost-sharing 
schemes; performance indicators for payment by performance schemes) 
9. Tools used, if available (e.g. registry, web applications) 
10. Who is in charge of MEA functioning and control (e.g. in case of price per volume 
agreements, who controls the volume ceiling? Or in case of a registry, who fills the forms?)    
11. Objective (e.g. managing budget impact, managing uncertainty on safety, clinical and/or 
cost effectiveness) 
12. Financial and administrative burden (e.g. number of employees, cost of the tools)  
13. Notes   
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Appendix 3: Country responses to survey 1 and 2 
Country Responded to survey 
1 
Responded to survey 
2 
Notes 
Belgium Yes Yes  
Cyprus Yes Yes  
Czech Republic Yes Yes  
Denmark  See notes See notes The official response 
from the Danish 
Health and Medicine 
Authority (DHMA) 




identified two MEAs. 
Following 
clarification with the 
DHMA we concluded 
that, examples like 
the ones identified in 
the literature review 
are limited to a few 
cases and in all of 
them there was no 
agreement with the 
National Health 
Service (NHS) and the 
main target were 
patients. 
France Yes No  
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Finland NA NA MEAs are not 
implemented 
Hungary No No  
Italy Yes Yes  
Latvia No No  
Lithuania Yes Yes  
Malta Yes Incomplete  
The 
Netherlands 
Yes Yes  
Norway NA NA At the time of the 
survey there was no 
active MEA but 
Norway has had two 
MEAs in the past. 
Poland No No  
Portugal Yes Yes  
Slovakia No No  
Spain No No  
Sweden Yes Yes  
United 
Kingdom 
Yes Yes  
Total 
respondent 
11 9  
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Appendix 4: Semi-structured Interview guide for drug reimbursement authorities 
1. Does your country have in place any type of MEAs and if so, how are these implemented?  
2. Where do MEAs fit into your reimbursement system? 
3. Which type of uncertainty are you trying to address by implementing MEAs? 
4. Can you provide a few examples of how evidence collected in the frame of a MEA 
influenced the final reimbursement decision? 
5. In general, how does your country deal with:  
- Uncertainty regarding budget impact and cost-effective ness, and  
- The introduction of high-cost drugs?  
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Appendix 5: Semi-structured Interview guide for industry representatives 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Based on your experience of implementing MEAs, what is your opinion of MEAs? 
(Advantages, disadvantages, challenges, preferences of implementation depending on 
country and type, etc.) 
 
2. Have MEAs offered predictability in terms of price and (future) financial rewards or have 
they rather been a disincentive in disease areas with weak evidence base? 
 
3. What has been your members' experience in terms of the operational requirements for 
implementing these agreements (e.g. admin burden, monitoring performance, collection of 
additional data, requirement to conduct further studies, etc)? 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
4. Which types of agreements are you currently implementing, for which therapeutic areas, 
and in which country? 
A list of agreements in each country (with conditions attached to the agreement if 
possible). 
5. For each agreement: Who proposed to introduce this drug through a MEA and what was 
the reason for implementing this agreement? 
6. For each agreement: Do you think this agreement enabled your product to obtain earlier 
market access than without? 
 
EXPERIENCE/OPINION 
7. In general, do you think these agreements reward manufacturers for the perceived level of 
innovation? Do you think they could act as an incentive for future R&D investments?  
8. Have MEAs offered you some predictability in terms of initial price and future financial 
rewards or have they rather been a disincentive in disease areas with weak evidence base 
due to uncertainty in terms of expected returns? 
9. Could MEA offer competitive advantage to manufacturers implementing them? E.g. If more 
than one comparable therapy is available for a particular diagnosis, the drug linked to a 
MEA might become more attractive in comparison to the others? 
10. Were the operational requirements for implementing these agreements (e.g. 
administrative burden, monitoring performance, collection of additional data, requirement 
to conduct further studies) manageable or too burdensome? How have manufacturers 
coped with these? 
11. Who do you think should be in charge of additional data collection and who should pay for 
it? What (regulatory) framework would you like to see around additional evidence 
development? 
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12. What do you think about the statement that “MEAs cause a post-market shift in the 
product development process of a significant portion of the experimental phase?” 
13. Has your company ever performed an evaluation of the MEAs you implemented? If so, 
what were the findings/lessons learned and would that be possible for you to share any 
relevant information? 
 
COMMON FINAL QUESTIONS 
14. Do you think MEAs can offer mutual benefits to all three parties involved, i.e. 
manufacturer, payer, patient? If yes, which advantages and which disadvantages do they 
offer and under which circumstances (e.g. particular therapeutic area, type of uncertainty, 
operational requirements)? 
15. Do you think MEAs represent the way forward for introducing expensive innovative drugs? 
Why/Why not? If no, how do you think payers/health insurers ought to address 
uncertainty and the cost implications of introducing highly specialised medicines? 
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Appendix 6: Semi-structured Interview guide for patient representatives 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
As part of the EU process on corporate responsibility in the field of pharmaceuticals, one of the 
three work areas looks at access to medicines in Europe. Capacity building on managed entry 
agreements for innovative medicines is one of this platform’s five projects. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/competitiveness/process_on_corporate_respo
nsibility/platform_access/index_en.htm  
After a new medicine has been approved for safety and efficacy by the European Medicine 
Agency, individual country’s drug reimbursement agencies need to decide whether they are willing 
to reimburse the drug and which price they are will reimburse. Information available at this stage 
is often limited and this leads to uncertainty regarding the projected vs. actual use, effectiveness 
in clinical practice and cost-effectiveness. In turn, uncertainty can lead to delayed access to new 
medicines for patients. Managed entry agreements (MEAs)19 for pharmaceuticals have been 
introduced as an instrument to deal with this type of uncertainty by sharing the risk of introducing 
a new drug onto the market between payers and manufacturers. Examples include payback if the 
drug does not achieve the promise effect, price-volume agreements, and discount agreement 
(cost-effectiveness).  
GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Are you familiar with MEAs for pharmaceuticals and do you know if your country is 
implementing any? 
2. What do you think about MEAs, what advantages and/or disadvantages can they bring to 
patients? (E.g. early access to innovative treatments, danger of not being treated because 
not eligible and is this better or worse than the threat of the drug not being reimbursed at 
all) 
 
                                                      
19 Several terms have been used to define these agreements including risk-sharing agreements, patient access 
schemes (UK), coverage with evidence development, performance-based agreements, conditional reimbursement, 
payment-by-result, etc. 
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EXPERIENCE/OPINION 
3. What do you think about eligibility criteria (both eligibility to start treatment and to 
continue with treatment)? Do you perceive eligibility criteria as fair (they aim to avoid 
treating patient in which the drug does not work) or do you perceive them as rather 
restrictive because they may exclude patients who could benefit from the drug (e.g. the 
biomarker or indicators for treatment continuation are not sensitive enough)?  
4. What do you think about the requirement of certain agreements of monitoring patients?  
Do you perceive them rather as a contribution to generate additional evidence which will 
benefit other patients or would you rather not participate (and if yes why)? 
5. Has your patient representative group ever performed an evaluation of the MEAs 
implemented in your country/disease area? If yes what were the findings and would that 
be possible for you to share the report? 
 
FINAL QUESTIONS 
6. Do you think MEAs can offer mutual benefits to all three parties involved, i.e. 
manufacturer, payer, patient? If yes, which advantages and which disadvantages do they 
offer and under which circumstances (e.g. particular therapeutic area, type of uncertainty, 
operational requirements)? 
7. Do you think MEAs represent the way forward for introducing expensive innovative drugs? 
Why?   
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Appendix 7: Frameworks for MEAs  











Source: (Carlson et al. 2010) 
 
Characterisation of MEAs according to nature of the risk they are trying to address developed 
Klemp et al. on behalf of the HTAi Policy Forum 2011 
• Managing budget impact: management of the process of adoption to address 
concerns about budget impact (e.g., through capping total budget impact, 
discounting, limiting number of doses, free first cycle, etc.). 
• Managing uncertainty relating to clinical and/or cost-effectiveness: management of 
uncertainty relating to the clinical and cost-effectiveness in the long-term, in a real-
world clinical setting (e.g., through CED). 
• Managing utilization to optimize performance: management of delivery systems to 
plan technology diffusion to targeted patients/ or by means of particular delivery 
mechanisms (e.g., limitation of technology diffusion to appropriately trained 
practitioners). 
Source: (Klemp, Frønsdal, Facey, and on behalf of the HTAi Policy Forum 2011) 
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Jaroslawski and Toumi, 2011 
 
Source: (Jaroslawski and Toumi 2011) 
 
Espin and Rovira 2009 adapted from Casado et al. 2009  
 
Source: (Espin and Rovira 2009) adapted from (Casado et al. 2009) 
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MEAs in Italy 
 
Source: (Siviero 2011) 
 
MEAs in the UK 
 
Source: (UK Department of Health and ABPI 2008) 
 
  142 
References 
 
Adamski, B, B Godman, G Ofierska-Sujkowska, B Osińska, H Harholz, K Wendykowsla, O Laius, S Jan, C 
Sermet, C Zara, M Kalaba, R Gustafsson, K Garuolienè, A Haycox, S Garattini, and LL Gustafsson. 2010. Risk 
sharing arrangements for pharmaceuticals: potential considerations and recommendations for European 
payers. BMC Health Services Research 10 (153):1-16. 
Adamski, J. 2011. Personal communication with Jakub Adamski from the Ministry of Health in Poland. 
Rome, 14.11.2011. 
AETSA. 2011. Assessment of effectivity and safety of the drug and economic analysis of use in Paroxysmal 
Nocturnal Haemoglobinuria therapy. In Report on drug assessment Soliris: Agencia de Evaluación de 
Tecnologías Sanitarias de Andalucía. 
Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA). Farmaci Sottoposti a Monitoraggio  2011 [cited 23/11/2011. Available 
from http://monitoraggio-farmaci.agenziafarmaco.it/. 
Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco, AIFA. 2008. La pratica clinica mette alla prova l’innovazione terapeutica: 
l’esempio “ivabradina”. Bollettino d'informazione sui farmaci 15 (1):12-17. 
Anell, A, and U  Persson. 2005. Reimbursement and clinical guidance for pharmaceuticals in Sweden. Eur J 
Health Econom 50:274-279. 
Anon. 2007. "Money-back"cancer treatment scheme could set precedent. Tce (793):11-11. 
Anonym. 2008. Direktverträge zwischen Krankenkassen und Industrie. Rabattverträge, Geld-zurück-
Garantien u.a. Arznei-Telegramm 39:1-3. 
Antonanzas, F, C Juarez-Castello, and R Rodriguez-Ibeas. 2011. Should health authorities offer risk-sharing 
contracts to pharmaceutical firms? A theoretical approach. Health Economics, Policy and Law 6 (3):391-403. 
Arnberg, K. 2012. MEA in Sweden. Presentation at the EU meeting on MEAs in Rome (21.05.2012). 
Barros, PP. 2011. The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Health Economics 20 (4):461-470. 
Bellelli, G, E Lucchi, and N Minicuci. 2005. Results of a Multi-Level Therapeutic Approach for Alzheimer's 
Disease Subjects in the "Real World" (Cronos Project): A 36-Week Follow-up Study. Aging Clinical and 
Experimental Research 17 (1):56-61. 
Boggild, M., J. Palace, P. Barton, Y. Ben-Shlomo, T. Bregenzer, C. Dobson, and R. Gray. 2009. Multiple 
sclerosis risk sharing scheme: two year results of clinical cohort study with historical comparator. British 
Medical Journal 339. 
Bowden, H. 2011. Patient Access Schemes. Presentation at the EU meeting on MEAs in Rome (14.11.2011). 
Breckenridge, A, and T Walley. 2008. Risk Sharing and Payment by Results. Nature 83 (5):666-667. 
  143 
Breckenridge, A., and T. Walley. 2008. Risk sharing and payment by results. Clinical Pharmacology & 
Therapeutics 83 (5):666-667. 
Briggs, A., K. Ritchie, E. Fenwick, K. Chalkidou, and P. Littlejohns. 2010. Access with Evidence Development 
in the UK Past Experience, Current Initiatives and Future Potential. Pharmacoeconomics 28 (2):163-170. 
Brzezińska, A. 2012. Risk Sharing in Poland present or future. Presentation at the Piperska meeting in 
Ljubjiana (22.04.2012). 
Bundesministerium der Justiz. Social Code Book V. § 130a Rabatte der pharmazeutischen Unternehmer. 
Carbonneil, C, F Quentin, and SH Lee-Robin. 2009. A common policy framework for evidence generation on 
promising health technologies. International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 25 (Suppl. 
2):56–67. 
Carbonneil, C., F. Quentin, S. H. Lee-Robin, and Asse European Network Hlth Technol. 2009. A common 
policy framework for evidence generation on promising health technologies. International Journal of 
Technology Assessment in Health Care 25:56-67. 
Carlson, J. J., S. D. Sullivan, L. P. Garrison, P. J. Neumann, and D. L. Veenstra. 2010. Linking payment to 
health outcomes: A taxonomy and examination of performance-based reimbursement schemes between 
healthcare payers and manufacturers. Health Policy 96 (3):179-190. 
Carlson, JJ, LP Garrison, and SD Sullivan. 2009. Paying for Outcomes: Innovative Coverage and 
Reimbursement Schemes for Pharmaceuticals. Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy 15 (8):683-687. 
Carlson, JJ, SD Sullivan, LP Garrison, PJ Neumann, and DL Veenstra. 2010. Linking payment to health 
outcomes: A taxonomy and examination of performance-based reimbursement schemes between 
healthcare payers and manufacturers. Health Policy 96 (10). 
Carroll, S. M., and R. Wasiak. 2009. "PATIENT ACCESS SCHEMES"-THE USE OF RISK-SHARING IN THE UK. 
Value in Health 12 (7):A286-A287. 
Casado, B, S Ruiz, K Genenz, and F Schmidt. 2009. Nuevas tendencias en la evaluación y financiación de 
medicamentos en Europa: Estrategias de Riesgo Compartido. In Simon Kucher & Partners Strategy & 
Marketing Consultants, edited by P. i. M. 19.07.2009. 
CEPS. 2011. Healthcare products pricing committee. Annual report 2010. Comité Economique des Produits 
de Santé (CEPS). 
Chalkidou, K , A  Hoy, and P. Littlejohns. 2007. Making a decision to wait for more evidence: when the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence recommends a technology only in the context of 
research. J R Soc Med 100:453–460. 
Chalkidou, K, A  Hoy, and P. Littlejohns. 2007. Making a Decision to Wait for More Evidence: When the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence Recommends a Technology Only in the Context of 
Research. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 100 (10):453-60. 
  144 
Chapman, S. R., and E. Reeve. 2002. Risk sharing in a state funded health service: Outcomes guarantee 
project. Value in Health 5 (6):467-467. 
Chapman, S., E. Reeve, D. Price, G. Rajaratnam, and R. Neary. 2004. Outcomes guarantee for lipid-lowering 
drugs: Results from a novel approach to risk sharing in primary care. British Journal of Cardiology 11 
(3):205-210. 
Chapman, S., E. Reeve, G. Rajaratnam, and R. Neary. 2003. Setting up an outcomes guarantee for 
pharmaceuticals: new approach to risk sharing in primary care. British Medical Journal 326 (7391):707-709. 
Cook, JP, JA Vernon, and R Manning. 2008. Pharmaceutical Risk-Sharing Agreements. Pharmacoeconomics 
26 (7):551-556. 
Danish Health and Medicines Authority. Reimbursement of medicines  2011 [cited 19.11.2012. Available 
from http://www.dkma.dk/en/topics/statistics,-prices-and-reimbursement/reimbursement. 
Danish Health and Medicines Authority. Reassessment of reimbursement status for medicinal products  
2012 [cited 28.11.2012. Available from http://laegemiddelstyrelsen.dk/en/topics/statistics,-prices-and-
reimbursement/reimbursement/general-reimbursement/reassessment. 
De Ambrosis, P. 2008. Risk sharing e rimborso in base al risultato innovazione e sostenibilità economica. 
Politica sanitaria 5:235-237. 
De Nigro, L. 2011. Outline of the Post Marketing Drugs Monitoring Registers of the Italian Medicines 
Agency. Rome, 14 November 2011. 
de Pouvourville, G. 2006. Risk-sharing agreements for innovative drugs. A new solution to old problems? 
European Journal of Health Economics 7 (3):155-157. 
de Pouvourville, G. 2006. Risk-sharing agreements for innovative drugs: a new solution to old problems? 
Eur J Health Econ 7 (3):155-7. 
de Swaef, A, and Y Antonissen. 2007. Belgium pharma profile. In Pharmaceutical Pricing and 
Reimbursement Information, edited by T. Lyager Thomson, N. Satterly and D. Arts. 
Der Bundestag. 2010. Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelmarktes in der gesetzlichen 
Krankenversicherung (Arzneimittelmarktneuordnungsgesetz – AMNOG). In Teil I Nr. 67. Bundesgesetzblatt 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag. 
Dobson, R. 2008. NICE introduces cost sharing scheme for sight drug. BMJ (Clinical research ed.) 337. 
Duerden, M., N. Gogna, B. Godman, K. Eden, M. Mallinson, and N. Sullivan. 2004. Current National 
Initiatives and Policies to Control Drug Costs in Europe: UK Perspective. Journal of Ambulatory Care 
Management 27 (2):132-138. 
Eichler, HG , K Oye, LG  Baird, E  Abadie, J   Brown, CL  Drum, J  Ferguson, S Garner, P  Honig, M  
Hukkelhoven, JCW  Lim, R  Lim, MM  Lumpkin, G  Neil, B  O’Rourke, E Pezalla, D  Shoda, V  Seyfert-Margolis, 
EV  Sigal, J Sobotka, D  Tan, TF Unger, and G Hirsch. 2012. Adaptive Licensing: Taking the Next Step in the 
Evolution of Drug Approval. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 91 (3):426-437. 
  145 
Eichler, HG, F  Pignatti, B  Flamion, H  Leufkens, and A. Breckenridge. 2008. Balancing early market access to 
new drugs with the need for benefit/risk data: a mounting dilemma. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 7:818-
826. 
EMA. 2010. Road map to 2015. In The European Medicines Agency’s contribution to science, medicines and 
health: European Medicines Agency. 
Engraff, T. 2011. Personal communication with Tina Engraff from the Danish Medicines Agency. Rome, 
14.11.2011. 
EpiRare. Website of the European platform for rare disease registries. Available from 
http://www.epirare.eu/. 
Espin, J, and J Rovira. 2009. Risk sharing schemes for pharmaceuticals: Terminology, classification and 
experiences. EMINET. 
Espin, J, J Rovira, and L Garcia. 2010. Experiences and impact of European risk-sharing schemes focusing on 
oncology medicines. EMINET. 
EUCERD. 2011. EUCERD/EMA workshop report: Towards a public-private partnership for registries in the 
field of rare diseases London: European Union Committee of Experts on Rare Diseases. 
Fogarty, E., L. Tilson, M. Ryan, and M. Barry. 2010. Health Technology Assessment International 7th Annual 
Meeting: Dublin, Ireland, 6-9 June 2010. Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res 10 (5):501-3. 
Gaceta Médica. Volibris, primer contrato de riesgo compartido en España tras dos años de intentos fallidos. 
Published 25 February 2011 2011 [cited 29.11.2011. Available from 
http://www.gacetamedica.com/articulo.aspx?idart=523941&idcat=706&tipo=2. 
Garattini, L., and G. Casadei. 2011. Risk sharing agreements: What lessons from Italy? International Journal 
of Technology Assessment in Health Care 27 (2):169-172. 
Garber, A. M., and M. B. McClellan. 2007. Satisfaction guaranteed - "Payment by results" for biologic 
agents. New England Journal of Medicine 357 (16):1575-1577. 
Garuoliene, K 2012. Managed Entry Agreements in Lithuania. Presentation at the managed entry 
agreement meeting in Rome, 21 May 2012. 
Generalitat de Catalunya. Salut promou un acord de risc compartit en un fàrmac oncològic, posted on 22 
November 2011 2011 [cited 12 September 2012. Available from 
http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/detall.do?id=129351&idioma=0. 
Hogan & Hartson. 2008. Risk-Sharing and Other New Business Models for Pharmaceutical Companies in 
Germany. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Update:1-8. 
IMS. 2007. Innovative Approaches to Pricing. IMS PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT:224-227. 
IRDiRC. Webpage of the International Rare Diseases Research Consortium  [cited 25.04.2012. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/medical-research/rare-diseases/irdirc_en.html. 
  146 
Jaroslawski, S., and M. Toumi. 2011. Market Access Agreements for pharmaceuticals in Europe: diversity of 
approaches and underlying concepts. BMC Health Serv Res 11 (1):259. 
Jarosławski, S., and M. Toumi. 2011. Design of Patient Access Schemes in the UK: Influence of health 
technology assessment by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. Applied Health 
Economics and Health Policy 9 (4):209-215. 
Joppi, R , L   Demattè, Menti AM, D   Pase, C   Poggiani, L  Mezzalira, and on behalf of the Italian Horizon 
Scanning Project Group. 2009. The Italian Horizon Scanning Project. Eur J Clin Pharmacol 65:775–78. 
Katzerová. 2012. Managed entry agreements in the Czech Republic – highly innovative medicines. 
Presentation at the EU meeting on MEAs in Rome (21.05.2012). 
Klemp, M, KB  Frønsdal, K Facey, and HTAi Policy Forum. 2011. What principles should govern the use of 
managed entry agreements? Int J Technol Assess Health Care 27 (1):77-83. 
Klemp, M, KB Frønsdal, K Facey, and on behalf of the HTAi Policy Forum. 2011. What principles should 
govern the use of managed entry agreements? International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health 
Care 27 (1):77-83. 
Kooijman, H. 2011. Managed Entry Schemes in the Netherlands. Presentation at the EU meeting on MEAs in 
Rome (14.11.2011). 
Kotrba, J 2011. Personal communication with Jindrich Kotrba from The State Institute of Drug Control 
(SÚKL) in the Czech Republic. Rome, 14.11.2011. 
Kovács, T, P Rózsa, S Szigeti, B Borcsek, and G Lengyel. 2007. Hungary pharma profile. In Pharmaceutical 
Pricing and Reimbursement Information, edited by T. Lyager Thomson, N. Satterly, K. Antony and C. Habl. 
Lægemiddelstyrelsen [The Danish Health and Medicines Authority]. Receptpligtige lægemidler med 
klausuleret tilskud, 02.07.2012 2012 [cited 19.07.2012. Available from http://laegemiddelstyrelsen.dk/ftp-
upload/Oversigt_over_receptpligtige_laegemidler_med_klausuleret_tilskud.PDF. 
Lexchin, J. 2011. COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHARMACEUTICALS: A POLICY IN 
EVOLUTION? International Journal of Health Services 41 (2):337-354. 
Lilford, R. J. 2010. MS risk sharing scheme Response from chair of scientific advisory committee. British 
Medical Journal 341. 
Martini, N, P  Folino Gallo, and S Montilla. 2007. Italy pharma profile. In Pharmaceutical Pricing and 
Reimbursement Information, edited by T. Lyager Thomson, N. Satterley, S. Vogler and C. Leopold. 
McCabe, C, L Bergmann, N Bosanquet, M Ellis, H Enzmann, M von Euler, B Jönsson, KJ Kallen, D Newling, B 
Paschen, R de Wilde, N Wilking, C Teale, H Zwierzina, and Biotherapy Development Association. 2009. 
Market and patient access to new oncology products in Europe: a current, multidisciplinary perspective. 
Annals of Oncology 20 (3):403-412. 
McCabe, C., J. Chilcott, K. Claxton, P. Tappenden, C. Cooper, J. Roberts, N. Cooper, and K. Abrams. 2010. 
Continuing the multiple sclerosis risk sharing scheme is unjustified. British Medical Journal 340. 
  147 
McCabe, CJ, T Stafinski, R Edlin, D Menon, and for and on behalf of the Banff AED Summit. 2010. Access 
with Evidence Development Schemes. A Framework for Description and Evaluation. Pharmacoeconomics 28 
(2):143-152. 
Menon, D, CJ McCabe, T Stafinski, R Edlin, and on behalf of the signatories to the Consensus Statement. 
2010. Principles of Design of Access with Evidence Development Approaches. A Consensus Statement from 
the Banff Summit. Pharmacoeconomics 28 (2):109-111. 
Messori, A., V. Fadda, and S. Trippoli. 2011. A Uniform Procedure for Reimbursing the Off-Label Use of 
Antineoplastic Drugs According to the Value-for-Money Approach. Journal of Chemotherapy 23 (2):67-70. 
Møldrup, C. 2005. No cure, no pay. British Medical Journal 330:1262–4. 
Moldrup, C. 2004. [The "money back" concept is a new dimension in a rational pharmacotherapy]. Ugeskr 
Laeger 166 (26-31):2589-90. 
Muston, D., R. Perard, and F. Nixon. 2008. Characteristics of risk-sharing schemes in Europe. Value in Health 
11 (3):A49-A49. 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). List of technologies with approved patient access 
schemes, recommended by NICE for use in the NHS  2011 [cited 02/10/2011. Available from "  
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/howwework/paslu/ListOfPatientAccessSchemesApprovedAsPartOfANIC
EAppraisal.jsp. 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, NICE. 2010. Erlotinib for the tratment of non-small-cell 
lung cancer. In NICE technology appraisal guidance 162. 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, NICE. 2011. Erlotinib monotherapy for maintenance 
treatment of non-small-cell lung cancer. In NICE technology appraisal guidance 227. 
Network, European Healthcare Innovation Leadership. 2007. Value for money in pharmaceuticals: fostering 
constructive collaboration among stakeholders. 
NHS Devon. Peninsula collaborative commissioning for drugs and health technologies  2011 [cited 
05.12.2011. Available from 
http://www.devonpct.nhs.uk/Treatments/Pen_coll_comm_for_drugs_and_health_tec.aspx. 
NHS Devon. 2011. Risk Sharing Schemes (RSS) and Patient Access Schemes (PAS). 
Niezen, MGH  , EA   Stolk, A  Steenhoek, and CA Uyl-De Groot. 2006. Inequalities in Oncology Care: 
Economic Consequences of High Cost Drugs. European Journal of Cancer 42 (17):2887-2892. 
OECD. 2010. Value for Money in Health Spending. In OECD Health Policy Studies Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
Persson, U., M. Willis, and K. Odegaard. 2010. A case study of ex ante, value-based price and 
reimbursement decision-making: TLV and rimonabant in Sweden. European Journal of Health Economics 11 
(2):195-203. 
  148 
Pickin, M., C. L. Cooper, T. Chater, A. O'Hagan, K. R. Abrams, N. J. Cooper, M. Boggild, J. Palace, G. Ebers, J. 
B. Chilcott, P. Tappenden, and J. Nicholl. 2009. The Multiple Sclerosis Risk Sharing Scheme Monitoring 
Study--early results and lessons for the future. BMC Neurol 9:1. 
PortalFarma, Organizaciòn farmacéutica colegial. Cataluña estrena el pago de fàrmacos segùn su eficacia. 
Published 23 November 2011 2011. Available from 
http://www.portalfarma.com/pfarma/noticias.nsf/0/70EC28616F345077C1257951003C7830?OpenDocum
ent. 
Pudersell, K, A Vetka, L Rootslane, M  Mathiesen, K  Vendla, and J  Laasalu. 2007. Estonia pharma profile. In 
Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information, edited by T. Lyager Thomson, K. de Joncheere, N. 
Satterly and C. Habl. 
Pugatch, M, P Healy, and R Chu. 2010. Sharing the Burden: Could risk-sharing change the way we pay for 
healthcare? London: Stockholm Network. 
Raftery, J. 2010. Multiple sclerosis risk sharing scheme: a costly failure. British Medical Journal 340. 
Renaudin, MN. 2010. Risk Sharing For Reimbursement and Pricing of Drugs: The French Practical 
Experience. The Official News & Technical Journal of the ISPOR. 
Richards, R. G. 2010. MS risk sharing scheme Some clarification needed. British Medical Journal 341. 
Russo, P, FS Mennini, PD Siviero, and G Rasi. 2010. Time to market and patient access to new oncology 
products in Italy: a multistep pathway from European context to regional health care providers. Annals of 
Oncology 21 (10):2081-2087. 
Rutten, FFH, CA Uyl-de Groot, and AG Vulto. 2009. Innovative payment systems for medicines in Europe. 
European Journal of Hospital Pharmacy Practice 15 (3):60-62. 
Scolding, N. 2010. The multiple sclerosis risk sharing scheme. Despite being flawed, has had unintended 
beneficial consequences. British Medical Journal 340:1255-1256. 
Scottish Medicines Consortium, (SMC). Patient Access Scheme  2011 [cited 29.11.2011. Available from 
http://www.scottishmedicines.org.uk/Submission_Process/Submission_Guidance_and_Templates_for_Ind
ustry/Patient-Access-Schemes. 
Senior, M. 2009. Pricing experiments: Germans get creative in Germany. In Vivo 27 (7):1-7. 
Siviero, P. D. 2011. The experience of Managed Entry Agreements in Italy. In Capacity building on managed 
entry agreements for innovative medicines. Presentation at the EU meeting on MEAs in Rome 14.11.2011. 
Stafinski, T, CJ McCabe, and D Menon. 2010. Funding the Unfundable. Mechanisms for Managing 
Uncertainty in Decisions on the Introduction of New and Innovative Technologies into Healthcare Systems. 
Pharmacoeconomics 28 (2):113-142. 
Stafinski, T., C. McCabe, and D. Menon. 2010. Funding the unfundable: Mechanisms for managing 
uncertainty in decisions on the introduction of new and innovative technologies into healthcare systems. 
Pharmacoeconomics 28 (2):113-142. 
  149 
Stichting Farmaceutische Kengetallen. 2010. Monitor Dure Geneesmiddelen 2008. Kosten van dure- en 
weesgeneesmiddelen in het ziekenhuis. 
Sudlow, C. L., and C. E. Counsell. 2003. Problems with UK government's risk sharing scheme for assessing 
drugs for multiple sclerosis. BMJ 326 (7385):388-92. 
Teixeira, I , and I Vieira. 2008. Portugal pharma profile. In Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement 
Information, edited by S. Vogler and S. Morak. 
Tomino, C, A Addis, L.  De Nigro, L Periotto, E Xoxi, M De Rosa, A  Covezzoli, E Fedozzi, A Bosio, V Mozzi, MT 
Marano, A Pezzi, and L Martuzzi. 2011. Registro farmaci antidiabetici sottoposti a monitoraggio. Rapporto 
farmaci incretino-mimetici e DPP-4 inibitori. Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco. 
Tomino, C, A Venegoni, A Addis, L De Nigro, L Periotto, E Xoxi, M De Rosa, E Fedozzi, A Covezzoli, V Mozzi, G 
Valenti, A Bosio, AP Maggioni, F Bianchini, P Priami, and B Del Taglia. 2010. Registro farmaci cardiovascolari 
sottoposti a monitoraggio. Rapporto finale Ivabradina. Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco. 
Towse, A, and LP Garrison. 2010. Can’t Get No Satisfaction? Will Pay for Performance Help? Toward an 
Economic Framework for Understanding Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Agreements for Innovative 
Medical Products. Pharmacoeconomics 28 (2):93-102. 
Towse, A. 2010. Value based pricing, research and development, and patient access schemes. Will the 
United Kingdom get it right or wrong? British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 70 (3):360-366. 
Trueman, P, DL Grainger, and KE Downs. 2010. Coverage with Evidence Development: Applications and 
issues. International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 26 (1):79-85. 
UK Department of Health, and ABPI. 2008. The pharmaceutical price regulation scheme 2009. 
Van der Meersch, H. 2012. Risk-sharing and value-based pricing agreements: the Belgian experience. 
Presentation at the managed entry agreement meeting in Rome, 21 May 2012. 
Vogler, S, J Espin, and C Habl. 2009. Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information (PPRI) – New 
PPRI analysis including Spain. Pharmaceutical Policy and Law 11 (3):213-234 
 
Wettermark, B , B  Godman, C  Eriksson, E  van Ganse, S  Garattini, R Joppi, RE  Malmström, K Paterson, and 
L. L. Gustafsson. 2010. Einführung neuer Arzneimittel in europäische Gesundheitssysteme. GGW – Das 
Wissenschaftsforum in Gesundheit und Gesellschaft 10 (3):24-34. 
Whalen, J. 2007. Europe's Drug Insurers Try Pay-for-Performance. Wall Street Journal, 12 October 2007. 
Wilk, N. 2012. Faces of Risk Sharing in Poland. Current Legal Framework and Practice. Paper read at 4th 
Annual Pharmaceutical Pricing & Reimbursement In Central & Eastern Europe, 16.01.2012, at Bratislava, 
Slovakia. 
Willis, M, U Persson, Y Zoellner, and B Gradl. 2010. Reducing Uncertainty in Value-Based Pricing Using 
Evidence Development 
  150 
Agreements. The Case of Continuous Intraduodenal Infusion of Levodopa/Carbidopa (Duodopa) in Sweden. 
Applied Journal of Health Policy 8 (6):377-386. 
Wlodarczyk, JH, LG Cleland, AM Keogh, KD McNeil, K Perl, RG Weintraub, and TJ Williams. 2006. Public 
Funding of Bosentan for the Treatment of Pulmonary Artery Hypertension in Australia: Cost Effectiveness 
and Risk Sharing. 
Zaric, GS, and BJ O'Brien. 2005. Analysis of a pharmaceutical risk sharing agreement based on the 
purchaser’s total budget. Health Economics 14 (8):793-803. 
Zaric, GS, and B Xie. 2009. The Impact of Two Pharmaceutical Risk-Sharing Agreements on Pricing, 
Promotion, and Net Health Benefits. Value in Health 12 (5):838-845. 
 
 
